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Preface
The urgency for decoupling escalating resource use and environmental degradation from economic growth is now widely acknowledged by policy-makers, industry leaders and civil society. Indeed, it has become a key issue in the on-going deliberations on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Decoupling lies at the heart of the mission of the International Resource Panel. 
Established by UNEP in 2007, the Panel provides independent, coherent, authoritative and 
policy relevant scientific assessments on the management of natural resources and the 
environment for the highest net benefit of present and future generations. Its analysis, 
based on full lifecycle impacts of resource use, has repeatedly highlighted the importance 
of decoupling for ensuring that the gains in human well-being made by economies are not 
lost because of the simultaneous costs arising from resource scarcity and environmental 
destruction.
In its first Decoupling report published in 2011, the Panel showed that breaking the link 
between human well-being and resource consumption is necessary and possible but in 
reality is hardly happening. In this follow-up report – “Decoupling 2” – the Panel highlights 
existing technological possibilities and opportunities for both developing and developed 
countries to accelerate decoupling and reap the environmental and economic benefits of 
increased resource productivity. 
Many decoupling technologies and techniques that deliver significant resource productivity 
increases are already commercially available and used in both developing and developed 
economies. They allow economic output to be achieved with fewer resource inputs, 
reducing waste and saving costs that can further expand the economy or reduce its 
exposure to resource risks.
But while these technologies are readably available, their uptake and upscaling requires 
policies to remove barriers to decoupling and intentionally promote a transition towards 
greater resource productivity. Economies often do not naturally adjust to changes in 
resource availability by promoting innovation and resource productivity; they can suffer 
from blocks to transition which “lock-in” existing patterns of resource use. The legacy of 
past policy decisions and technological, behavioural, organisational and institutional biases 
against innovation in resource productivity present significant barriers to decoupling.
Facilitating decoupling will thus require removing these barriers and overcoming the 
“lock-in”. Developing countries may have a relative advantage in decoupling, because 
they are not so strongly locked-in by resource-intensive consumption patterns, production 
systems, infrastructure and institutions as in the developed world. But in both cases, 
raising resource productivity is easier and more successful when policymakers are 
sensitive to the perceived needs of stakeholders and the interests, relative power, the 
norms and assumptions that shape economic and societal decisions. 
XIII
Obviously, a high level of leadership is needed in the public and private sectors to 
overcome the resistance that is commonly faced by such deep policy changes and to 
promote the needed policy action.
This report examines several policy options that have proved to be successful in 
helping different countries to improve resource productivity in various sectors of their 
economy. It also highlights examples that demonstrate significant progress towards 
decoupling economic growth from resource use. 
In particular, the report mentions two policy proposals which are illustrative of the type 
of combined policy that is needed. One proposal uses taxation or subsidy reduction 
to move resource prices upwards in line with documented increases of energy or 
resource productivity.  Another looks to shift revenue-raising onto resource prices 
through resource taxation at source or in relation to product imports, with recycling of 
revenues back to the economy.
There is growing evidence that decoupling will be one of the next big opportunities 
for innovation, wise use of resources, and thus for continued economic development. 
Policymakers along with corporate leaders with vision and an understanding of 
political realities can take significant steps to benefit from future resource trends and 
decoupling opportunities.
The International Resource Panel is committed to continue providing cutting-edge 
scientific knowledge on sustainable resource management and promote a better 
understanding of the opportunities of decoupling technologies and policies. We are 
grateful to the lead authors of this report for their encouraging findings and incisive 
recommendations, and we are very much looking forward to the reaction of policy-
makers to the tremendous challenges and opportunities highlighted in this report 
for overcoming the barriers to decoupling and collecting the economic benefits of 
increased resource productivity.
 
Dr. Ashok Khosla 
Co-Chair, 
International Resource Panel (IRP)
New Delhi, India, May 2014
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Foreword
One of the greatest challenges facing humanity today is to maintain the healthy growth necessary to lift the world’s one billion people out of absolute poverty and manage the natural resources required for the well-being of nine billion people by 2050 – all while keeping environmental impacts within acceptable limits and 
sustaining life’s natural support system.
The first Decoupling Report by UNEP's International Resource Panel (IRP), launched in 
2011, sought to apply the concept of “decoupling” economic growth and human well-
being from negative environmental impacts and escalating resource use to address this 
challenge.
Improving the rate of resource productivity (doing more with less) faster than the economic 
growth rate is the notion behind decoupling, to the extent of actually using less resources. 
That goal, however, demands an urgent rethink of the links between resource use and 
economic prosperity, buttressed by a massive investment in technological, financial and 
social innovation, to at least stabilise and ultimately reduce per capita consumption in 
wealthy countries and help developing nations follow a more sustainable path.
The IRP’s new Decoupling 2 report demonstrates that the worldwide use of natural 
resources has accelerated, causing severe environmental damage and depletion of natural 
resources.
Annual material extraction grew by a factor of eight through the twentieth century. At 
the same time, the use of resources, such as freshwater, land and soil has transgressed 
sustainable levels.
This explosion in demand is set to accelerate as population growth and the increase in 
incomes continue to rise. More than 3 billion people are expected to enjoy “middle class” 
income levels in the next twenty years, compared to 1.8 billion today.
A global economy, based on the current consumption models, is not sustainable and 
carries significant economic consequences. Price volatility and supply shocks of resources 
have already been observed across a range of key materials and commodities. The volatility 
of food prices, for example, increased to 22.4 per cent in 2000-2012 compared to 7.7 per 
cent in the previous decade.
Placing the world’s environmental resources – such as water, biomass, fish stocks and 
ecosystems – under too much stress can lead to sudden, non-linear collapse. Over-mining 
has led to a decline in average ore grades for several key metals, such as copper, gold 
and tin. As a result, three times as much resources and materials needs to be moved for 
the same quantity of metal extraction as a century ago.  Global markets cannot respond 
adequately by simply raising the supply of resources to meet demand, especially when they 
are not set up to factor in the anticipated scarcity of resources.  
XV
The decoupling of economic growth rates from resource use is, therefore, more than just 
an imperative. It is the next big opportunity for green economic growth, innovation and 
sustainable development at large.
 
The Decoupling 2 report highlights that efficient technologies do exist for both developing 
and developed countries to significantly reduce resource intensity and, where feasible, 
achieve the absolute decoupling of resource use. Decoupling allows economic output to be 
achieved with fewer resource inputs, reducing waste and saving capital. Those funds can 
further expand the economy or reduce its exposure to resource risks.
This new IRP report also explores the enabling environment required for national 
economies to promote decoupling and prosper in the future, through identifying and 
removing barriers, including technical and institutional “lock-in”, which can hold back 
effective policy change. 
The report concludes that with leadership, vision and an understanding of political realities, 
policy makers can take significant steps to reap benefits from future resource trends. 
These steps include the creation of favorable conditions for investment in technological and 
institutional innovation and transformation.
In 2014, the United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals will 
submit a proposal to the General Assembly that will set development priorities for the 
coming years. 
It is my sincere hope that the findings of this important report will inspire Member States to 
embed sustainable resource management and the concept of decoupling in the post-2015 
development agenda, and trigger visionary political and business leadership to foster policy 
co-ordination in the public and private domain aimed at effectively decoupling economic 
growth  from the escalating use of energy, land, water and materials.   
I would like to express my gratitude to the International Resource Panel, under the 
leadership of Ashok Khosla and Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, for coordinating this 
important report.
Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary-General and 
UNEP Executive Director 
Nairobi, Kenya, May 2014
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Decoupling 2: 
Technologies, opportunities and policy options 
1 Introduction
As the work of the International Resource Panel (IRP) shows, the worldwide use of natural 
resources has accelerated, bringing with it the thinning or depletion of numerous resource 
stocks and causing negative environmental impacts (UNEP, 2010a). Adjusting our societies 
to these trends is one of the grand challenges of our times. The trends in resource use 
suggest that successful economies will be the ones that can increase the value they 
deliver, while using fewer resources. 
This report highlights existing technological possibilities, for developing and developed 
countries, and the economic advantages. It shows that there is growing evidence that 
decoupling will be one of the next big opportunities for economic growth, innovation and 
wise use of resources. The report explores the actions that a country would need to take to 
create the conditions for its economy to prosper in the future. 
It finds that policymakers with leadership, vision and an understanding of political realities 
can take steps to benefit from the future resource trends. The report identifies the barriers 
that can hold back effective policy change, and examines technological, organisational 
and policy options that have proved to be successful in different regions of the world. It 
highlights the forms of policy action that can make faster progress towards the decoupling 
of economic growth from use of resources.
2 Changes in Resource Use and Scarcity
Trends in resource use
During the twentieth century, the annual 
extraction of ores and minerals grew by a 
factor of 27, construction materials by a 
factor of 34, fossil fuels by a factor of 12 and 
biomass by a factor of 3.6. In total, material 
extraction increased by a factor of about 
eight. The extraction of many metals has 
followed an essentially exponential growth 
path since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as Figure 0.1 shows.
Figure 0.1 Extraction of many metals grew 
exponentially since the year 1900 (the ordinate on the 
picture being logarithmic) From: Sverdrup et al, 2013
Executive Summary
3Other reports have illustrated that the use of some natural resources essential to 
prosperity – including freshwater, land and soils, and fish – have similarly increased, in 
many cases beyond sustainable levels. 
The underlying drivers for this explosion in demand appear set to continue. The UN 
projects global population to grow by more than 2.5 billion people by 2050 (UN, 2013) and 
incomes (on average) are on track to continue rising. According to one estimate, in 20 
years there will be 3 billion more people worldwide enjoying ”middle class” income levels, 
compared to 1.8 billion today (Kharas, 2010).
In our first Decoupling report, we described three future scenarios for resource use. 
In the scenario which represents many policymakers’ current plans – in which levels 
of resource use per head for all global citizens reached the levels of current use of the 
average European – annual resource extraction would need to triple by 2050, compared to 
extraction in 2000. This probably exceeds all possible measures of available resources and 
assessments of the limits of the planet to absorb the impacts of their extraction and use. 
For example, global demand for water is expected to rise by 40%, so that in 20 years’ time 
available supplies may probably satisfy only 60% of world demand (2030 Water Resources 
Group, 2009). 
Consequences of these changes
It does not seem possible for a global economy based on the current high-consumption 
model of resources to continue into the future. The economic consequences of increasing 
resource use are already apparent in three areas:  increases in resource prices, increased 
price volatility and disruption of environmental systems.
Price increases: During most of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
commodity prices had a tendency of 
declining. But recent developments of 
massively increased demand have caused the 
reverse, as shown in Figure 0.2.
Figure 0.2 Commodity price indices 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data, 2011. 
Increased price volatility: Price volatility and 
supply shocks have already been observed across a range of key materials and commodities 
used in the economy. For instance, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
found that the volatility of food prices increased to 22.4 per cent in 2000-12 compared to 7.7 
per cent in 1990-991. Price volatility can be more disruptive than trends of price increase – 
some believe that rising global food prices led to civil dissatisfaction which fuelled the “Arab 
Spring” (see for example: Center for Climate Change and Security, 2013).
Disruption of environmental systems: There are strong links between resource use and 
damage and depletion of environmental systems, including greenhouse gas emissions 
(UNEP, 2010a). The UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment documented several 
accelerating, abrupt, and potentially irreversible changes already occurring to the world’s 
1 Measured by the standard deviation around the average price.  However, note that before 1990, food prices were also volatile, having a higher standard deviation than in 
the years 2000-12.
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4
ecosystems, and a number anticipated to occur in the coming decades. These include 
possible fishery collapses, bleaching of coral reefs, desertification, increased vulnerability 
to natural disasters, and crop failures (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Studies 
show that such environmental deterioration is affecting economies and economic growth 
(Stern, 2006; Brown, 2008). 
There are several reasons why the market is unlikely to respond adequately to these 
challenges by simply raising supply of resources to meet demand. 
  The scale and rate of change has accelerated, and often outpaces the supply side 
response. 
  There are real physical constraints: past mining of the most attractive ores has led to 
declining average ore grades for several key metals, such as copper, gold or tin, so 
that, for many metals, about three times as much material needs to be moved for the 
same quantity of metal extraction as a century ago. 
  For environmental resources – like climate, fish stocks or local ecosystems, too much 
stress may lead to sudden, non-linear collapse (Smith et al., 2010). 
  And, importantly, markets are not adequately set up to factor in much of the expected 
scarcity of resources – but rather reflect today’s extraction cost of still conveniently 
available ores.
Strategic implications 
The resource trends have strategic implications for economies. They appear likely to 
alter the relative importance of resources compared to other inputs into production – and 
in doing so change the basis of relative competitive advantage between countries. This 
implies that the economies that move first, or fastest, to adapt to the changed economic 
conditions stand to gain and bring greater security and wealth to their populations.
As the current model of development is not sustainable in the long term, a real change 
of course will be needed, significantly changing technologies, policies and consumption 
habits. Some commentators believe that the economic growth of many developing 
countries means that they, compared to those developed countries that are in some 
situations locked in wasteful infrastructures and habits, have more opportunities to adapt, 
and so can gain more from change.
At the same time, trends in resource use increase the risks of disruption to economic 
growth from potential resource scarcity and shocks, including environmental degradation 
and possible collapse. These often cause more severe effects in developing countries, 
than in richer economies.
3 Choices of Response for Policymakers
For economic prosperity and growth, one of the most appealing strategies for adapting is 
decoupling (UNEP, 2011 and Smith et al., 2010) – the seizing of opportunities for resource 
productivity, so that a nation can produce greater economic value out of fewer resource 
inputs (both material and energy) per unit of value2. When considering changes, decision-
makers need to look as closely as they can at the productivity changes in the resources 
that matter most to them.  Aggregate figures for resource use – which are frequently the 
most available – may not reflect the possibilities for decoupling economic growth from 
some particularly important resources.
2 Growth is more strongly decoupled where a greater share of an economy’s growth comes from resource productivity relative to labour productivity
5Decoupling, can mean different achievements. We propose to distinguish between three 
types of decoupling: 
1.  Decoupling through maturation. This type of decoupling is a ”natural” process of 
overcoming clumsy and inefficient techniques, of building-up of infrastructures, and 
of actively reducing environmental pollution. This is related to the maturation process 
as countries shift from an extraction and production-based economy towards a service 
economy.
2.  Decoupling through shifting to other countries the more material intensive stages in 
product life cycles (burden-shifting). If domestic extraction and production is replaced by 
imported materials and products, resource use may decline domestically, but still occur 
elsewhere in the world where the more material intensive, often more polluting, stages 
in products life cycles may be taking place. This type of decoupling is often labelled as 
burden-shifting, where resource-intensive activities and their environmental impacts are 
shifted offshore.
3.  Decoupling through intentional resource productivity increase. This is what is really 
needed to reduce pressures on limited resources, on climate, and on the environment 
in general. It requires technological innovation, infrastructures conducive to resource 
efficient and low material intensity manufacturing and living, and appropriate attitudes 
and consumption patterns. Intentional decoupling is the main focus of this report. 
Investments in resource productivity can bring multiple gains, ranging from reduced 
operational costs for companies and the public sector to better environmental quality 
and the creation of jobs (Smith et al., 2010). For example, energy efficiency policies in 
California are estimated to have created nearly 1.5 million jobs from 1977 to 2007. Similar 
figures emerged from Germany’s resource productivity policies in the years before 2004, 
creating or saving more than 1 million jobs (Fischer et al., 2004).
Economic growth comes, partly, through investments in innovations, and policymakers 
can influence the nature of the innovations that receive investment through their enabling 
policies.  A vivid visualisation of the relationship between innovation and economic growth 
is given by “Kondratiev cycles” (Freeman and Louçã, 2001). Economic growth has been 
observed to come in waves of prosperity, each driven by the spread of new technologies 
and structural economic change. Figure 0.3 illustrates the way that growth usually 
involves changes in technologies.  
Figure 0.3 Kondratiev cycles. Source: Allianz Global Investors “The Sixth Kondratieff” – Long waves 
of prosperity, 2010. The description of the sixth Kondratieff suggests that resource productivity could 
become the overarching characteristic of the new cycle
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6
Considering the trends in global resource use and environmental degradation, we might 
expect a well-functioning economy to naturally respond to information on resource scarcity 
by increasing innovations in resource productivity. That implies that decoupling would be 
one of the drivers of the next period of growth in successful economies.
In practice, there are several barriers and biases that hold back the desired improvements, 
meaning that the steep rise in resource productivity requires courageous policy changes 
(UNEP, 2011; pp. 48, 74). In the past era of declining resource prices, business has tended to 
focus on increasing labour productivity – with the result that labour productivity has grown 
at faster rates than other factors of productivity (Figure 0.4). 
Figure 0.4 Resource Productivity, Labour Productivity and Energy Productivity. 
Source: EEA, 2011
While the existing policy set may have been suitable for promoting growth in the past, it 
seems unlikely to meet the challenges of the future. The trends in resources imply that to 
maintain stable future economies and natural life support systems, resource productivity 
increases would need to be greater than the rate of economic growth for the world as 
a whole. This is called “decoupling”. Decoupling can either reduce the use of resources 
absolutely as an economy grows, or only relatively – so that the rate of increase in 
resource use is lower than the growth rate of the economy. With absolute decoupling, in 
contrast, resource use declines, irrespective of the growth rate of the economies.
Indeed, for resources – although pressures differ greatly by resource and country – 
approximately a factor five improvement (Weizsäcker et al., 2009) in total resource 
productivity by 2050 would be required for OECD countries (resulting in just 20 per cent 
of today’s material usage/unit of production), including also the resources embedded in 
the goods and services they import from other countries.  This implies that each unit of 
production is produced using between 25 per cent and 10 per cent of its current resource 
inputs by 2050 (WBCSD, 2010), a much greater rate than resource productivity gains 
previously seen.
For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment 
Report, published in 2007, warns that to maintain an agreeable kind of climate, global 
emissions need to peak by 2015, and then reduce by 25-40 per cent by 2020 and 80 per 
cent by 2050. OECD countries would need to absolutely decouple their growth from 
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7their greenhouse gas emissions, at a rate that would give more room to developing 
countries to raise living standards until they too can achieve absolute decoupling. Apart 
from greenhouse gas emissions, such decoupling is also needed for a number of other 
resources such as forestry, fishery, food, waste, air pollution, minerals. The IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report, published in October 2013, also confirms these findings.
The required intentional policy change should influence all aspects of economic and 
environmental policies, with a view of facilitating their economy’s transition to absolute 
decoupling.
Knowing that relative decoupling will not suffice on a global scale, the focus of this report 
is on the opportunities for countries to pursue strategies of better lives for their people 
while significantly reducing resource intensity and consumption patterns and, where 
feasible, even achieving absolute decoupling of resource use. As an encouragement for 
decoupling policies, our report shows that:
  The potential exists for much greater levels of absolute decoupling to be achieved 
through strategic changes in technologies and design. Much of the technologies and 
technique “know how” to achieve significant levels of resource productivity (as much 
as five to tenfold improvements) already exist. A number of publications over the 
last 15 years (Hawken et al., 1999; McDonough and Braungart, 2002; Hargroves and 
Smith, 2005; Pascala and Socolow, 2004; Pauli, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Lovins and 
RMI, 2011) have shown that decoupling is technically possible for material resource 
consumption, greenhouse gases, and water extraction. (Chapter 3)
  Success stories exist of countries that achieved some modest absolute decoupling 
of economic growth from selected aspects of resource use and greenhouse gas 
emissions, from which we can learn. (Chapters 6 and 7)
  Much of the policy “know how” required to achieve economy wide “decoupling” 
exists in the form of legislation, incentive systems, administrative measures, and 
institutional reform. But additional policy options could be opened for a yet more 
strategic and long-term avenue towards ecologically sound growth. (Chapters 7 and 8) 
4 Technological Responses Allowing Significant Decoupling
Increasing resource productivity is technologically possible: technologies and techniques 
that bring very significant resource productivity gains are already available, right across 
the range of resource consuming activities, with different technologies applicable at 
different levels of economic development.
The Rathkerewwa Desiccated Coconut Industry (RDCI) in Maspotha, Sri Lanka, provides 
a good example. RDCI could reduce 12 per cent of energy use, 8 per cent of material 
use and 68 per cent of water use, while increasing the production by 8 per cent during 
the same period by adopting a series of recommendations on its peeling process, water 
treatment, and fuel switching. The total investment required for implementing these 
recommendations was less than US$5,000, while an annual financial return of about 
US$300,000 was reported.3 Sweden introduced an energy efficiency programme in 2005 for 
its energy intensive industries. A recent analysis showed average payback periods of less 
than 1.5 years (Stenqvist and Nilsson, 2013).
3  For details, see  http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/Environmental_Management/Cleaner_Production/RECP_SriLanka.pdf
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The wide range of existing opportunities is illustrated by Figure 0.5. Our report describes 
some of the more remarkable technologies and techniques.
Figure 0.5 Mapping the range of opportunities for resource productivity gains. 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute. Resource Revolution (2011)
The scale of the opportunity is very large. One estimate places the savings potential 
between US$2.9 trillion and US$3.7 trillion each year (by 2030). Ninety per cent of the 
opportunities had an internal rate of return of greater than 10 per cent, if adjusted for 
subsidies, carbon prices and a social discount rate (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011).4 The 
following examples provide an illustration of some of the potential:
High-efficiency motors: These could potentially save 28-50% of motor energy use, with 
a typical payback period of one to three years (CADDET, 1995). Electric motors used 
in industry in China account for around 60 per cent of the country’s total electricity 
consumption. The operational efficiency of these motors is 10-30 per cent below 
international best practice, depending on the industry. A pilot study at China’s second-
largest oil field suggested there was the potential to save more than 400 million kilowatt 
hours (kWh) of electricity per year in the oil field, with a payback period for recovery of the 
initial investment of 1.6 years (UNEP, 2010b).
Higher strength steel: Using steel with higher strength for re-enforcement of concrete, 
beams and columns saves steel: ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steel company 
estimates use of higher strength steel achieves a 32 per cent reduction in the weight of 
steel columns and 19 per cent in beams (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011, p. 105). China 
and developing countries tend to use lower-strength steel, with China using steel for 
reinforcement that is two-thirds the strength of steel averagely used in Europe. This offers 
a very good opportunity – as these countries’ use of steel is very significant. (For example, 
China currently consumes 60 per cent of global steel reinforcement bar production.) 
Even partial global switching to higher strength steel could save 105 million tonnes of 
steel a year, and save 20 per cent of the costs of the use of steel (Allwood, J. and Cullen, 
J., 2012).
4 The study suggests also that 70% of the opportunities have a greater than 10% IRR at current prices. The higher figure (3.7 trillion) applies if carbon is appropriately 
priced and perverse subsidies phased out.
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9Blanking sheet metal: The pressing out (or “blanking”) of metal components of different 
size and shape from sheet metal necessarily leaves behind pieces of sheet metal that 
are not wanted and too small to use for other components. Intelligent organisation of 
the different shapes to be pressed out can realise significant metal savings. Deutsche 
Mechatronics GmbH operates in Germany using computer-driven shuffling and a good 
production planning system that could reduce metal use by 12 per cent.
Methane from waste landfill: In the United States of America (USA), approximately 480 
landfill sites, representing around 27 per cent of the nation’s landfills, capture released 
methane gas from decomposing organic waste (2009 figures) (Bracmort et al., 2009).  It 
is estimated that between 60 and 90 per cent of the methane in the landfill gas can be 
captured and burnt. Nevertheless, methane from landfills contributes 1.8 per cent to the 
US total greenhouse gas emissions. 
Drip irrigation: Agriculture is responsible for 70% of freshwater withdrawals (Weizsäcker 
et al., 2009). In many countries, 90 per cent of irrigated land receives irrigation water 
through open channels or by intentional flooding. The waste of freshwater through these 
methods, through evaporation, leakage and seepage is high. Farmers in India, Israel, 
Jordan, Spain and the USA have shown that sub-surface drip irrigation systems that 
deliver water directly to crop roots can reduce water use by 30-70 per cent and raise crop 
yields by 20-90 per cent, depending on the crop (Postel et al., 2001).  Efficiency savings can 
be as high as 50-80 per cent, and can be made affordable for use in the developing world 
(Shah and Keller, 2002) with payback periods of less than a year.
5 Creating the Conditions for Investments in Resource Productivity
Success comes from creating the right conditions for investment
Policymakers can facilitate the widespread uptake of technologies and techniques for 
decoupling. A wealth of experience from policies on innovation, decoupling and environment 
can guide future policy action. Lessons can be learned from some great successes: for 
example in water efficiency. In Australia, GDP rose by 30 per cent and water consumption 
was reduced in absolute terms by 40 per cent from 2001 to 2009 (Smith et al., 2010). 
Many countries have put in places policy mixes promoting decoupling. For example, 
at European Union (EU) level, recent initiatives, such as the 7th Environmental Action 
Programme and the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, and the Energy Efficiency 
Directive of 2012 are long-term strategies moving energy, climate change, research and 
innovation, industry, transport, agriculture, fisheries and environment policy all towards 
decoupling. 
The roadmap also deals with tax policy, making the case for a shift from labour taxes 
to resource taxes, and discusses the phasing out of environmentally harmful subsidies. 
Similarly, China has strategically improved energy efficiency writing 20 per cent and 16 per 
cent efficiency gains into its eleventh and twelfth Five-Year Plans respectively, and adopting 
regulation and incentives to make it happen. 
Whether, where and how decoupling occurs may depend on national decision makers’ 
abilities to overcome biases which currently disadvantage investments in resource 
productivity. Countries that can overcome those barriers can lead the next wave of 
development, and gain advantage over their competitors. 
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Changing current biases
There are currently several factors that lead to bias against investments in resource 
productivity and two areas of barriers for policymakers to tackle.  The first group arises 
from the effect of the historic policy framework. There a number of areas where current 
policy structures coming out of past government decisions steer economies away from 
resource productivity, examples of which are:
  Subsidies of up to US$1.1 trillion each year for resource consumption (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2011). These subsidies encourage the wasteful use of resources while 
reducing the savings from investments to use the resources more efficiently.  
  Taxation of people’s work through labour taxes is typically higher than the tax burden 
on resources (and energy). As labour and resources are often alternative inputs 
into economic growth, this favours resource consumption rather than increased 
employment. Together with distortions from subsidisation of resources, taxation 
reduces the return on investment in resource efficient technologies and techniques. 
Taking the economy as a whole, it encourages development of an economy that is more 
resource intensive than it needs to be.
  Regulatory frameworks for markets have often been created in ways that discourage 
long-term management of resources, but rather promote their wasteful early use. 
Market regulations that have worked well for old technologies may disadvantage the 
entry of new technologies. For instance, in some developed country energy markets, 
bidding systems for electricity supply have taken place one day in advance of electricity 
delivery. This has put operators of wind turbines at a disadvantage, because they can 
only reliably predict their electricity output three hours in advance (OECD, 2010).
The second group of factors holding back decoupling are biases against change. These 
can be seen as physical and technological biases, behavioural biases, organisational and 
institutional biases.
  Technological bias can arise because many technologies are used in conjunction with 
existing physical infrastructure, giving existing technologies a significant advantage 
over alternative technologies that would require different infrastructure (for example, 
the lack of electric vehicles’ recharging points compared to the large number of 
refuelling stations for oil-powered vehicles).
  Organisational and institutional biases arise from the way in which standard practices, 
cultural norms, accepted wisdom and rules influence peoples’ behaviours and the 
decisions they make.  To illustrate this with  one example from the finance sector: 
due to the internal incentives and controls found in many banks and financing 
organisations, positive financing decisions tend to be made in areas familiar to 
the professional expertise of staff. The lack of track record for the investment 
performance of new technologies makes them appear more risky, and places them 
at a severe disadvantage when investment decisions are made (Hudson et al., 2013).  
This represents a problem as meeting the world’s future consumption demands 
through resource efficient technologies (or supply side technologies) has been 
estimated to require around US$3 trillion of investment a year globally (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2011) for which the financing will need to be found. 
Both these groups of barriers need to be tackled to make full progress to a successful, 
resource-productive society. Policy changes can overcome these barriers. In doing so, 
11
it would create conditions where investments in resource productivity became more 
attractive than alternative investments, and open up the universe of opportunities offered 
by decoupling for both developed and developing countries.
‘Lock-in’ to political and economic structures 
Relatively few opportunities for beneficial policy change are currently taken up. Part of the 
reason for this seems to be that political systems have their own inertia, which often act 
as a brake on policy reform, or block it entirely. The close interaction in nearly all countries 
between political decision-making and economic interests can lead to what is called 
”systems lock-in” because the policy framework is difficult to change without change to 
economic interests and vice versa. Political processes can therefore act as barriers to 
decoupling, because:
  Frequently, policy is formed in response to the interests of leading economic 
groupings. Where these groupings are biased towards the current arrangements 
that have given them market power, they tend to engage strongly to preserve existing 
policy. This can be the case even as underlying conditions change (Iike resource 
availability). 
  Segmented policy-making governmental structures – with different ministers or 
departments favouring different specific interest groups – lead to policy inconsistency, 
with the effect of some policies being cancelled out by the indirect effect of others. 
This inconsistency, lack of clear direction and past records of changes in policy 
creates unpredictability and uncertainty about future investment return dependent on 
lasting policy change.
  The institutions through which policies are made often reflect existing norms, and 
change is often resisted, within the institutions (for example government departments) 
or industrial organisations shaping policy (Ekins and Salmons, 2010, p. 132). 
  Where economic interests are at stake, groups are likely to contest evidence showing 
the need for change. Where there is some degree of scientific uncertainty about the 
future (as is inevitable) this can be used to discredit unfavourable information. Even 
evidence gathered by governments seeking to promote innovation may be sceptically 
received and scrutinised for bias.  This rejection of, or unwillingness to hear, 
information demonstrating the benefits of change is a key barrier to achieving policy 
change – as success in policy reform often involves political and economic actors 
perception of their own self-interest to alter (Ekins and Salmons, 2010, p. 133-4).
  Policy-making procedures are often lengthy, and can have additional lead-in times 
before policy is expected to take effect – leading to lags in the policy framework in 
reaction to new information.
The inertia created by these political and procedural factors is frequently the primary 
barrier to successful decoupling. Understanding these aspects of the problem can assist 
policy makers in making further progress.
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6 Making progress with Resource Productivity
Action on policies
Policy change, in the face of this significant inertia, requires leadership.  A central part 
of this leadership will be a clear vision of a successful future economy, well adjusted 
to trends in resource use and scarcity. Many different policy changes can create these 
favourable conditions - chapter 7 of this report gives some illustrations of past and 
current policies in both developed and developing countries.  So, there are opportunities 
for leadership for many people. This includes individuals working within organisations 
and institutions across most parts of government, the economy and civil society 
(including consumers). Inside government, there are opportunities for decision-makers 
with influence on policies regarding industry, development, innovation, environment, 
employment, and taxation. 
This wealth of options for areas for positive change arises because decoupling is often 
best stimulated by creating favourable conditions for investment in resource productive 
innovation, and letting market forces provide the best solutions. For these kind of changes, 
there is clearly no “one size fits all” prescription or instrument, but some common 
features can be identified for policies aiming at ambitious goals of decoupling including: 
  For decoupling, policy needs long-term objectives and the creation of incentives for 
others that align with those long-term objectives.
  Using a mix of policies simultaneously can maximise the potential for innovation and 
avoid unwanted knock-on effects in other parts of the economy.
  The potential of resource productivity is increased when policymakers consider the 
full set of interactions that their policy affects. Reaching the right decisions on policy 
will probably involve consideration of the indirect effects of a change on resources at 
each of the life-cycle stages of production and consumption.
  Although this report uses technological potential as the entry point into a transition 
to resource productivity, policies are also needed that encourage changes in 
consumption patterns – and support the community to consider arranging their 
daily habits, their homes and their nutrition so as to consume fewer resources while 
achieving improvements in quality of life. 
Unlocking change in policies
Replacement, reform or complementary addition to parts of the old policy framework, and 
the reduction of the biases against decoupling is possible, and has often been achieved. 
Success in creating the conditions for decoupling would need to unlock the observed 
resistance to policy reform. In this task, the chances of success appear higher where the 
policymaker looks at the institutional framework in which the political decision is made.  
In practice for changes to policy, this means being aware of the set of actors who are able 
to influence the decision, their interests, relative power and the norms and assumptions 
which are shaping the decision. Those seeking change:
 “... need to become adept at institutional analysis, identifying those elements supportive, 
or hostile to, the reform in question, and work to strengthen the more supportive 
elements and weaken the more hostile ones.” (Ekins and Salmons, 2010, p. 132)
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For example, there are frequently synergies between policies for decoupling and other 
policy goals. These can be used to win support for policy change.  This was the case in 
Germany which introduced a relevant tax reform from 1999-2003 in five consecutive steps, 
eventually shifting some €18 billion annually from indirect labour charges to taxes on 
energy. One motive for the tax reform was to reduce incentives for environmental harm, 
but it also allowed the corresponding reduction of other taxes on labour that lead to an 
estimated gain of 250,000 jobs (Knigge and Görlach, 2005). The World Bank’s summary of 
benefits from an environmental fiscal reform (World Bank, 2005) gives one illustration of 
the potential achievement of multiple goals. (Figure 0.6).
Figure 0.6 Assumed benefits from an Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR). 
Source: World Bank, 2005, l.c., p. 18
Based on past experience with policy changes5, success in decoupling appears to be more 
likely where policymakers seeking change:
  Take account of the potential losers from policy change, and consider what will bring 
enough of them to favour change. 
  Help those affected by change to focus their innovation towards a consensus future 
goal, by changing their expectations of the future. By creating shared visions and 
credible strategies, future investment patterns can be changed, often without great 
expense, as firms shift in advance to profit from new conditions. 
  Create, or rely on, a source of sufficiently trusted independent advice – on the science 
or on the impacts of change. Objective, transparent scientific evidence is very useful: 
information sources seen to be self-interested will be much less effective
  Present concrete examples of policies or practices used in different countries, or in 
different realms of policy.  Many of the reforms to increase decoupling will require new 
structures, behaviours or business models that may seem initially unfamiliar, and 
odd. Demonstrating that different arrangements work elsewhere can be convincing.
  Create an institutional structure for the specific policy decision that is participatory, 
sufficiently broad to contain enough people who can form a pro-reform coalition and 
set up in a way that allows potential supporters of change to voice their support.  This 
facilitates information flows, and can help form a common vision for the future that 
reconciles previously opposing views.
  Use a simultaneous mix of policy instruments. This can help the actors in a value-
chain of economic activity (for example, from raw material extraction to final product 
consumption and recycling) to change profitably together. This may be necessary to 
5 This section draws on Chapter 5, Ekins.P and Salmons R, in OECD (2010) Making Reform Happen
EFR
• Addressing environmental problems that affect the poor
• Improved access to environmental infrastructure
• Finances for pre-poor investments (e.g., education)  
• Revenue mobilisation
• Reduced distortions
• Reduced drains on public finances
• Incentives for sustainable natural resources management
• Incentives for curbing pollution (air, water, soil)
• Funds for environment agencies and investments
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FISCAL BENEFITS
POVERTY REDUCTION
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overcome a “lock-in” between demand and supply, which can commonly happen when 
a seller offers what is being demanded, the purchaser buys what is being offered and 
there is little scope for either to innovate. 
  Work to increase the cumulative effect of several smaller steps, as it is rarely the case 
that political or economic conditions exists that allow a policymaker to bring about a 
very large, radical change in resource productivity in one step.
  Be aware of options for reform and use political opportunities when they arise. Good 
economic times are often more favourable for introducing change, with less fear of 
negative consequences and greater availability of finance for innovative investments. 
Yet, crises can also facilitate reform, in different ways:
•	 An unsustainable economic situation in New Zealand in the early 1980s, which 
included the state running excessive budget deficits (of 9 per cent of GDP), 
provided the rationale and impetus for a thorough reform of state support for the 
agricultural sector. The Effective Rate of Assistance to agriculture fell from 123% 
in 1983 to around zero in the 1990s.6
•	 Crises may also provide opportunities for productivity reforming economic 
activity, when they lead to economic slack that can be stimulated to enter into 
new investments with low opportunity costs. By 2011, as a result of uncertainty 
on future returns on investments in difficult economic times, publically traded 
companies in Europe were holding excess cash of €750 billion (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2012) which could be directed by adept policy change into new areas. 
Unemployed labour can be re-employed with appropriate training, in growth 
sectors of the future.
Changing the institutional framework to facilitate future policy reform
One aspect of successful reform is to take steps that create the conditions for further, 
future policy reform. Making changes to decision-making processes, either internal to an 
organisation or external, can indirectly facilitate future change.
In government, this could mean making a change to the decision-making structures (like 
the mandate of ministers or committees) that allows decisions promoting the long-term 
management of resources to be taken more easily.  It could also mean implementing a 
policy that increases the future economic and political weight of innovators, or favourably 
changes the perception of potential opponents to change (for example by changing 
company reporting to include information on resources that helps companies take 
resource factors into account in their business decisions).
Changes to institutional decision-making structures have long been appreciated to have 
important beneficial outcomes, and this is particularly the case for overcoming the bias of 
decision-making towards the short term. 
For example, the UK is seen as a strong, liberal economy. In part this is because, in 1998, 
authority over monetary policy was passed from the government to the central Bank of 
England. This transferred the power to set interest rates – a power of huge importance 
to the economy. The aim was to provide greater economic stability by distancing those 
decisions from short-term political influence. 
6 The Effective Rate of Assistance is estimated by comparing the value added of an assisted sector with the same value added of an unassisted sector (at a world or 
reference price.) It includes direct and indirect assistance.
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There have also been many examples where international agreements have acted 
as stimulation for domestic action. In part this is because concerted action between 
countries, which reduces fears of unfavourable distortions in international markets. 
But it is also because an international commitment can act as a persuasive tool against 
opponents of change, not least by indicating that change is viewed as internationally 
important.
7 Putting Decoupling into Practice – Linking resource price rises to 
resource productivity gains
Economic instruments to push technologies and markets towards higher resource 
productivity typically run into one characteristic difficulty: if price signals are strong, 
industries may just give up or emigrate, and consumers tend to contest the government 
imposing painful price signals. But if price signals are weak, there is a high likelihood of 
effects remaining insignificant. 
A potential way out is a price signal that steadily increases at the pace of decoupling 
successes. For example, if the average efficiency of the car fleet rises by one per cent 
in one year, a one per cent price increase of petrol at the pump would seem fair and 
tolerable. However, the firm announcement of the continuation of this scheme will induce 
car manufacturers and traders as well as consumers to speed up efforts to reduce petrol 
consumption per kilometre or to avoid unnecessary trips. Hence a small signal can have a 
strong impact if continued over a long period of time.
A policy of this kind can combine several of the considerations to unlock inertia described 
above, and may come close to the type of combined policy which is needed.
One proposal for a policy could use taxation or subsidy reduction to move the price of 
a chosen resource upwards in line with documented increases of energy or resource 
productivity. In the sections below we look at different qualities of this proposal. In 
practical terms, one would not prescribe an exact price trajectory but a “corridor” 
within which prices can fluctuate a little. Interventions would only be made when such 
fluctuations are leaving the corridor. Interventions can also reduce prices or taxes if 
fluctuations leave the corridor upwards. The main purpose is predictability so that 
investors, manufacturers, and consumers know what is going to happen.
Broadening the economic discourse
By establishing a “ping-pong” between price rise and efficiency gains, costs (which are 
what influences competitiveness and livelihoods) would, on average, not increase. Under 
the “ping-pong” policy, on average, one would pay the same amount of money for the 
same quality of energy services as during the year before – paying a higher price for each 
unit of energy, but consuming fewer units of energy, as each unit of energy delivers more 
output thanks to the productivity gain. Of course, some industries and some families 
cannot increase their resource productivity as fast as the average gains take place. Politics 
will have to address this problem by a balanced mix of support measures or exemptions 
without destroying the incentive to innovate or adapt. 
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Creating a vision of the future and reducing uncertainty
The proposal would not entirely remove uncertainty about returns on investments in 
resource productivity, as variations in resource prices and uncertainty about future energy 
or resource productivity increases would remain. However, uncertainty would be reduced, 
in particular long-term uncertainty about the direction of prices.  This would serve as a 
strong and predictable incentive to investors, states, individual companies or research 
laboratories to systematically invest in ever more resource productivity.  It seems plausible 
that the mutual reinforcement between prices and efficiency increases will lead to a long 
term and ultimately dramatic increase of resource productivity.  
An interesting partial analogy exists to the proposed “ping-pong” dynamics between 
resource productivity gains and resource prices. It is the increase over at least 150 years in 
labour productivity and gross wages per hour of work. As productivity increased, workers 
could successfully demand 
higher wages. And as 
wages went up, employers 
were driven to speed 
up further increases of 
labour productivity. Figure 
0.7 shows the parallel 
dynamics between labour 
productivity and wages in 
the USA over 60 years.
Figure 0.7 The parallel increase 
of labour productivity and of 
gross hourly wages in the United 
States of America from 1947 – 
2007. 
Source: US Bureau of Labor
Obviously, the analogy is far from perfect. Wage negotiations typically occur without 
any state intervention, while the increase or moderation of energy prices does require 
such interventions. And it is not clear to what extent higher resource prices might lead 
to moving operations to other countries; in the case of rising wages this is less likely to 
occur because other countries tend to show the same dynamics of wages rising with 
productivity. 
Creating sufficient winners in favour of change
The proposal has aspects that give it the potential to create sufficient winners to form a 
coalition that supports its introduction. It would provide a source of government revenue, 
creating choices for the government to reduce taxation on other people or firms in the 
economy, increase spending or to reduce fiscal deficits. Linking the size of the tax to 
productivity increases means that the total potential revenue does not decline, even as the 
number of units of resource consumed decreases. 
Secondly, by increasing resource tax at the rate of average efficiency gain, the proposal 
increases the relative competitive advantage of firms which have above average resource 
productivity gains: these firms reduce costs relative to their competitors. This not only 
provides greater incentives for competition based on increased resource productivity, 
but also provides reasons for the more innovative and productive firms to take political 
positions in favour of change.
*Output per hour of all persons.
Labour Productivity and Real Compensation per Hour
(Nonfarm Business Sector)
Real Compensation per Hour**
Labour Productivity* 
**Compensation per hour divided by the impicit price deflator for nonfarm business output.
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
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Taking account of potential losers in a policy mix
Introducing a slow, incremental, long-term increase of prices in the way suggested 
might allow industry and families to gradually adapt to higher price levels and yet would 
serve as a strong signal for all long-term investments and decisions. Often the signalling 
effect alone induces more resource-efficient behaviours, as firms and people adjust in 
anticipation. 
The generation of revenues allows some recycling of those revenues to the losers from 
the policy change. Following a model from Sweden’s tax on nitrous oxides, the revenues 
from the policy could be returned to clusters of firms (such as the non-ferrous metals 
industries) – not per energy unit consumed but per job added or affected by price rises in 
ways which do not reduce the incentive effect of the resource price increase.  
Countries have also found ways to protect vulnerable low-income people (who have 
limited capacity to improve their resource use) from policy-induced price rises. In many 
countries of the world, a move from generally low and subsidized energy and water prices 
to realistic market prices (encouraging private capital to invest in more supplies) has been 
accompanied by policies that allow for a preferential low price level for poor families. 
South Africa has set a good example within its integrated water plan.
Creating new institutional arrangements
The design of a policy mechanism that raised prices of energy or resources in line 
with efficiency increases would require new, presumably legally binding, institutional 
arrangements. Those would be context specific to autonomous countries, but would 
be likely to involve binding pre-commitment of government to the mechanism, with 
independent and credible mechanisms for monitoring and calculating documented 
efficiency gains.
8 Conclusions
Trends in global consumption and exhaustion of natural resources and environmental 
systems imply that the decoupling of economic growth from resource use will become 
ever more important for stable, successful economies. These trends are already 
sufficiently significant to influence the factors that make economies competitive. 
Many technologies and techniques that deliver significant resource productivity increases 
are already commercially available and used in developing and developed economies. 
They allow economic output to be achieved with fewer resource inputs, reducing waste 
and savings costs that can further expand the economy or reduce its exposure to resource 
risks.
A well-functioning economy might be expected to naturally adjust to changes in resource 
availability by directing investments into areas of economic activity that bring patterns 
of resource use in line with society’s goals (for example, into innovation in resource 
productivity). In practice, we see that many economies do not naturally adjust in this way, 
but suffer from blocks to transition which ”lock-in” existing patterns of resource use. 
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These obstacles to decoupling can be categorised as arising from:
  the legacy of past policy decisions (including those made before information on 
resource trends was available); and
  technological, behavioural, organisational and institutional biases against innovation 
in resource productivity.
Facilitating decoupling will involve removing these obstacles, to create the conditions 
in which investments in resource productivity become widespread. Developing countries 
may have a relative advantage in decoupling, because they are not so strongly locked-
in by resource-intensive consumption and productions patterns, infrastructure and 
institutions. 
There has been a wealth of experience across the world in policy to intentionally facilitate 
the decoupling of resource use, or impacts of resource use, from economic growth, with 
some notable successes. They indicate that absolute decoupling of economic growth 
from resource use is possible.
The chances of success appear higher where policymakers look at the institutional 
framework in which the political decision is made.  This means being aware of the set 
of actors who are able to influence the decision, their interests, relative power and the 
norms and assumptions which are shaping the decision. Leadership will be needed to 
break out of resistance to policy changes. Leaders within the public and private sectors 
can draw on past experiences with policy for guidance on how to take forward decoupling. 
There are forms of policy available to promote decoupling that combine several of these 
considerations. The report mentions two, which are illustrative of the type of combined 
policy which is needed. One proposal uses taxation or subsidy reduction to move 
resource prices upwards in line with documented increases of energy or resource 
productivity.  Another looks to shift revenue-raising onto resource prices through 
resource taxation at source or in relation to product imports, with recycling of revenues 
back to the economy.
19
The focus of this Decoupling 2 report is to illustrate the steps by which countries can 
realise their strategies of better lives for their people, now and into the future, through 
improving resource productivity. 
The report shows that the potential exists for significant increases in resource productivity 
(as much as five- to 10-fold improvements), and that these could be achieved through 
strategic changes to current policy regimes. It shows that technologies and techniques, 
which bring very significant resource productivity gains, are already available, right across 
the range of resource-consuming activities. It also shows that much of the policy design 
“know-how” we need to achieve significant levels of resource productivity already exists 
in the form of legislation, incentive systems, and institutional reform, and aspects of it 
have been tried out and implemented, encouraging other nations to study and where 
appropriate replicate such success stories. 
The report shows that many nations have already achieved decoupling of economic 
growth from numerous pollutants, like sulphur dioxide emissions, with some having 
achieved modest progress in separating economic growth from growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions and from growth in the use of some resources. 
The report aims to assist the world’s leaders in government and business understand the 
issues and opportunities around decoupling. 
Introduction
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Changes in Resource 
Use and Scarcity1
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Sometimes, even experts hold inaccurate beliefs about future economic conditions. One of the recent, catastrophic, illustrations 
of this was the misvaluation of assets that 
triggered the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
Widely held beliefs about the future 
commodity prices and availability of 
resources like minerals, water and land 
may often be similarly out of line with the 
likely future reality. In our view, future 
trends of increasing resource use seem 
likely to continue to change some of the 
conditions that currently support economic 
success.
Resources are the foundation for industrial 
growth and prosperity for countries and 
firms, and changes in their price and 
availability brings the likelihood of change 
in relative competitive advantage. The 
changing conditions may create new 
winners and losers, with the advantage 
going to those who strategically prepare for 
the change.
Although changes in the cost of energy 
are frequently discussed in policy and 
economic circles, the cost and availability 
of other resources are more important for 
many industrial sectors.  For example, in 
Germany, according to official statistics, 
the costs of material inputs for the 
processing industry is around 40 per cent 
of total production cost, while the direct 
energy cost (not counting energy cost 
used in the provision of material inputs) is 
around 2 per cent7.
As we showed in our first decoupling report, 
countries such as China and Germany have 
already seen negative impacts from patterns 
of resource use and have responded. 
That report (UNEP, 2011b) highlights the 
significant trends in global resource use in 
the twentieth century and their implications. 
7 German Federal Statistics Office.
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It found that the annual extraction of ores 
and minerals in that period grew 27 times, 
construction materials by 34 times, fossil 
fuels by 12 and biomass by 3.6.  In total, 
material extraction increased to about eight 
times its previous level.
The extraction of many metals has followed 
an essentially exponential growth path since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as 
Figure 1.1 shows.
Figure 1.1 Extraction of many metals grew 
exponentially since the year 1900 (the ordinate on 
the picture being logarithmic) 
From Sverdrup et al, 2013
Other reports have illustrated that the 
use of some of the natural resources 
essential to prosperity – including 
freshwater, land and soils, and fish – have 
similarly increased, in many cases beyond 
sustainable levels.  
1.1 The drivers of changes in 
resource use
The two great drivers of changes of 
resource use are population and per capita 
income growth. 
1.1.1 Population
During the twentieth century, world 
population increased from 1.65 billion to 
more than 6 billion. By the second half 
of 2011, our global population exceeded 
7 billion. The rate of global population 
growth rate has fallen from its peak 
above 2 per cent per year in 1963 to 
around 1.3 per cent today. However, 
because the population is so much 
larger now than in 1963, the number 
of additional people on the planet each 
year is now significantly larger than in 
1963 (UN, 2011). 
1.1.2 Income
The impact of a growing population on 
resource use is related to the volume 
of resources each citizen consumes, 
which in fact, has been broadly 
correlated with the level of increasing 
incomes. Per capita incomes have, 
on average, been growing, although 
unequally, with very large disparities 
between countries and between 
individuals within countries.
With this income increase, average 
resource use per person has increased 
(though this average also hides great 
differences between individuals).  One 
hundred years earlier, the average 
global per capita use was 4.6 tonnes; 
by 2005 the notional average inhabitant 
used somewhere between 8.5 and 9.2 
tonnes of resources annually.  
1.2 Future trends in these 
drivers of resource use
These two drivers of increasing 
resource use seem almost certain to 
continue:
  The UN projects global population 
to add more than 2.5 billion extra 
humans by 2050, with population 
continuing to grow further to 10.9 
billion by the end of the century 
in its medium variant estimation 
(UN, 2013). 
  Growth in per capita incomes is 
predicted to continue to increase, 
with differences between countries. 
All countries are aiming for 
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the consumption levels of the most 
wealthy, with those in the wealthiest 
countries looking to consume more. 
Some have estimated that within the 
next 20 years, there will be 3 billion 
additional people worldwide enjoying 
“middle class” income levels, on top of 
the 1.8 billion today (Kharas, 2010). 
The significance of the growth in 
population and incomes becomes apparent 
when considering that the rich countries 
that historically consume 80 per cent of 
global natural resources represent only 
around 18 per cent of the global population 
(UNEP, 2010a). As ever-increasing shares 
of the global population look to reach 
better standards of living, ever-greater 
resource use is expected. 
1.2.1 Implications for resource 
demand
With populous lower-income nations fast 
increasing incomes from a low base, the 
resulting pace of increase in resource 
demand is amplified.  The five emerging 
economic powers that make up the BRICS 
group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), represent 42 per cent of 
world population. Their gross domestic 
products (GDPs) have been growing at rates 
of up to 10% per year, but the average per 
capita incomes are still significantly lower 
than that of the high-income countries. 
Currently, one person in India “consumes”, 
on average, four tons of resources per year, 
while a Canadian consumes an average 
of 25 tons.  As populations in emerging 
economies adopt similar technologies 
and lifestyles to those currently used in 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, global 
metal needs will be three to nine times 
larger than all the metals currently used in 
the world (UNEP, 2013a).
Cautious predictions of the future suggest 
that due to economic growth, demand for 
one area of resources – food, feed and fibre 
– could increase by 70 per cent by 2050 
(FAO, 2009). Looking at the dynamics in 
China and elsewhere, this appears to be a 
low estimate. The size of China’s population 
and increase in economic growth gives 
indications of the global consequences of 
convergence of standards of living.
 If China were to match the US for levels 
of car ownership and oil consumption per 
person it would need approximately 850 
million more cars and more than doubling 
the world output of oil. If China alone were 
to consume seafood at the per capita rate 
of Japan, it alone would need 100 million 
tonnes, more than today’s total catch.
 Sustainable Consumption – 
UNEP Global Status Report, 2002
In our first report on decoupling, we set 
out different scenarios for future material 
resource use. In each of these – one 
of which included profound change in 
the resource productivity of the world 
economy – resource use increased by 
2050. To reflect equity goals, each scenario 
assumes that by 2050, every citizen in the 
world will be able to assume the same 
amount of material resources as others8. 
In the scenario that represents many 
policymakers’ current plans – in which 
levels of material resource use per head 
for all global citizens reached the levels 
of current use of the average European – 
annual resource extraction would need to 
triple by 2050, compared to extraction in 
2000. 
This probably exceeds all possible measures 
of available resources and assessments 
of the limits of the planets to absorb the 
impacts of their extraction and use. It does 
not seem possible for an economy based 
on the current high-consumption model of 
resources to continue into the future.
8 'Material resource use' in our first report includes: construction materials, 
ores and industrial minerals, fossil fuels and biomass and is aggregated by 
mass, expressed in tons.
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1.3 The Consequences of 
increasing resource use
The economic consequences of increasing 
resource use are already apparent in 
three areas:  increases in resource prices, 
increased price volatility, increased scarcity 
and disruption of environmental systems.
1.3.1 Increasing resource prices 
As the demands resulting from growth of 
the global economy reach supply constraints 
for resources, two effects are likely: an 
increase in the price of those resources, and 
increased volatility in those resource prices, 
as speculation and a scramble to acquire 
resources impact on markets. 
Figure 1.2 Commodity price indices.
(Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data, 2011. Trend 
lines added, courtesy Mark Swilling (World Bank, 2011a)
From the evidence, it seems possible that 
for many resources, the shift in balance 
between demand and supply has already 
been reached, and these negative effects 
can be seen. Even though the continuing 
global downturn has now reduced demand 
pressures for some resources, a review of 
resource prices to 2013 provides a pointer 
that a long era of declining real resource 
prices has come to an end, and that prices 
may now have already begun a rising trend. 
For example, since 2000, metal prices have 
risen 176 per cent, rubber prices by 350 
per cent, energy prices by an average of 
260 per cent, and food prices by more than 
100 per cent (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2011). Some predict that global food prices 
will increase by 120-180 per cent by 2030, 
accelerating past trends in price rises 
(Willenbockel, 2011). 
These price rises affect the economy. 
Evidence from Europe might be taken as 
significant for the world as a whole: An 
official EU “Eurobarometer” survey in the 
past five years found that some 75 per 
cent of European businesses reported 
that they have experienced an increase 
in material costs (Eurobarometer, 2011). 
Figure 1.3 shows the results of a forward-
looking Eurobarometer survey indicating 
that European firms expect price rises to 
continue (EIO, 2010). 
Figure 1.3 Expectations about how companies’ 
material costs would evolve in the 5-10 years 
 following 20119 
Rising commodity prices not only result 
in higher costs to business, but also risk 
short-term inflationary effects that could 
harm economic growth. Rising commodity 
prices also make it harder to reduce global 
poverty. 
9 Data from DEMEA, presented in Berlin July 2010, with image and text from 
(EIO, 2010).
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1.3.2 Increased price volatility and 
price shocks
In addition to rising price trends, 
commodity price volatility in the last 
decade is now higher than at any other 
time in the last 100 years (Figure 1.4). 
This is partly due to stronger linkages 
between energy, water, resources and food 
production. These strong linkages have 
resulted in shortages and price changes 
in one commodity or resource rapidly 
impacting on other commodity prices. 
Figure 1.4 Scale and Drivers of Commodity 
Volatility by Decade from 1920 to 2011 
(Source: Dobbs et al., 2012)
For some of the key elements used in 
production, Figure 1.5 below illustrates 
both the volatility and the annual price 
increase for certain key materials used in 
the economy, with mostly dramatic figures 
both regarding price hikes and volatilities. 
Figure 1.5 Price Volatility and Prices Increases of 
various key elements. 
Source: “Natural Resources Consumption and 
Sustainable Industrial Development”, S. Suh, 
Sustainable Industrial Development, Fall Issue 2008
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Recent sustained spikes in food prices 
caused by supply shortfalls relative to 
global demand are believed by some 
to have fuelled civil dissatisfaction. In 
2007 and 2008, higher food prices were 
linked to riots in numerous countries, 
including Pakistan, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, Mexico 
and India.  Some believe that rapidly 
rising global prices for food in 2010 led 
to civil dissatisfaction which fuelled the 
“Arab Spring” (e.g. Center for Climate and 
Security, 2013).  (Figure 1.6)
The linkage between energy demand and 
food prices was one factor in rising corn 
prices in 2007, with an increase in use of 
corn for biofuel increasing global corn 
demand. Overall, the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), found 
that the volatility of food prices increased 
to 22.4 per cent in 2000-12 compared to 
7.7 per cent in 1990-99 (measured by the 
standard deviation around the average 
price)10.  
10  However, before 1990, food prices were also volatile, having a higher 
standard deviation than in the years 2000-12.
1.3.3 Increasing resources 
scarcities
In addition to price trends and volatility, 
for some resources there are particular 
concerns about scarcity. These include land, 
freshwater and fish, which play key roles 
in the supply of food. Other resources are 
needed for the diffusion of new technologies. 
This scarcity can come from two causes: 
declining stocks for which cost-effective 
substitutes are not readily available; and 
disruptions to the flow of resources, for 
example, caused by political factors.
Metals and minerals
  Some metals risk becoming very 
expensive, as metal concentrations 
in accessible ores keep declining. 
More pessimistic forecasts say that 
some rare earth metals may even risk 
running out within two decades unless 
recycling rates are rapidly increased 
(USGS, 2008; quoted in Diederen, A., 
2009, see figure 5 based on table 1). 
High-tech industries are increasingly 
worried about the price hikes of rare 
Figure 1.6 FAO Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011 and food riot events. The figure in 
parentheses is the reported number of deaths from each riot. 
Source: Lagi et al., 2011
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metals. Better recycling could help 
reduce such concerns – yet today, less 
than 1 per cent of specialty metals are 
recycled (UNEP, 2011a). 
  Shortage of some of the world’s key 
metals will be felt within 50 years, 
potentially affecting many industries 
(USGS, 2008). 
  World phosphorus production appears 
likely to peak in a relatively short 
timescale with relatively limited 
alternatives for use of phosphate 
as fertilisers for agriculture. Known 
deposits of phosphate rock are large 
enough to last some hundreds of years. 
Yet declining qualities may make these 
uneconomic.  Some studies suggest 
a peak in as little as 25 years’ time, 
others significantly longer (Gilbert, 
2009; Cordell et al., 2009; IFA, 2006; 
Jasinski, 2007; Laherrere, 2000; Lewis, 
2008, Stewart et al., 2005). 
Freshwater
  Extraction of freshwater (Brown, 2008) 
in many parts of the world exceeds 
sustainable yields, with groundwater 
extracted from wells the main source of 
drinking water for more than 3 billion 
people (Shah et al., 2007). Water tables 
are already falling rapidly in countries 
that contain more than half the world’s 
people, including the biggest three grain 
producers: China, India, and the United 
States (Shiklomanov, 1998, cited in 
Gleick, 2001, p. 52). 
  Global demand for water is expected 
to rise by 40 per cent. In 20 years’ time, 
available supplies may probably satisfy 
only 60 per cent of world demand (2030 
Water Resources Group, 2009, p.7). 
  In part, this is also due to predicted 
supply changes, for example, the 
increasing rate of disappearance of 
the Himalayan and Andean glaciers 
that regulate river flow and supply 
clean water for over more than 1 billion 
people. Although dams contained four 
times more water in 2008 than in 1960, 
freshwater scarcity and water stress 
could grow from affecting 1 billion to 
more than 3 billion people by 2030 
(OECD, 2008a). 
Land
  Global cropland is expanding at the 
expense of savannahs, grasslands 
and forests, and expected rise of 
demand for food, fibre and fuel will 
only increase the pressure on the land 
resource base. If current conditions 
continue, by 2050, there could be 
between 320 and 849 million hectares 
of natural land converted to cropland. 
At the same time, land degradation 
continues to expand, affecting today an 
estimated 23 per cent of global soils 
and in its severe form leads to the 
abandonment and shift of 2 to 5 million 
hectares of cropland.
  One response has been increasing 
acquisition of land in foreign countries 
by external investors. Globally, in 
2012, foreign investors bought land 
equivalent to the area of France for 
production for export. These sales of 
land also imply the sale of a country’s 
freshwater, soil fertility and ecosystem 
services that are linked to that land. 
Fisheries 
  The UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization has found that globally, 
25 per cent of fish stocks were 
overexploited or depleted, and around 
half fully exploited in 2005 (FAO, 2005b) 
with severe depletion of the larger 
fish. A 2003 study published in the 
journal Nature concluded that 90 per 
cent of the large fish in the oceans had 
disappeared over the previous 50 years 
(Myers and Worm, 2003; Crosby, 2003). 
Two examples are Atlantic stocks of the 
bluefin tuna that have been cut by 94 
per cent, and the harvest of the Caspian 
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Sea sturgeon – source of the world’s 
most prized caviar – which fell from 
27,700 tons in 1977 to 461 tons in 2000. 
A comprehensive analysis of global 
commercial stocks in 2012 estimated 
that more than half the stocks 
worldwide were shrinking year-on-year, 
with many stocks already below two 
thirds of the level at which they would 
provide the maximum sustainable 
yearly yield (Costello et al., 2012).
1.3.4 Increased disruption of 
environmental systems 
The extraction and use of material 
resources is also closely linked to negative 
impacts on aspects of the environment.  
For example, there are strong links 
between the use of material resources in 
the economy and the level of fossil fuels 
burnt.  (Our 2010 Report on Environmental 
Impacts describes the relationship 
between the use of different resources and 
greenhouse gas emissions, UNEP, 2010a).
Parts of the environment can easily be 
seen as resources in their own right – 
because they provide benefits to people 
and the economy. Examples include soil 
fertility, stocks of biodiversity (rather 
like fish), clean air and a stable climate. 
Although these environmental resources 
often do not have prices, or owners, 
their degradation has significant impact 
on factors affecting prosperity and 
alleviation of poverty. The role and value 
of environmental resources in economic 
production, stability and wellbeing is now 
well established. (See Box 1.1)
Box 1.1 The value of clean air,  biodiversity 
and a stable climate
1. Clean air 
Clean air is a resource that is essential 
for human health, and for crops and other 
natural systems. Its pollution has significant 
economic costs – both direct and indirect 
(e.g. from lost working hours). 
A range of studies11 from across the world 
(OECD, 2008a) have reported economic 
losses of between 2-4 per cent of GDP in 
cities and countries because of air pollution, 
with most of the economic costs coming 
from health costs and premature deaths, 
and from damage to the built and natural 
environment from acid rain and tropospheric 
ozone. Estimates of the costs of air pollution 
to economies include 1.16-3.8 per cent for 
China, two per cent for the European Union, 
four per cent for the Ukraine, 2-5 per cent 
for Russia, 0.7-2.8 per cent for the USA. 
2. Biodiversity
A global 2010 study on the economic value of 
biodiversity (Sukhdev et al., 2008) concluded 
that cumulative economic costs from the 
loss of ecosystems services and biodiversity 
from overharvesting of biota and biomass 
under a “business as usual” scenario would 
be equivalent to around 7 per cent of GDP 
per annum in costs by 2050 – equivalent to 
around US$2-4.5 trillion each year.
3. Climate
A range of studies have highlighted that 
the costs of postponing action on climate 
are significant, even in the short term. For 
instance, the 2006 Stern review quantified 
the economic costs of irreversible climate 
change between 5-20 per cent of global GDP 
per annum by 2050 (Stern, 2006).
As the use of material resources has 
increased there have been major 
negative impacts on these resources 
(UNEP, 2010a).  The United Nations’ 
2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
documented several accelerating, 
abrupt, and potentially irreversible 
changes already occurring to the world’s 
ecosystems. These include algal blooms 
from overuse of nitrogen fertilizers, 
bleaching of coral reefs, desertification, 
increased vulnerability to natural 
disasters, and crop failures (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). At that 
time, approximately 60 per cent of the 
ecosystem services that support life on 
11  UNEP refs at Source: Adapted from World Bank (2008), Markandya and 
Tamborra (2005), Strukova et al. (2006), Bobylev et al (2002), Mendelsohn 
and Muller (2007)
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Earth, such as high-quality freshwater, 
soil fertility and biodiversity, were being 
seriously degraded or used unsustainably. 
These negative impacts, or exhaustion, to 
parts of the environment often have direct 
effects on people and the economy – for 
example through damage to health, water 
shortages, loss of fish stocks or increased 
storm damage.  
It also has very serious indirect 
implications, with negative impacts on 
local and global environmental systems – 
like the climate system – that are essential 
for providing stable conditions for our life 
on Earth. As a means to illustrate this, 
Johan Rockstrom from the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre and others produced 
a representation of the extent to which 
human impacts on the global environment 
have gone beyond planetary boundaries 
(Figure 1.7, from 2008), after which risks 
of sudden or irreversible environmental 
changes increase (Rockström et al., 2009): 
Figure 1.7 A representation of the extent to which 
human activity is operating within safe levels 
of environmental impacts, highlighting that 
safe thresholds for three out of nine planetary 
boundaries have already been crossed.
Source: Rockström et al., 2009
Empirical evidence that the global 
economy has already overshot the 
thresholds allowing continued provision 
of resources from many areas of the 
world’s ecosystems is also covered 
in detail in numerous publications, 
including the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Global Environmental 
Outlooks12, International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) assessments13, OECD 
DAC Development Reports14, Human 
Development Report15, the State of the 
World reports.16 Some of the science 
suggests that humanity has two to three 
decades to change economic patterns to 
ensure irreversible decline of ecosystem 
resilience is avoided. 
Climate
The best known and most deeply 
researched of these systems is the climate 
system17.  Since 1950, the concentration of 
CO2 emissions has increased from around 
320 parts per million (ppm) (Petit et al., 
1999) to an average of just under 400ppm 
in 201318 along with other greenhouse 
gases that increase this total by some 25%. 
Emissions of greenhouse gases are on 
track to increase much further according 
to the International Energy Agency. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts 
that, under business as usual economic 
growth, world energy demand will increase 
by more than 60 per cent between 2004 
and 2030 (IEA, 2005), with future growth 
of more than one third from 2012 to 2035 
(IEA, 2012). The IPCC estimates that 
capping greenhouse gas output at 840 
billion tons gives a 50 per cent chance 
of meeting the UN target of restraining 
warming below 2°C (3.6°F) (IPCC, 2013). 
12  http://www.unep.org/geo/
13  https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.
shtml 
14  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-
report_20747721 
15  http://hdr.undp.org/en 
16  http://www.worldwatch.org/bookstore/state-of-the-world 
17  See: IPCC Assessments at https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/
publications_and_data_reports.shtml 
18  http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ 
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1.4 Why these problems appear 
unlikely to be solved by 
a “leave it to the market 
approach.”
There have been predictions in the past 
that resource constraints would be 
impossible to overcome. Thomas Malthus’s 
concern in 1798 that the supply of land 
was insufficient to meet the food needs 
of a quickly growing human population is 
perhaps the most famous. In many (though 
not all – see section 4.8) of these cases, 
progress or the functioning of markets 
overcame the feared constraint. In general, 
the past expansion of demand for resource 
consumption in the twentieth century did 
not lead to global resource scarcity, with 
very important exceptions.
The resource constraints now facing 
decision-makers are of a different nature 
– one that appears impossible to be solved 
by market forces under current economic 
trends: 
 “The next 20 years appear to be quite 
different from the resource-related 
shocks that have periodically erupted 
in history” (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2011, p. 2) 
There are several distinguishing features 
that make an adequate supply-side 
response from the market unlikely:
1.4.1 The scale and rate of change 
often outpaces the supply side 
response
The pace of increase of demand has 
accelerated. The increase in global GDP 
represents a reasonable proxy for the 
changing pace of resource demands.  GDP 
increased six-fold from 1950 to 1998 with 
an average growth of 3.9 per cent a year. 
This compares to a rate of increase of 1.6 
from 1820 to 1950, and 0.3 per cent from 
1500 to 1820 (Maddison, 2001) (Figure 1.8). 
At the same time, the scale of demand 
is very much greater, meaning that each 
percentage increase in demand requires a 
far greater increase in resources.  
Figure 1.8 World GDP 1960-2009 at current 
market prices (left scale in units of $1.000 million) 
Source: World Bank, 2009
A major change of the situation occurred 
since roughly the year 2000, as China and 
other major countries entered the world 
commodity markets as big buyers, turning 
markets into sellers’ markets. Demand for 
several resources has reached the limits 
of short-term supply, which results in even 
small extra demand creating significant 
price volatility. Further supply side change 
currently appears unlikely to keep pace 
with predicted increases in demand. The 
investments in infrastructure needed for 
supply increase are often not sufficient. 
1.4.2 Historically, growth in 
developed countries has 
used resources from other 
countries
Although the situation differs greatly 
between countries, for many wealthier 
countries a significant proportion of the 
resource use related to their economies 
takes place in their trading partners. For 
instance, when a north African country 
exports food to the EU, the water to grow 
those crops is used in north Africa for 
the benefit of a consumer in the EU. The 
same can be true of material extraction or 
burning of fossil fuels to provide products 
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for export: the product may be consumed 
in Japan, but the material is mined, or CO2 
released within the exporting country (for 
example China).
Chapter 4 of our first decoupling report 
describes these flows, based on a growing 
academic literature examining the issue. 
Recent trends show that developed 
countries appear to be increasing this form 
of indirect use of resources.19  Sixteen per 
cent of total global water consumption 
is now used for exported goods and 
commodities.20 Figure 1.9 illustrates the 
balance of imports and exports of water 
used in one region for consumption in 
another – “virtual water”. 
19  The indirect use of resources and resources embedded in trade are being the 
object of a new assessment study by the UNEP-hosted International Resource 
Panel, to be published in 2014. 
20 15% of the water use in the agricultural sector, and 34% of the water in global 
industry is used in making goods for export (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2004).
Figure 1.9: Virtual water trade balances 1997-2001. 
Source: Adapted from Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2008
This economic model only works when 
there are sufficient countries who are 
not using their resources – like their 
freshwater supplies – to their full extent, 
and are willing to use them to supply 
others with consumption goods. As 
demands for consumption rise across the 
world, only those countries with excess 
supply of resources, beyond their own 
future national needs, may be willing to 
use their resources in this way. There will 
be fewer of these countries.
1.4.3 Declining ore grades and 
impacts on other resources
Depending on the metal concerned, past 
mining of the most attractive ores has 
led to declining average ore grades, as 
Figure 1.10 shows for several key metals. 
For many metals, this means that about 
three times as much material needs to 
be moved for the same quantity of metal 
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extraction as a century ago. This brings 
associated increases in fossil fuel energy 
use, land disruption, chemical release 
and implications for groundwater and 
freshwater bodies. 
Technological innovation can offset at 
least some of the decline in ore grades, 
and find and process new sources of 
natural resources that were previously 
economically inaccessible. Yet, this very 
rarely avoids the need for more energy, 
water and resource inputs to extract the 
same quantity of a natural resource. The 
tendency to process lower grades of ore 
to meet increasing demand is leading to a 
higher energy requirement per kilogram of 
metals, and consequentially to increased 
production costs (UNEP, 2013b). 
Figure 1.10: Ore grades of mines in Australia 
1840-2005. 
Source: Mudd, 2009
Similarly, oil production costs are rising: 
the cost of bringing a new oil well online 
doubled between 2000 and 2010. With oil 
production having peaked in more than 
50 countries, production is now shifting to 
either secondary sources such as tar sands 
– or more extreme geographic deep-sea 
locations, where extraction is more costly.
1.4.4 Linkages between energy 
production, water, resources 
and food  
Numerous reports (World Economic 
Forum, 2011; Hoff, 2011) provide evidence 
of the increasingly linked use of different 
resources in the supply of others – a 
trend that can exacerbate scarcity (Figure 
1.11). For instance, according to the IEA, 
current energy policies will result in the 
volume of water consumed for energy 
production to double by 2035 mainly due to 
investment in biofuels, new coal plants and 
unconventional natural gas (Lavelle and 
Grose, 2013).
Currently, the water intensity of energy 
production, the energy intensity of water 
production and the energy and water 
intensity of resource extraction (i.e. mining) 
are increasing. The cost of pollution per 
kilogram of metals is rising as these 
concentrations shrink (Bardi, 2014). The 
average resource intensity of intensive 
agriculture is also rising, while extreme 
weather events have negatively impacted 
on agricultural productivity. 
Figure 2.12. Ore grades of mines in Australia, 1840–2005 
Source: Mudd, 2009
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Figure 1.11 The Climate Change, Energy, Water 
and Food Security Nexus 
Source: WBCSD, 201221
1.4.5 Tipping points, sudden or 
irreversible declines
The environmental resources present 
an additional risk – that they may 
suddenly collapse in a non-linear way 
if put under too much stress22. This is 
because they form part of ecosystems or 
climate systems that consist of complex 
interactions and feedbacks that are 
difficult to understand and impossible to 
predict. Such effects include:  
  Possible fishery collapses, illustrated 
by the collapse of the Newfoundland 
cod fishery off the coast of Canada. 
Another collapse was the Locos 
abalone in Chile, which is now almost 
extinct.
  Increased desertification, as land 
degradation worsens due to climate 
change and loss of biomass leading 
to potential collapse of grasslands, 
21  http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/sector-projects/water/
waterenergyfood.aspx
22  for further explanation see: Smith et al., 2010a.   
moisture retention and soil structure. 
  Possible irreversible climate change 
(IPCC, 2013, IEA, 2011). 
Damage to one part of a natural system 
is unlikely to just cause a linear effect, 
but rather is likely to lead to amplification 
effects across the system. At low levels 
of harm, the system may accommodate 
change (due to system resilience and 
support capacity), but at higher levels 
additional depletion may take the system 
over a tipping point, into collapse, that is 
either irreversible or recovers over very 
long periods of time (Diamond, 2005).  
For example, irreversible climate change 
may occur due to the release of methane 
from melting permafrost (Christensen et 
al., 2004) and the weakening of carbon sinks 
(Le Quéré et al., 2007), as the Earth warms 
(Cox et al., 2000; Canadell et al., 2007). 
1.4.6 Many of the essential 
resources are not accurately 
priced by the market
Market forces work to balance supply and 
demand through the price mechanism 
– so that higher demand typically leads 
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to higher prices that encourage greater 
supply, or substitution to alternative inputs. 
For many of the resources facing scarcity, 
the prices do not currently reflect scarcity, 
and so the market has little incentive 
to find solutions.  Frequently resource 
use is subsidised, with the subsidy 
encouraging use above levels that the 
market would determine. This is often true 
for freshwater, fish, fossil fuels, emission 
of greenhouse gasses, soil fertility 
and natural resources like forests and 
ecosystems. This mispricing is a result of 
factors explored more deeply in Chapter 
4. Geopolitical risks to global commodity 
markets, such as those when a nation 
restricts exports of rare earth metals 
in response to perceived scarcity, are 
unpredictable, and so also not accurately 
reflected in prices.
 In these cases, existing market forces 
alone cannot provide the solutions.
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Responding to Change
2.1 Strategic implications of 
trends in resource use
The global trends in resource demand and availability appear sufficiently strong that almost all economies would benefit from 
adapting their form of development to 
changed future conditions.  This applies at 
least as much to lower-income countries 
as to OECD economies. One indication of 
the scale of the change is an estimate that 
US$3 trillion per year would be needed 
in new investment in resource supply to 
meet demand (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2011) if no other action was taken. 
There are two wider economic implications 
of the changes: a changing basis of 
competitive advantage and risks of 
disruption to existing economic growth 
patterns.
2.1.1 A changing basis of 
competitive economic 
advantage 
For centuries, nations have been 
concerned with securing and exploiting 
resources as the key to greater wealth. 
The trends we now observe suggest that 
economies should look more closely at 
the changing risks and challenges related 
to resources. They have significance for 
economic growth. They appear very likely 
to alter the relative importance of labour 
productivity and resource productivity as 
sources of growth and future economic 
wellbeing. 
While many opportunities remain in labour 
productivity gains, it appears that some of 
the greatest opportunities for growth are 
to be found in increasing an economy’s 
resource productivity (Weizsäcker et al., 
1997; Hawken et al., 1999).  
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Leading research institutes and thinktanks 
such as the Wuppertal Institute, Rocky 
Mountain Institute, and The Natural Edge 
Project have highlighted for some time 
that as resource productivity has not been 
a focus in the past, many opportunities in 
resource productivity with higher economic 
returns can be taken with little capital 
investment, often with short payback 
periods. This can increase growth rates. 
Chapter 3 describes some examples with 
this potential.
McKinsey Global Institute estimates that 
resource productivity has the potential to 
earn US$2.9 trillion each year by 2030 from 
resource savings. This estimate rises to 
US$3.7 trillion per year if carbon is priced 
and subsidies and taxation aligned with 
policy goals. Both estimates are based 
on currently available technologies or 
techniques and neither cover the full range 
of potential areas of saving, for example, 
the only metal considered is steel.  Even 
ignoring increases in prices, greater 
efficiency offers potential for growth by 
reducing costs. 
There is widespread belief that the 
economies that move first, or fastest, 
will have strategic competitive advantage 
under the changed economic conditions.  
Both developed and developing countries 
that successfully identify and seize the 
opportunities for resource productivity 
are likely to be able to outperform global 
competitors and bring greater security and 
wealth to their populations. 
In fact, there is a relationship between 
competitiveness and material productivity. 
Bleischwitz et al. (Bleischwitz et al, 2009, 
2010; Steger and Bleischwitz, 2011) find a 
positive relationship between the material 
productivity of 26 economies (measured 
by GDP in purchasing power parity 
US$ per kilogram of Domestic Material 
Consumption, or DMC) and their Global 
Competitiveness Index scores based on 
data by the World Economic Forum.
Compared to growth through labour 
productivity, resource efficiency 
opportunities promote employment: 
an increase in output is likely to be 
accompanied by increased labour demand. 
This makes it particularly attractive at 
times of high unemployment. For instance, 
energy efficiency policies in California are 
estimated to have created nearly 1.5 million 
jobs from 1977 to 2007.23 Estimates of the 
impact of improved resource efficiency in 
Germany in the years before 2004 suggest 
that economic benefits included the 
creation or saving of more than 1 million 
jobs (Fischer et al., 2004).
2.1.2 Potential advantages for 
developing countries
These trends offer newly or fast-developing 
countries potential advantage over 
OECD countries. Representatives from 
developing countries often claim that 
in their phase of development, absolute 
decoupling is unrealistic for resource flows 
and greenhouse gas emissions.
However, there are commentators who 
believe that developing countries have 
a relative advantage in decoupling, 
compared to more established economies, 
as a result of their state of development. 
This advantage is a result of weaker biases 
against resource-productive investments 
than are found in older economies, and 
described in Chapter 4. Swilling and 
Annecke list the following24:
  Firms that have dominant positions in 
the market will tend to resist change 
and protect their technologies. 
Emerging firms in developing 
economies may be less rigid because 
they do not have dominant positions 
to defend.
  Regulatory regimes in developing 
countries are often less restrictive or 
23  There are suggestions that 50 jobs were created in the energy efficiency 
sector for each 1 lost in fossil fuels (Roland-Holst, 2008).  
24  Adapted from Swilling and Annecke (2012, p. 101) following Montalvo (2008). 
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more permissive, which can reduce 
the protection from regulatory and 
financial institutions.
  The lack of embedded consumer 
cultures that favour the dominance of 
current technologies in more mature 
economies can make developing 
countries more flexible to change.
  Firms and countries can “leapfrog” 
stages in the development of 
technological capacity. Developing 
countries without the “baggage” 
of resource intensive production 
and consumption systems and 
infrastructures have an inherent 
potential for leapfrogging, if the 
associated challenges can be overcome.
  Markets in developing countries 
are less saturated than markets in 
developed countries, implying greater 
opportunity for products and services 
that meet needs in more resource-
productive ways.
  Consumption habits in developing 
countries may not yet be so tied to mass 
consumption with rapid obsolescence 
as those in developed countries, 
providing greater scope for forms of 
consumption based on long-term, or 
shared, ownership of goods.
In addition, for countries that substantially 
rely on a particular resource as a key input 
into their economy, greater efficiency 
can bring greater benefits than in other 
countries – particularly in reducing the 
risk of drops in income from scarcity, and 
potential political unrest.
2.1.3 Risks of disruption to existing 
economic growth patterns
The other implication of trends in 
resources is the risk of disruption to 
existing economic growth patterns:
  International trade has increased 
dramatically over the past few decades 
– by an average of 7.2 per cent a year 
in monetary terms. This represents 
an ever-deeper set of interactions 
between the economies of countries. 
It brings with it the risk that scarcity 
or demand increases in one region 
affect the economic health of a distant 
country. When a tsunami damaged 
the Fukushima nuclear reactor in 
Japan in March 2011, one effect was 
that a Hitachi factory producing 60% 
of the world’s airflow sensors was 
shut down, leading to disruption in 
vehicle production on the other side 
of the world: General Motors shutting 
a plant in Louisiana for a week, and 
Peugeot-Citroën slowing production at 
its European factories (Congressional 
Research Service, 2011). 
  Security of supply issues and market 
volatility in important resources 
increases macroeconomic instability, 
for example, by reducing inflationary 
threats. Global food price hikes, 
caused, for example by regional water 
shortages can undermine government 
reforms.
  Countries that are reliant on resource 
imports, or on particular domestic 
resources, are at higher risk of 
disruption.  For example, many lower-
income nations and communities 
depend on fish and other seafood as 
a key part of their diet, providing 22 
per cent and 19 per cent of animal 
proteins consumed in Asia and Africa 
respectively (Congressional Research 
Service, 2011).  The fisheries sector 
employs about 40 million fishers and 
fish farmers, most living in developing 
countries (FAO; 1999), who depend 
on fisheries for their livelihood (FAO, 
2005a).  
These risks point to the need for economic 
strategies that reduce dependency 
on foreign imports, reduce risks from 
exposure to global markets and return 
greater sovereignty and choice over 
economic decisions to nations without 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
37
creating any barriers to efficient trade.  
The current model of development is not 
sustainable in the long term. A real change 
of course will be needed, significantly 
changing technologies and consumption 
habits.
2.2 Decoupling as a response
2.2.1 What is decoupling?
When a country improves its resource 
productivity, its economy grows at a faster 
rate than its consumption of resources. 
Figure 2.1 shows this for OECD countries 
between 1980-2000.
Figure 2.1 Gross Domestic Production and 
Domestic Material Consumption in OECD countries 
1980-2000
Decision-makers in government, business 
and civil society have the choice to respond 
to the opportunities and threats from 
changing resource pressures through 
improving the resource productivity of 
economic activity. Improving resource 
productivity has not always been 
considered as an option for economic 
policy. Yet, historical evidence suggests 
that the resource productivity of an 
economy is often largely determined by 
policy choice (UNEP, 2011b).
Policy choices can shape the 
competitiveness and growth of a 
country, and the extent to which a 
country is exposed to the risks and 
potential disruptions from changes in 
resource availability. They influence the 
developmental path of an economy. The 
nature of the choice is similar to the 
decisions regularly made on boosting 
labour productivity or favouring the 
development of particular industries 
(for example biotechnology or metal 
production) in a country. It is, in practice, 
also the kind of decision over what 
infrastructure to provide for citizens and 
cities: for example, how water is supplied.
When an economy grows at a faster 
rate than its consumption of resources, 
it is called “decoupling”.  A successful 
economy (in terms of resource productivity) 
has decoupled its growth from its resource 
use.  It means that the nation can produce 
greater economic value out of fewer 
resource inputs (both material and energy) 
per unit of value25. It stands as one 
indicator of how wasteful the economic 
activity is. 
We propose to distinguish between three 
types of decoupling: 
1.  Decoupling through maturation. 
This type of decoupling is a “natural” 
process of overcoming clumsy and 
inefficient techniques, of building-up of 
infrastructures, and of actively reducing 
environmental pollution. This is related 
to the maturation process as countries 
shift from an extraction and production-
based economy towards a service 
economy. For example this can happen 
after a period of strong investment in 
physical infrastructure and buildings 
has satisfied that need, so construction 
activity declines and the economy 
uses proportionally less construction 
materials. 
2.  Decoupling through shifting to other 
countries the more material intensive 
stages in product life cycles (burden-
shifting), which happens when domestic 
25  Growth is more strongly decoupled where a greater share of an economy’s 
growth comes from resource productivity relative to labour productivity. 
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extraction and production is partly 
replaced by imported materials and 
products, and the domestic economy 
shifts towards a service economy. 
Although resource use may decline 
domestically, it still occurs elsewhere 
in the world where the more material 
intensive, often more polluting, stages 
in products life cycles may be taking 
place.– This type of decoupling is often 
labelled as “burden shifting”, where 
resource-intensive activities and their 
environmental impacts are shifted 
offshore.
 3. Decoupling through intentional resource 
productivity increase. This is what is 
really needed to reduce pressures 
on limited resources, on climate, 
and on the environment in general. 
This happens through technological 
innovation, infrastructures conducive 
to resource efficient and low material 
intensity manufacturing and living, and 
appropriate attitudes and consumption 
patterns, including active steps to reduce 
environmental harm and changes 
in products and services by which 
consumption delivers quality of life. 
The first two types of decoupling are often 
observed, and play a role in supporting 
the idea of a “Kuznets curve” for local 
environmental pollution, and the frequent 
but incorrect reasoning that the appropriate 
policies of countries should be to grow 
and get prosperous in order to deal with 
environmental problems. 
The first two typically lead to decoupling 
that reduces resource intensity of the 
economy, but only to such a small degree 
that total resource use still increases as the 
economy expands. Intentional decoupling 
can lead to an expanding economy that uses 
fewer resources, and is the main focus of 
this report.  
In response to changes in resource 
demand, some countries have already 
intentionally moved forward with initiatives 
aimed at fostering decoupling.  China 
and Germany stand as two of the clearest 
examples. In its eleventh Five-Year Plan, 
setting out the country’s economy goals 
from 2005-10, China set a target to improve 
its energy efficiency by 20 per cent. The 
twelfth Five-Year Plan set an additional 16 
per cent energy efficiency improvement 
goal for the period 2011-15. In 2002, 
Germany set a clear target of doubling 
material productivity of its economy by 
2020, compared to 1994. 
Chapter 3 illustrates that technologies 
and techniques are already available to 
greatly improve resource productivity, 
by providing a few of the more notable 
examples. Chapter 4 then reviews some of 
the reasons why these opportunities are 
not being taken up more widely.
2.2.2 Choices involved in 
decoupling
When a more resource-productive 
economy saves resources by cutting waste, 
it saves the costs of the resources that it 
has not needed. This allows policymakers 
to decide how the savings are used. The 
savings can be used to create more growth 
– which brings a choice about how best 
those savings can be allocated to meet 
the government’s goals. For instance, 
governments can capture the savings from 
productivity gains through taxation. Then 
they can decide directly how they are spent. 
Or they can choose not to tax, and 
to leave those gains to be allocated 
by the economy into investments or 
greater consumption. In both cases, 
policymakers in government have choices 
that determine whether the allocation 
of the savings will grow the economy on 
a more efficient and productive path, or 
alternatively, choose that it will use up 
the resources that have been saved. In 
the second case, the threats to stability 
mentioned above will remain. 
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For example, when savings are gathered 
by the government, they could be spent 
to improve the resource productivity of 
agriculture (and so increasing agricultural 
output or lessening costs of inputs), or 
alternatively in subsidising energy (which, 
on the contrary would encourage wasteful 
use of energy, among other effects).
When savings are not taken by taxation, 
but left in a market economy, evidence 
suggests that without policy change, 
savings from resource productivity gains 
for a particular resource may not reduce 
dependence on that resource to the extent 
expected, but that at least part of the 
savings from productivity gains will be used 
to buy more of the resource as further 
inputs. This is known as the “rebound 
effect” or, when it is particularly strong, the 
“Jevons paradox” 26.
2.2.3 The “‘rebound effect”’ from 
resource productivity gains 
In 1865, William Stanley Jevons (Jevons, 
1865) described how the dramatic resource 
efficiency gains coming from the invention 
of the steam engine two generations 
earlier did not reduce the total amount of 
coal burned for industrial processes. The 
opposite happened: coal consumption 
soared. The explanation was that more 
efficient use of coal induced ever more and 
new applications for steam power. 
The greater potential production from 
using coal as a resource made it more 
popular as an input in production than 
before. The “Jevons paradox” is now a 
term used to describe similar situations 
of resource productivity with such large 
rebound effects they actually increase 
resource use.
The rebound effect is not only a nineteenth 
century phenomenon – it is seen in each 
country today. Figure 2.2 shows it applied 
26  Since the 1990s also called the Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate, e.g. in 
Saunders, 1992.
to energy consumption in the USA. As each 
unit of energy input could produce more 
economic output (left-hand graph), energy 
consumption rose (right-hand graph).  It 
is possible to find similar phenomena in 
China after the introduction of ambitious 
efficiency standards, or in any EU country 
after EU efficiency standards were 
implemented.
Figure 2.2 The rebound phenomenon: energy 
efficiency increases but so does energy 
consumption. 
Source: Rubin and Tal, 2007
The strength of the rebound effect is 
different in each situation – because it is 
dependent on the policies in place and the 
strengths of the incentives for resource 
efficiency acting on the market economy. 
It can be very weak – so that almost all 
of the resource savings reduce exposure 
to risks from resource scarcity – or, very 
occasionally, as in the case with coal and 
steam engines – so strong that it even 
increases the absolute use of resources.
The implication of the rebound effect 
is that, without a change in the policy 
framework, at least a proportion of 
productivity gains will lead to absolute 
increases in resource use.  
2.2.4 Choosing decoupling is an 
active choice
The implication of the rebound effect is 
that successful decoupling of economic 
growth from resource consumption 
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will require clarity of purpose and 
intentional policy change. Without this, 
the interactions in our complex economic 
system appear likely to reduce the 
resource-saving effect of any efforts to 
decouple.  Countries can choose where 
they want to reduce waste – for example in 
their use of energy, freshwater, material 
resources (including minerals at particular 
risk of supply disruptions) or food. 
China’s investment in making its economy 
more resource-productive has already 
been estimated by some to be greater 
than that of the US and EU combined 
(The Resource Efficiency Alliance, 2011). 
China’s 2011 twelfth Five-Year Plan 
recognises the constraints to growth from 
unchecked resource depletion and sets 
targets for greater industrial resource 
efficiency and an economy that operates 
within the constraints of the changing 
physical environment. 
Countries can – and have – decoupled their 
growth from different resources to different 
degrees. Decoupling can either reduce the 
use of resources absolutely as a country 
grows, or only relatively – so that the rate 
of increase of growth of use of resources is 
lower than the growth itself.  
The first of these is called ”absolute 
decoupling” and the second ”relative 
decoupling”, and is illustrated graphically 
in Figure 2.3, where total water abstraction 
for OECD countries is shown to have been 
absolutely decoupled from 2005 (and 
almost absolutely decoupled before), but 
water for public supply has only been 
relatively decoupled from growth, its 
absolute abstraction increasing at a rate 
less than GDP growth since 1990.
It appears that any degree of decoupling 
is advantageous for a country when 
implemented wisely. However, we can also 
take a broader view to look at the extent 
of decoupling that would be necessary to 
reduce some of the greatest risks facing 
the world’s economic and environmental 
systems from current patterns of 
increasing resource use.
The trends in Chapter 1 imply that to 
maintain stable economies and global, 
natural life support systems, absolute 
decoupling would be required. 
For resources – although pressures 
differ greatly by resource and country – 
approximately a factor five improvement 
(Weizsäcker et al., 2009) in total resource 
productivity by 2050 would be required 
for OECD countries (resulting in just 20 
per cent of today’s material usage/unit of 
production), including also the resources 
embedded in the goods and services they 
import from other countries. This analysis 
is supported by the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development, 
which points to the need for an increase 
in aggregate resource efficiency of factor 
four to 10 by 2050. This implies that each 
unit of production is produced using 
between 25 per cent and 10 per cent of its 
current resource inputs by 2050 (WBCSD, 
2010), a much greater rate than resource 
productivity gains previously seen.
For example, to meet the IPCC’s 
Figure 2.3 Freshwater Abstraction by Major Use 
and GDP, OECD nations (OECD, 2011b, p. 78)
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recommended targets for reducing the risk 
of dangerous climate change, the carbon 
intensity of the global economy would need 
to have already peaked and be reduced by 7 
per cent each year.27 
(The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
(warns that global emissions need to peak 
by 2015, and then reduce by 25-40 per 
cent by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050 to 
minimise the risk of dangerous climate 
change. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
27  OECD countries would need to reduce at a faster rate to give more room to 
developing countries to raise living standards before they too start to achieve 
absolute decoupling. 
Report, published in October 2013, also 
confirms these findings) For any country 
growing at less than 7 per cent a year, a 
7 per cent yearly improvement in carbon 
intensity implies absolute decoupling. This 
would require intentional action: the Stern 
Review points out that historically nations 
have rarely increased energy efficiency by 
more than 2-4 per cent per annum (which 
is relative decoupling) (Stern, 2006). 
The implication is that countries would 
need to make an active choice to take 
effective action to absolutely decouple.
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Technological Responses 
Allowing Significant Decoupling28  
Remarkably, there exists very large untapped potential for decoupling that brings cost-savings through better resource management. 
Indeed, it appears to be almost ubiquitous. 
Technologies and techniques that bring 
very significant resource productivity gains 
are already available, right across the 
range of resource consuming activities.
This chapter is designed to illustrate 
that economies, firms and individual 
decision-makers can choose between 
future investments that are more, or 
less, resource productive.  The chapter 
highlights examples of technologies and 
some techniques that are available or 
currently used to greatly increase resource 
productivity. They indicate that for nearly 
28 This part of the report is based significantly on research and drafting by 
 Dr Michael Smith (ANU) for this report and previously for the co-authored 
 publication Factor Five and an for the Chicago Climate Exchange. It has also 
 received research and editorial support from the members of The Natural 
 Edge Project, namely Karlson ‘Charlie’ Hargroves, Cheryl Desha, Angie Reeve 
 and David Sparks.
every country, it is not technological 
potential that is holding back resource 
productivity. Whatever the level of 
development of a country, there appear to 
be more resource-productive methods of 
production or consumption.
The Rathkerewwa Desiccated Coconut 
Industry (RDCI) in Maspotha, Sri Lanka 
is a good example. RDCI could reduce 
12 per cent of energy use, 8 per cent of 
material use and 68 per cent of water use, 
while increasing the production by 8 per 
cent during the same period by adopting 
a series of recommendations on its 
peeling process, water treatment and fuel 
switching. The total investment required 
for implementing these recommendations 
was less than US$5,000 while an annual 
financial return of about US$300,000 was 
reported.29  
29  For details, see http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/
Environmental_Management/Cleaner_Production/RECP_SriLanka.pdf 
[accessed 12th April 2014]
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3.1 The widespread opportunity
An idea of the scale and diversity of the 
opportunity can be found by reviewing 
some of the available technologies for 
some of the key resources. The results of 
McKinsey Global Institute’s work – shown 
as estimated cost curves for reduction of 
resource use in Figure 3.1 – illustrate this. 
The shaded blocks provide an indication of 
the areas of saving potential, based on the 
cost efficiency of investments in energy, 
land, food, water and steel. 
In total, the opportunities from the 
technologies and techniques surveyed 
add up to a resource savings potential 
of US$2.9 trillion to US$3.7 trillion each 
year by 2030, on the assumptions used. 
Ninety per cent of the opportunities had an 
internal rate of return of greater than 10 
per cent, if adjusted for subsidies, carbon 
prices and a social discount rate as a way 
to reflect how the investments perform for 
a country’s economic goals, rather than 
only private returns.30 
30  And 70% of the opportunities had a greater than 10% IRR at current prices.
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*1 — Based on current prices for energy, steel and water at a discount rate of 10 per cent per annum, All values are expressed in 2010 prices
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE, 2030
Cost eciency of Investment
$ spent for implementation per $ total resource benefit
Lighting switch from compact flourescent 
to light-emitting diode - commercial
Iron and steel - electric arc furnace improvemnts
Prevention of land degradation
Smallholder yields — developing countries,
low political risk, high infratructure
Higher-strength steel — construction, columns and beams
Food waste reduction — developing countries,
processing, packing and distribution
Commercial yields — developing countries,
high political risk, low infrastructure
Light-duty vehicles gasoline — plug-in hybrid
Light-duty vehicles electric
Public transport — buses
Public transport — bus rapidtransit
Building
envelope — retrofit,
residential
Building envelope — basic retrofit, residential
High-eciency
residential new
builds
Other industry energy eciency
Aviation eciency
Public transport — metro
Smallholder yields — developing countries,
high political risk, low infrastructure
Heavy-duty vehicle — advanced diesel improvements
Ecient motor vehicle air conditioners
Higher-strength steel — construction and rebars
Road
freight
shift
Municipal
water leakage
Improved irrigation
techniques
Appliances — residential
Enhanced oil recovery
Building envelope — 
basic retrofit, commercial
Electronics - oce, commercial
Electronics - consumer, residential
Total annual resource benefit1
2030 savings, $billion
500 1,000 2,0001,500 2,500
Energy
Water
Land
Steel
Figure 3.1 Mapping the range of opportunities for resource productivity gains. 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute, 2011 
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Other evidence also suggests that many 
resource savings can be made with very 
short payback periods. For example, UK 
business are estimated to be able to save 
around £23 billion per year from resource 
efficiency measures that are either no or 
low cost (Hollins, 2011).
 A further £33 billion per year of annual 
savings could be realised from expenditure 
with payback periods of longer than one 
year. The majority of these savings come 
from using raw materials more efficiently 
and generating less waste. Payback times 
for investments for water efficiency and 
waste water treatment tend to be in the 
vicinity of five years31 (provided water is 
sold at an adequate price). Strikingly, the 
payback time curves all start with demand 
side (efficiency) measures and end up with 
payback times of 10 years or more for 
measures trying to increase water supply.
Some of the most striking results come 
from energy efficiency, where there has 
been a greater focus on efficiency since the 
1970s. This chapter also picks examples 
of resource productivity opportunities for 
metals, water, soil, biotic material and 
resources from waste. Although some of 
these technologies are resource specific, 
many of the opportunities – like the 
Rathkerewwa Desiccated Coconut Company 
– come from actions or technologies 
that simultaneously improve resource 
productivity in more than one resource.
3.2 Technologies to save energy
The technical potential to reduce demand 
for energy through energy efficiency 
appears to be in the order of 50-80 per 
cent (factor two-five) for most technical 
systems32. 
31  On the basis of sources including: Water Resources Group (2009).  
32   Since the late 1980s, there have been a range of detailed studies 
providing business and governments around the world with detailed and 
comprehensive guidance as to which showing that existing technologies can 
reduce the intensity of greenhouse gas emissions between 40-80% to be 
achieved by 2040-2050. For further information see: Smith et al., 2007.
  A team which included several of this 
report’s authors researched current 
efforts around the world which are 
currently achieving between 60-80 
per cent improvements in energy (and 
water) efficiency in sectors including: 
buildings, agriculture, food and 
hospitality, industry and transport 
(Weizsäcker et al., 2009). 
  Another recent research study (Cullen 
et al., 2011) analysing energy use 
in buildings, vehicles and industry 
and applying “best practice” energy 
efficiency technologies found that 73 
per cent of global energy use could be 
saved by introducing such changes. 
  Research indicates that developing 
countries could cut their annual 
energy demand growth by more than 
half from 3.4 to 1.4 per cent over the 
next 12 years. This would leave energy 
consumption some 22 per cent lower 
than it would otherwise have been – 
an abatement equivalent to the entire 
energy consumption of China today. 
The opportunities lie in choosing more 
energy-efficient cars and appliances, 
improving insulation in buildings, and 
selecting lower energy-consuming 
lighting and production technologies. 
Additional annual investments in 
energy productivity of $170 billion 
through 2020 could cut global energy 
demand growth by at least half while 
generating average internal rates of 
return of 17 per cent (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2008). Figure 3.2 illustrates 
the role efficiency can play in reducing 
energy consumption and – as shown 
in this figure – corresponding 
greenhouse gas emissions.
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Figure 3.2  International Energy Agency – Carbon 
Abatement Strategies. 
(Source: IEA, 2009)
3.2.1 Technologies directly reducing 
fossil fuel consumption
The following section summarises a 
selection of technologies that can improve 
fossil fuel productivity in key resource-
processing industries, suitable for 
application in developing countries. 
Mining and minerals: Optimal 
management of crushing and grinding 
significant advances have been made 
which now enable up to 50 per cent 
reductions in the energy intensity of 
crushing and rock grinding in the mining 
sector (Pokrajcic and Morrison, 2009). 
Enabling technologies also exist to achieve 
up to 40 per cent reductions in the energy 
intensity of zinc, tin, copper, and lead 
smelting by using advanced furnace 
technology with co-generation.33
Steel: Compared to inefficient smelting 
processes, reductions of more than 80 per 
cent in greenhouse gas emissions can be 
achieved in the steel processing industry 
by using innovative processes such as 
switching to a state of the art electric arc 
furnace system that process recycled 
steel (including options such as improved 
process control, oxy-fuel burners, DC-arc 
furnaces, scrap preheating and post-
33  See Ausmelt Technologies at http://www.outotec.com/en/About-us/Our-
technologies/Smelting/Ausmelt-smelting-and-converting/, accessed 12 April 
2014.   
combustion processes) and implementing 
options such as energy monitoring and 
management systems for energy recovery 
and distribution between processes along 
with preventative maintenance. Using 
high levels of recycled steel in electric 
arc furnaces not only improves energy 
productivity but also materials and water 
productivity (Liedtke and Merten, 1994).  
Cement: Research shows that the energy 
used in current methods of Portland 
cement manufacture can be reduced by 
at least 30 per cent globally (Humphreys 
and Mahasenan, 2002; Kim and Worrell, 
2002). However, the greatest reductions 
would come from the use of alumino-
silicate (geopolymer) cement that can 
reduce the overall greenhouse gas 
emissions of the concrete by 80 per cent, 
compared to Portland cement (Duxson 
et al., 2007; Duxson 2008) depending 
on formulation variations, as it requires 
lower kiln temperatures and has no direct 
process emissions of carbon dioxide 
(Davidovits, 2002). The World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development has 
identified cement manufacturing as one 
of the six key industries on which to focus 
efforts on reducing energy consumption 
and greenhouse gas emissions.34 Once 
commercialised at larger scale, geopolymer 
cement should cost less to produce than 
Portland cement and may have better 
durability. Other innovative cements that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions per ton 
by 40 per cent are already in commercial 
use for construction.
Paper and pulp: Fossil fuel use by the USA 
pulp and paper industry declined by more 
than 50 per cent between 1972 and 2002 
(AF&PA, 2004), largely through energy 
efficiency measures, power recovery 
through co-generation and increased 
sourcing of energy from biomass sources 
(IPCC, 2007). Since 1990, CO2 emissions 
in the sector globally have decreased 
34  WBCSD (undated) Cement Sustainability Initiative, http://www.wbcsdcement.
org/, accessed 12 April 2014. 
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by approximately 25 per cent in Europe, 
20 per cent in Australia (Prosser et al., 
2006), and 40 per cent in Canada through 
investing in similar measures.35 The sector 
also has the potential in both existing and 
new mills to become renewable electricity 
exporters through the use of Black Liquor 
Gasification-Combined Cycle (BLGCC) 
technologies (Worrell and Galitsky, 2004). 
Black Liquor is a by-product of de-
lignifying wood chips, and can be used to 
generate a synthesis gas (syngas) that is 
combusted in a gas turbine or combined 
cycle system with a high efficiency. 
Chemicals: According to research 
undertaken by the Climate Group, a UK 
based thinktank, Bayer has now achieved 
63 per cent reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions profitably (Bayer, 2004). A range 
of technologies enable significant energy 
savings and greenhouse gas reductions in 
this sector: chemical process innovation, 
catalysts, co-generation and heat 
exchangers to capture, recover and reuse 
heat and power, as well as separation 
membrane technologies to replace energy 
intensive distillation processes.  Use of 
innovative chemicals has the potential 
to greatly reduce resource use in other 
sectors of industry and society.
3.2.2 Technologies directly saving 
electricity in industry
Electric motors: Electric motors can 
account for approximately 60-80 per 
cent of industrial electricity use, driving 
pumps, fans, air compressors and 
materials processing and handling (Turton 
et al., 2002). Significant improvement 
in many aspects of motor design and 
production has resulted in the availability 
of “highefficiency motors”. Many factors 
influence the comparative efficiency of 
motors, and it is estimated that energy 
consumption can be very greatly reduced 
through the use of high-efficiency motors, 
35  FPAC, available at http://www.fpac.ca/publications/Sustainability_
Report_2009-e.pdf, accessed 12 April 2014. 
the use of a variable speed drive to 
precisely control the electricity frequency 
(Turton et al., 2002), matching design 
loadings, optimizing the whole system 
including the motor, shaft coupling, 
pump and throttle valve (Energy Efficiency 
Exchange, n.d.), and appropriate sizing. 
The IEA found in 2011 that using these 
approaches could reduce global electricity 
demand by 10% (Waide and Brunner, 
2011). High-efficiency motors alone could 
potentially save 28-50% of energy use, with 
a typical payback period of one to three 
years (CADDET, 1995).
CASE STUDY – CHINA: Electric motors used 
in industry in China account for around 60 
per cent of the country’s total electricity 
consumption. The operational efficiency 
of these motors is 10-30 per cent below 
international best practice, depending on 
the industry. There is generally a low level 
of awareness of the potential efficiency 
gains with motors. Some actions are being 
taken, however. For example, in the second 
largest oil field in China, the total power 
consumption was 7 billion kilowatt hours 
(kWh) per year, of which 3.11 billion kWh 
were used by motors. An audit revealed that 
there were 14,000 motors operating with 
high power consumption and low efficiency, 
operating for on average 7,200 hours per 
year, revealing an enormous potential for 
fuel saving (Schröder and Tuncer, 2010). 
To test the potential for energy and financial 
savings, several motors were replaced with 
efficient motors. The output with the new 
motors is only marginally higher than the 
previous motors (0.84 per cent higher), 
however the average power saving rate is 
13.2 per cent. This equates to a monthly 
power saving of 5,910kWh and annual 
power saving of 70,920kWh. The investment 
cost for these motors was 52,500 yuan 
(US$7,600), and with the price of electricity 
being 0.45 yuan/kWh, this resulted in annual 
savings of 32,600 yuan (US$4,700). Hence, 
the payback period for recovery of the initial 
investment was 1.6 years. The estimated 
service life is 15 years, saving a total of 
486,000 yuan (US$70,350). Based on the 
savings produced in this pilot study, there is 
the potential to save more than 400 million 
kWh of electricity per year in this oil field.
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Energy-efficient lighting: Globally, lighting 
is responsible for around 19 per cent of 
global electricity use, and a much higher 
proportion of energy use in buildings 
(IEA, 2006a). Additionally, electric lighting 
generates waste heat, which subsequently 
places additional load on building 
ventilating and cooling systems, estimated 
to account for up to 15-20 per cent of 
cooling demand (IESNA; 2001).
Light-emitting diode (LED) lamps are 
generally around 80 per cent more 
efficient than incandescent lamps 
(Portela et al., 2010). These new, highly 
efficient lighting technologies such as 
LED lamps are increasingly being used 
across the world. In developing countries, 
they provide good quality light to more 
people by coupling these efficient forms 
of lighting with renewable power sources 
(Portela et al., 2010). 
This has begun to tackle the problem 
identified by the World Health Organization, 
that approximately 1.5 billion people 
still lack access to electricity, with the 
majority of these residing in south Asia or 
sub-Saharan Africa (Legros et al., 2009). 
Without access to modern electricity 
supplies, people rely on fuels such as 
kerosene, diesel and biomass for lighting 
(Mills, 2005), that are inefficient and highly 
polluting. With LEDs, photovoltaic systems, 
pico-hydro generators, and hand- or 
pedal-powered generators may be used to 
provide power for the efficient lamps. 
CASE STUDY – NEPAL: A pico-hydro system 
in Nepal, that previously supplied lighting 
energy to three households, was instead 
able to provide light to 28 houses after the 
installation of LED lamps (Mills, 2002). In 
this case, increasing the end-use efficiency 
of the lighting source allowed more 
households to benefit from higher quality 
light at a cost equivalent to kerosene.
Energy-efficient technologies used 
in conjunction with design principles 
can significantly reduce use of energy 
in buildings while providing a better 
environment for building occupants. 
Effective day lighting strategies can deliver 
reductions in annual lighting energy 
consumption in the order of 10 – 60 per 
cent, and up to 40-80 per cent in perimeter 
zones (Levine et al., 2007). Savings are 
achieved by coupling natural daylighting 
strategies with simple technologies such 
as lighting controls, occupancy/daylight 
sensors, and effective task lighting. Passive 
design principles that effectively utilise 
daylight while avoiding glare and solar 
heat gain reduce or eliminate the need for 
artificial lighting and provide a pleasing 
lighting quality for occupants (Smith et al., 
2007). Appropriate inclusion of windows 
and skylights in conjunction with simple 
technologies such as light shelves, light 
ducts, and light tubes, have been shown 
to give high performance with satisfactory 
payback periods (Singhal et al., 2009). 
These technologies reduce the need for 
electric lighting over the life of the building 
and therefore reduce both resource 
consumption and energy use. Adequate day 
lighting has also been linked to mood and 
productivity of occupants in offices (Abdou, 
1997) and schools (Plympton et al., 2000). 
Energy-efficient street and traffic 
lighting: Street lighting contributes 
significantly to city energy demand and 
associated greenhouse gas emissions. 
New and emerging lighting technologies, 
such as fluorescents and LEDs can 
dramatically reduce energy consumption, 
as well as reduce resource consumption 
through longer service lives. These newer 
lamps also reduce municipal expenditure 
for energy and maintenance of street 
lighting. Performance of high-efficiency 
lighting is predicted to further improve 
over time (Hansen, 2009). Combining these 
high-efficiency lighting technologies with 
emerging lighting control technologies can 
deliver further energy savings of 5-10 per 
cent, leading to total savings of 90 per cent 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011a).
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CASE STUDY – USA: LED lights are 
now often being used in traffic light 
applications, providing the same level of 
light as traditional incandescent bulbs 
while reducing energy use and maintenance 
requirements. The City of Denver began 
replacing traditional incandescent 
traffic lights with LED signals in 1996. 
Approximately 20,500 traffic signals have 
since been retrofitted, avoiding 1,440 metric 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) and saving 
the city more than US$430,000 annually with 
a four-year payback period (Winer, 1998).
CASE STUDY – SOUTH AFRICA: The city 
of Cape Town in South Africa is currently 
conducting a 10-year traffic signal upgrade 
programme, retrofitting 120 intersections 
per year with LED lamps. The LED lamps 
consume almost 90 per cent less electricity 
than the lamps they replaced, yet produce 
the same lighting service (Soloman and 
Sebitosi, 2007). A total of 1,200 major traffic 
intersections will be retrofitted during the 
programme period and are expected to 
deliver savings of ZAR 23.8 million (US$2.9 
million) due to electricity savings and 
reduced maintenance. The programme 
is estimated to have also reduced CO2 
emissions by 39,000 tonnes (Soloman and 
Sebitosi, 2007)). 
CASE STUDY – AUSTRALIA: The city of 
Sydney found that one third of the city’s 
annual electricity use came from public 
lighting (City of Sydney, 2014). The council 
investigated high-efficiency street lighting 
technologies as a key measure to help 
achieve the city’s targeted energy and 
emissions reductions of 50 per cent. A 
trial to test the viability of LED street 
lights found substantial energy and 
greenhouse reductions of 40 per cent 
was possible, and has led to a citywide 
lighting retrofit (City of Sydney, 2011). The 
LED lights met appropriate standards and 
produced high-quality light while reducing 
electricity consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions. The city then undertook 
a citywide lighting retrofit using LED 
technologies in combination with lighting 
controls to allow remote monitoring and 
control, so as to further reduce energy use.
3.2.3 Technologies for reducing 
fossil-fuel demand in 
transportation: trucks   
and ships
Trucking fuel efficiency: Freight trucks 
contribute 24 per cent of greenhouse 
gas emissions for the transport sector. 
Emissions from this sector are forecast to 
more than double over the next 50 years 
(WBCSD, 2004). The fuel efficiency of trucks 
can be greatly improved through a number 
of key measures, including improving 
the aerodynamics and reducing rolling 
resistance. The Rocky Mountain Institute 
estimates that 50 per cent improvements 
are possible for both with design innovation 
and current off-the-shelf technology. This 
is significant as for heavy trucks travelling 
along interstate highways at speeds over 
100 kilometres per hour, the aerodynamic 
drag can be responsible for more than half 
the power requirements. 
Achieving close to these theoretical limits 
requires a combination of modifications 
to the freight truck and trailer form, 
such as adding a full roof deflector (5-
10 per cent reduction), chassis fairing 
(1-3 per cent reduction), sloped hood (2 
per cent reduction), round corners, aero 
bumper (2 per cent reduction), air dam, 
flush headlights (0.5 per cent reduction), 
slanted windshield, curved windshield, side 
extenders (1-7 per cent reduction), skirts 
(plates which are mounted on the sides of 
trailers) and under-hood air cleaners (1-4 
per cent reduction), concealed exhaust 
system, recessed door hinges, grab 
handles, aerodynamic mirrors (1-2 per 
cent reduction) and truck vision systems 
(3-4 per cent reduction) that can replace 
mirrors (Cummins, 2006, p. 10; Kenworth 
Truck Company, 2006, pp. 7-10). Similarly, 
for trailers, designing smooth-sided van 
trailers with a rounded leading edge will 
induce minimum drag.
The rolling resistance of the truck can 
be reduced through a combination of 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
49
cumulative factors, such as reducing the 
weight of the truck (for example by using 
alternative floor materials and reducing 
the amount of steel used in the frame), 
optimizing tyre configuration (4-6 per cent 
fuel savings), tyre and axle alignment and 
behavioural practices (truck speed and tyre 
inflation). Once the power requirements 
of the truck have been reduced by 
optimizing the aerodynamic form and 
reducing the rolling resistance, the engine 
can be resized and redesigned to match 
this reduced capacity, further producing 
fuel savings. Collectively, by cascading 
efficiencies created through improved 
aerodynamism, reduced rolling resistance 
and downsizing and enhanced engine 
efficiency, improvements of 70-80 per cent 
are estimated to be achievable (Lovins et 
al., 2004).
Shipping efficiency: Shipping is a primary 
means of transportation for many goods 
as it is a relatively low-energy transport 
option (Macintosh, 2007). However due 
to the scale of the industry, shipping is 
responsible for 2.7-5 per cent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions and contributes 
heavily to air pollution in coastal areas 
(Kleiner, 2007). A range of technological 
innovations is being used in the sector to 
achieve better environmental outcomes and 
greater energy efficiency. New low-drag hull 
coatings, air floatation devices, advanced 
propeller technology, waste heat recovery, 
and the utilization of parafoils and other 
wind-assisted propulsion technologies are 
all contributing to energy and greenhouse 
gas reductions. Low-drag hull coatings 
have been trialled on more than 300 vessels 
around the world and delivered CO2 savings 
of approximately 9 per cent (Boyd, 2012). 
The inclusion of an air cavity in the hull 
of ships aids buoyancy and reduces drag. 
This innovation was trialled on five vessels 
and resulted in greenhouse gas reductions 
of 7-15 per cent (Boyd, 2012). Additional 
improvements in associated container 
logistics operations, such as loading and 
unloading containers from cargo ships, 
are further efficiency gains, giving a total 
potential of 40-70 per cent.
CASE STUDY – VYCON: The loading and 
unloading of containers from cargo ships 
requires large amounts of energy and thus 
represents a significant cost involved in 
container transportation. Mobile cranes, 
powered by onboard diesel generators, are 
utilised to move the enormous containers 
between ports and container ships and then 
to freight trains and trucks. However, an 
innovation by flywheel manufacturer Vycon 
has cut energy consumption drastically 
while extending the life of mechanical parts 
(Pauli, 2011). Lowering the containers 
is energy intensive because the braking 
system must generate significant resistance 
in order to slowly lower the containers. 
Usually the energy from braking is directed 
to a bank of resistors where the energy is 
dissipated. Vycon realised that the kinetic 
energy generated by lowering the containers 
could be harnessed using a flywheel and 
stored for use during the next container lift. 
The design is a form of regenerative brake, 
which slows the descent of the container 
by converting its kinetic energy into 
rotational energy in the flywheel. This simple 
innovation reduced energy consumption by 
30-35 per cent (Pauli, 2011). In addition, the 
design reduces noise and prolongs the life of 
generators due to the utilization of magnetic 
bearings. The bearing design levitates the 
flywheel in a magnetic field, essentially 
eliminating friction and mechanical wear in 
the system.
3.2.4 Technologies for reducing 
fossil-fuel demand in 
transportation: rail and road 
passengers
Transporting passengers and freight by rail 
is much more efficient than transporting 
by road, with freight estimated to be up 
to 66-80 per cent more efficient than 
trucking (Kamakaté, 2007), with significant 
opportunities existing to further improve 
efficiency. The UK Carbon Trust argues 
that significant efficiencies could be 
achieved in this sector through energy 
efficiency, regenerative braking, lighter 
rolling stock, better traffic flow and load 
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factor management, biodiesel and hybrid or 
fuel cell engines and renewable electricity 
(UK Carbon Trust, n.d.). Large efficiency 
gains have already been recognized over 
the last few decades as locomotives have 
become more efficient. In the USA, the 
volume of freight transported by rail has 
almost doubled since 1980 while energy use 
increased only marginally (Association of 
American Railroads, 2009).
Although the aerodynamic performance 
of trains is already relatively good, it is 
still possible to reduce drag and friction 
(Jochem, 2004). Simple alterations can 
be quite effective. For example, during 
transport of coal, empty cars can contribute 
significantly to fuel consumption. Adding 
covers over empty containers during 
transport has been shown to reduce drag 
by 25 per cent due to improved aerodynamic 
performance (Jochem, 2004). Improved 
logistics may also deliver significant energy 
savings without need for further resource 
consumption (Jochem, 2004). Focusing 
on better traffic flow and load factor 
management can assist in utilizing rail 
infrastructure more efficiently (UK Carbon 
Trust, n.d.). Other management practices, 
such as reduced idling time can deliver 
savings of more than 6.3 per cent. Simple 
software and GPS technology can also be 
used to help optimize speed for maximum 
fuel efficiency by considering factors such 
as the type of locomotive, weight, gradient, 
and location (Association of American 
Railroads, 2009).
CASE STUDY – JAPAN: Japanese train 
manufacturer JR East Group has been 
applying a range of strategies to improve 
the energy efficiency of passenger train 
design since 1993. Their latest trains, the 
E231 series, are 50 per cent more efficient 
than the 103 series, which is the major 
metropolitan area commuter train (JR East 
Group, 2004). The E231 series achieves 
these savings mainly through lighter overall 
weight, effective use of braking energy, and 
greater motor efficiency. 
3.3 Technologies saving metals 
and minerals
3.3.1 Steel end use in construction 
Around half of global steel is currently 
used in construction. Three examples show 
the extent of potential savings:
Higher strength steel: Using steel with 
higher strength for re-enforcement of 
concrete, beams and columns saves steel. 
ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steel 
company estimates use of higher strength 
steel achieves a 32 per cent reduction in the 
weight of steel columns and 19 per cent in 
beams (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). 
China and developing countries tend to 
use lower strength steel, with China using 
steel for reinforcement that is two thirds the 
strength of steel averagely used in Europe. 
This offers a very good opportunity as these 
countries’ use of steel is very significant. 
(For example, China currently consumes 60 
per cent of global steel reinforcement bar 
production.) Even partial global switching to 
higher strength steel could save 105 million 
tonnes of steel a year, and save 20 per cent 
of the costs of the use of steel (Allwood, J. 
and Cullen, J., 2012).
Steel use optimisation: Additionally, the 
mass of steel put for reinforcement in 
buildings and infrastructure constructions 
is frequently excessive, with 15-30 per cent 
more put into constructions than would 
be needed to meet building codes and 
design needs. This can be because simple 
estimations of the steel needed on the 
construction site do not take into account 
the construction’s design. One solution is 
offsite, computer-controlled fabrication of 
“carpets” of reinforcement bars that are 
designed for the building’s needs. This 
technology is already being commercially 
implemented, for example by Qube Design. 
Using these techniques could save 15 per 
cent of the mass of steel used globally for 
reinforcement in construction (Allwood, J. 
and Cullen, J., 2012).
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Beam and joist redesign: Estimations from 
Cambridge University in the UK suggest 
that savings of more than 30 per cent of 
steel used in floor and ceiling beams for 
construction could come from redesign 
of the beams by using less steel while 
offering the same physical properties. This 
includes using beams with variable depth 
(or thickness) or ceiling joists made of a web 
of steel elements instead of a solid beam 
(Allwood, J. and Cullen, J., 2012). 
3.3.2 Reduction in metal use
Blanking sheet metal: The pressing out 
(or “blanking”) of metal components of 
different size and shape from sheet metal 
necessarily leaves behind pieces of sheet 
metal that are not wanted and too small 
to use for other components. Intelligent 
organization of the different shapes to be 
pressed out can realize significant metal 
savings.
Figure 3.3 Alternative blanking patterns for metal 
components from sheet metal. 
Source: Closing the Eco-Innovation Gap (Eco-Innovation 
Observatory Annual Report 2011)
CASE STUDY: DEUTSCHE MECHATRONICS. 
Deutsche Mechatronics GmbH operates in 
Germany providing engineering services, 
including pressing out of sheet metal parts 
for external customers. It used up to 40 
tonnes of sheet metal a day for almost 
100 different customer orders, with a wide 
variety of shapes. By using computer-driven 
shuffling and a good production planning 
system, metal use could be reduced by 12 
per cent.
Substitution with bamboo: Bamboo is 
one of the fastest growing woody plants 
globally, reaching maturity three times 
faster than any other harvestable timber, 
in on average three years (Jayanetti and 
Follet, 2003). Bamboo is used for many 
purposes that reduce consumption of 
less sustainable resources, such as for 
co-firing in power plants, producing 
bio-oil, for food, paper, clothing, 
furniture, wind turbine blades, sporting 
equipment, scaffolding and construction. 
It is estimated the construction sector is 
responsible for as much as 50 per cent 
of material extraction, and 50 per cent of 
waste generation (Edwards and Bennet, 
2003). Bamboo is well-established as a 
viable construction material, particularly 
in relatively poor, rural areas. Bamboo 
can grow in most climatic conditions and 
soil types, and provides benefits while 
growing such as soil stabilisation; due to 
spreading roots, bamboo has been found 
to reduce soil erosion by 75 per cent within 
two years of being planted (INBAR, 2010). 
Due to a rapid growth rate, bamboo can be 
sustainably harvested in three- to five-year 
rotations (Jayanetti and Follet, 2003). 
Bamboo has natural structural advantages, 
including its strength and light weight, such 
that properly constructed bamboo buildings 
are inherently wind and earthquake 
resistant (Jayanetti and Follet, 2003). 
Indeed, the tensile strength of bamboo is 
relatively high, reaching 370 megapascals, 
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making bamboo an attractive substitute for 
steel (Ghavami, 2008). The ratio of tensile 
strength to specific weight of bamboo 
is six times greater than that of steel. 
The energy needed to produce 1m3 of 
bamboo per unit of stress compared with 
materials commonly used in construction 
found that steel requires 50 times for 
energy than bamboo. Two tons of CO2 
are emitted to produce one ton of steel, 
compared to bamboo, which absorbs CO2 
as it grows (Ghavami, 2005). While bamboo 
would normally be part of a short carbon 
cycle, rapidly absorbing carbon from the 
atmosphere and rereleasing this as the 
plant decomposes, the use of bamboo for 
construction and other durable purposes 
can sequester the bamboo carbon for at 
least several decades (Yiping et al., 2010).
CASE STUDY – CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY: There is growing application 
and sophistication in the use of bamboo in 
the construction industry, including as flat 
panels able to be used as floor boards and 
walls, large laminated sections for use in 
external joinery, to reinforce concrete and to 
provide structural support (Ghavami, 2008). 
As bamboo is flexible, it can be used to create 
domes and other curved shapes that can be 
difficult to achieve with other construction 
materials (INBAR, 2010). Bamboo is in 
particular an attractive building material in 
developing countries as it is cheap, locally 
available and quick to grow. Further, only 
a low degree of industrialization is needed 
to cure and process bamboo, particularly 
in comparison to steel. This reduces 
transportation requirements and construction 
costs, and can enhance job prospects for 
local construction workers without access 
to training or facilities for the production 
and use of more industrialized construction 
materials (Ghavami, 2008). Furthermore, 
bamboo production can provide sustainable 
jobs and incomes, particularly in developing 
countries. Due to the variety of end uses, 
growing demand, and low-tech harvesting 
and processing, local producers in developing 
countries can cultivate, process and market 
the bamboo themselves to maximize their 
income (INBAR, 2010). Bamboo has been 
found to outlast steel when used to reinforce 
concrete (Ghavami, 2005). 
CASE STUDY – INDIA: The UK based Timber 
Research and Development Association 
designed a project in India to develop and 
promote cost-effective bamboo based 
building systems through demonstration 
and education. To this end, the project 
aimed to showcase safe, secure and durable 
construction that would be affordable even 
to the poorest communities in India, and 
to show how to design buildings so that 
the life of the bamboo would be equivalent 
to that of other building materials. The 
building systems they designed were 
half the cost of traditional brick block 
or reinforced concrete, were simple to 
erect and incorporated all of the essential 
requirements for affordable shelter. At 
the same time, they were sustainable, 
stood up to wind, earthquakes and other 
environmental conditions, and the building 
design was flexible and easily adjusted 
to need. The use of bamboo presents 
the opportunity to also improve the local 
environment (habitat for wildlife, reduced 
erosion, carbon sink and protection of native 
forests) and to enhance the local economy 
through providing a local industry (bamboo 
cultivation and processing), jobs (bamboo 
harvesting, processing and building) and a 
food source (Jayanetti and Follet, 2003).
 
Information and communication 
technologies (ICT)36 are continuously 
making astounding progress in technical 
efficiency and performance. The space, 
material and energy needed to provide 
a unit of ICT service have decreased by 
three orders of magnitude (Hilty, 2008, p. 
13) (Factor 1,000) since the first personal 
computer, the Apple II, was sold in 1977. 
For this reason there are high expectations 
in regard to the contribution of ICT to 
continue to reduce its own impacts, and 
to further support significant energy and 
resource productivity improvements across 
our economies in the coming decades.
36  Extract from Fitcher et al., 2010.
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3.3.3 Saving materials from  
waste streams
Reducing the material that a nation discards 
reduces resource wastage, which increases 
the resource productivity of the economy, 
helping to decouple its resource use. 
This can be done through waste prevention 
and increasing recycling, which also 
provides an additional domestic source 
of supply for materials. The waste of one 
industry can be used as input by others if 
properly facilitated. 
Globally, there is significant scope to lift 
recycling rates. Currently, however, only 25 
per cent of the 4 billion tonnes of municipal 
waste produced each year is recovered or 
recycled. Only 15 per cent of all electronic 
waste is recycled and less than 1 per cent 
of rare earth metals are currently recycled.  
UNEP research has found that on a global 
scale, under a scenario of increased “green” 
investment, the global recycling rate in 2050 
could be more than three times the level 
projected under business as usual, and 
the amount of waste destined for landfills 
reduced by more than 85 per cent.
Design of products to reduce waste: 
Reductions in waste can be found by design 
in the products being consumed. 
CASE STUDY – PACKAGING REDUCTION: 
In one instance, Electrodomesticos Taurus 
redesigned its domestic food blender so that 
nearly all cardboard packaging previously 
used for sale was eliminated. Instead, the 
blender was packed in two containers that 
form part of the product itself, and are used 
for blending, chopping and making sauces. 
Each redesigned blender saves 130g of 
cardboard and its related life cycle impacts.
CASE STUDY – CARPET TILES: UK-based 
commercial carpet maker Desso set a 
goal to make all its products 100 per cent 
recyclable, while launching a scheme for 
the return of its and its competitors’ carpets 
for recycling. Putting this goal into practice 
required design changes, and material 
substitution to use materials that can be 
recycled over and over again. Materials 
are evaluated against 19 human health 
and environment criteria, with the goal 
to use 100 per cent materials that can be 
constantly recycled by 2020. This required 
a re-engineering of the firm’s supply chain. 
More than 60 per cent of the company’s 
product range now contains recycled 
material, while the company aims to collect 
around 12,000 tonnes of carpets to feed into 
recycling during 2013.
Substituting fossil fuels with methane 
from landfill: Landfills generate 
large amounts of methane gas from 
decomposing organic waste. Further, 
methane in landfills often presents a 
difficult management issue as it can 
cause explosions and noxious odours. 
However, methane is a valuable fuel and 
can be burned in power stations and for 
industrial applications, and can also be 
liquefied, transported and distributed for 
purposes such as heating and cooking. 
Hence, capturing and beneficially using 
the 40-60 per cent methane in landfill gas 
can reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
as well as offset the use of other fossil 
fuels. (Methane itself is a significant 
greenhouse gas and globally emissions 
from waste contribute 3 per cent to total 
greenhouse gas emissions, IEA, 2008a) 
Globally, there is significant potential to 
capture and beneficially use methane from 
landfill gas. Figure 3.4 below shows an 
estimate of the methane emissions from 
landfills in the top 10 emitting countries 
in 2010, highlighting the potential for this 
technology to reduce global greenhouse 
gas emissions. Several of these are 
developing economies.
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Figure 3.4 Estimate methane emissions from 
landfills in the top ten emitting countries, 2010 
Source: Global Methane Initiative (GMI, 2011, p.2)
Developing countries such as China, 
Mexico, Brazil and India can benefit as 
waste disposal rates increase, landfill 
management practices improve, and 
energy demand grows. 
CASE STUDY – USA: In the USA, landfill gas 
has been captured at the nation’s largest 
landfills to meet requirements under the 
1996 Clean Air Act. However even landfills 
not required by legislation have landfill gas 
capture projects due to tax incentives and 
voluntary projects, such that there were 
approximately 480 landfill sites in December 
2008, representing around 27 per cent of 
the nation’s landfills, capturing landfill 
gas (Bracmort et al., 2009). Methane from 
landfills contributes 1.8 per cent to the 
US total greenhouse gas emissions. It is 
estimated that between 60 and 90 per cent 
of the methane in the landfill gas can be 
captured and burned. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) encourages the 
capture and use of landfill gas for energy by 
burning the methane in a thermal electricity 
generator, directly using the gas to provide 
heat for industrial or other purposes, or in 
cogeneration plants. 
CASE STUDY – CHINA: The Gauantun 
landfill in China has been retrofitted to 
enable landfill gas capture and use (GMI, 
2011, p. 3). Following testing and pre-
feasibility investigations conducted by the 
US EPA, a gas collection system consisting 
of 150 extraction wells was converted 
from existing passive vents. A 500-kilowatt 
(kW) reciprocating engine was installed in 
2007 to generate electricity for the onsite 
leachate treatment plant, and a second 
500kW engine was added in 2008. The 
project is annually reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions by 37,100 tons of CO2e from 
electricity generation and 500 tons of CO2e 
through direct use. Two additional engines 
will be added, bringing the total electric 
generating capacity to 2.5 megawatts (MW). 
There are plans to ultimately increase the 
power generating capacity to 4MW by the 
landfill closure date (GMI, 2011).
3.4 Technologies saving 
freshwater and biotic 
resources
3.4.1 Technologies saving 
freshwater extraction 
Within each area of potential efficiency, 
there is usually a wide range of options 
(Smith et al, 2010c), of which this chapter 
only gives one or two illustrative examples. 
For example, one map of the potential 
means for reducing a projected demand-
supply gap in China’s future water demand 
identified 55 levers utilizing more than 
40 technologies (2030 Water Resources 
Group, 2009).
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Figure 3.5 China Water Availability Cost Curve  
Source: 2030 Water Resources Group, 2009, p. 77 
A long list of the technologies to reduce 
freshwater consumption through 
improving water efficiency and increasing 
reuse and recycling of treated water can 
be found in Annex A, with two examples 
described below.
Drip irrigation:  Agriculture is responsible 
for 70 per cent of freshwater withdrawals 
(Weizsäcker et al., 2009). In many 
countries, 90 per cent of irrigated land 
receives water through open channels 
or by intentional flooding. The waste 
of freshwater through these methods, 
through evaporation, leakage and seepage 
is high. Farmers in India, Israel, Jordan, 
Spain and the USA have shown that sub-
surface drip irrigation systems that deliver 
water directly to crop roots can reduce 
water use by 30-70 per cent and raise crop 
yields by 20-90 per cent, depending on 
the crop (Postel et al., 2001).  Efficiency 
savings can be as high as 50-80 per cent, 
and can be made affordable for use in the 
developing world (Shah and Keller, 2002) 
with payback periods of less than a year.
The use of freshwater on farms has 
halved in Israel since 1984, while the 
value of production has continued to 
climb. Drip irrigation has played a role in 
this, alongside the recycling of water for 
farming. More than 80 per cent of all water 
used for farming in Israel is recycled. 
These low-cost solutions are seen to 
increase incomes of smallholders and 
were estimated, in 2001, to be able 
to profitably irrigate a tenth of India’s 
cropland, with similar potential for China.  
India and China currently use this kind of 
technology on just 1-3 per cent of their 
irrigated land, with China in particular 
increasing the spread of this technology to 
arid areas (Brown, 2008).
Where drip irrigation is not appropriate, 
better water management still delivers 
benefits. Farmers in Malaysia saw a 45 per 
cent increase in their water productivity 
through a combination of better scheduling 
their irrigations, shoring up canals, and 
sowing seeds directly in the field rather 
than transplanting seedlings.
Reducing municipal water leakage: 
Estimates of the current rates of leakage 
of municipal water show a great variance 
between countries, with leakage rates 
of 5 per cent losses in Germany and 25 
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per cent in the United Kingdom. The 
opportunity to reduce wastage by leakage 
is particularly large in developing countries 
– India could save 26 per cent of its 
municipal water demand by fixing leaks 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). 
The value of water for municipal use 
is sufficiently high to make leak-fixing 
economically attractive: McKinsey Global 
Institute estimates that action in China 
could have a 22 per cent return (even taking 
into account the subsidised price of water) 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). The World 
Bank’s Water and Sanitation Programme 
found that more than 40 per cent of water 
produced in Indian cities did not produce 
revenue for the utilities because of leakage 
or failure to invoice, pointing to the sources 
for payback of the capital investment 
required for fixing leaks.  Identification and 
location of leaks has now been made much 
easier by technologies that allow remote 
monitoring of water leakage. 
3.4.2 Technologies protecting   
soil fertility 
Currently, large-scale industrial 
agriculture often reduces soil fertility, 
diminishing soil biodiversity and humus 
levels, relying on flows of resources, 
chemicals and fossil energy to maintain 
productive output (Jackson and Berry, 
2011). Many strategies exist to reduce 
resource consumption while maintaining 
productivity. Simple management 
techniques, requiring only education and 
costing little to implement, are being used 
to improve the fertility of agricultural 
systems while reducing resource use and 
maximizing the carbon sequestration 
potential of soils. Increasing soil organic 
carbon through the use of crop residues, 
manures and compost is an effective 
means of improving soil health while 
closing nutrient cycles and sequestering 
carbon (CSIRO, 2011). Practices such as 
cultivating perennial crops, employing 
winter cover crops and utilizing meadow-
based rotation systems can also help 
maintain soil health while requiring less 
input of fertilizer and chemicals.  Energy 
savings of 30 per cent exist and can be 
realized through better understanding 
of farm energy usage (CSIRO, 2011). 
Furthermore, agricultural systems can 
also be used to sequester carbon in soil 
organic matter (Lal, 2004).
Shifting food production systems away 
from monocultures to diverse local 
farming systems built upon biodynamic 
or permaculture principles that are 
restorative of ecological capital and 
maximize the reuse potential of local 
nutrient and energy flows will reduce 
resource consumption and sequester 
soil organic carbon, while also helping to 
restore food sovereignty to communities. 
CASE STUDY – BIOCHAR: According to the 
UN Convention on Climate Change and 
Desertification, “pyrolysis” of agricultural 
residues resulting in charcoal and 
energy production with biochar carbon 
sequestration provides a tool to combine 
sustainable soil management, carbon 
sequestration and renewable energy 
production. While producing renewable 
energy from biomass, agricultural 
productivity, and environmental quality can 
be sustained and improved if the biomass 
is transferred to an inactive carbon pool 
and redistributed to agricultural fields. The 
uses of crop residues as potential energy 
source or to sequester carbon and improve 
soil quality can be complementary, not 
competing uses (UNCCD, 2008).
CASE STUDY – GRAZING METHODS: “Time-
controlled grazing” has been long used 
as a form of pasture management. In the 
late 1950s, French farmer and scientist 
André Voisin showed that for wet and cold 
climates, regularly allowing grazed pasture 
plants adequate time to recover meant that 
the biomass produced in a season could be 
significantly greater than that produced by a 
constantly grazed pasture (Voisin, 1959). This 
involves moving stock through a number of 
paddocks at high stock density (Cook, 1994).
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In the 1980s, Zimbabwean biologist Allan 
Savoury successfully adapted Voisin’s 
ideas to grazing systems in hotter 
and drier climates of southern Africa. 
Through short duration and high-density 
grazing, livestock eat whatever grasses 
and vegetation is available, rather than 
just those species the livestock prefer. 
The combination of these changes leads 
to more soil biota activity, improved soil 
structure and hydraulic properties and 
increased and more active root systems 
of plants (Savory and Butterfield, 1988). 
This also means plants and grasses are 
able to grow longer in dry periods because 
more of the natural rainfall is stored in the 
soil and need less water from irrigation. 
It also means significant levels of soil 
carbon are stored in the soil, which as 
grazing pastures comprise 69 per cent 
of agricultural land globally (FAO and 
IFAD, 2006), indicates significant potential 
for carbon storage through use of these 
methods. The methods have now been 
applied to 30 million hectares of grazing 
land globally.
Figure 3.6 Traditional grazing practices on the left 
hand side, and time controlled grazing practices 
on the right hand side.  
Source: Milkwood (2010)
3.4.3 Technology- saving  
biotic resources
Solar cookers: Two-and-a-half billion 
people in developing countries depend 
on biomass – wood, dung, charcoal and 
agricultural residues – to meet their 
cooking energy needs (IEA, 2006b). This 
often leads to harvesting of biomass 
beyond sustainable levels, leading to 
resource depletion, ecosystem decline 
and soil degradation. (It also results in 
the premature deaths of an estimated 1.6 
million people each year from breathing 
elevated levels of indoor smoke, with 
indoor air pollution being the fourth 
leading cause of death in poor developing 
countries, WHO, 2004). Solar thermal 
cookers have been improved to achieve 
more than factor five efficiencies and are 
cost effective, relying on sunlight instead 
of biomass to cook food. Solar Cookers 
International operates in Kenya, providing 
cookers made from cardboard and 
aluminium foil and costing $10 each. They 
cook slowly, much like a Crockpot and 
require less than two hours of sunshine to 
cook a complete meal. They can also be 
used to pasteurize water, which saves lives 
(Brown, 2008, p. 154).
Reducing consumption of biomass based 
forest products – timber – enabling 
technologies (Hawken et al., 1999): 
Engineered timbers and timber recycling 
provides numerous opportunities to reduce 
raw timber consumption. “Engineered 
timber products” have about 1.8–2.4 times 
conventional lumber’s product yield per 
unit of fibre, and can use younger, softer, 
lower quality trees. Still another important 
timber-saving development is modern 
Glulam beams, which glue together many 
layers of timber to replace massive solid 
beams which can save two thirds of the 
timber mass.
Reducing wastage of food:  The UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization has 
estimated that between 20-30 per cent of 
all food produced is wasted along the value 
chain even before it gets to consumers. In 
developed countries this happens mainly 
in processing packaging and distribution. 
In developing countries it occurs mainly in 
storage and distribution (FAO, 2011). 
Reducing food waste has consequential 
savings for the water, soil, nutrients and 
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energy used in food production at earlier 
stages of the value chain. It offers the 
opportunity to improve domestic food 
security, as well as increased incomes 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011, p. 94). 
The technologies to reduce food wastage 
are not seen as innovatory. Much of the 
savings can come from improved or 
widespread use of best practices (coupled 
with technologies) in processing, storage 
and transport. In developing countries 
this often implies the use of cold-storage 
systems and transport infrastructure.  
Investing in natural assets: Decoupling 
can also involve investments in natural 
assets that provide services, or resource 
flows. The impact of building this natural 
asset base can be profound – as is often 
the case with reafforestation. Forty years 
ago, Niger had severe problems with 
drought, desertification, unsustainable 
farming practices and rapid population 
growth. It was becoming harder and taking 
longer for firewood and timber to be 
found and the farming soils’ fertility was 
declining. 
From the mid-1980s this began to change. 
At that time, farmers in several villages 
were taught to plough carefully around 
tree saplings when sowing crops of millet, 
sorghum, peanuts and beans. The growing 
trees, along with other simple soil and 
water conservation practices, stabilised 
topsoil erosion and so reduced crop loss. 
They became assets that families used to 
supplement incomes, provide insurance 
against crop failure and meet their own 
needs. The trees provided wood for 
charcoal, foliage for animal fodder and 
fruit for food.
Word of mouth spread the benefits until an 
area of 7 million hectares was replanted 
with trees. The average distance a woman 
must walk for firewood in the Zinder region 
of Niger has declined from 2.5 hours to 
half an hour. Poverty is lower, nutrition 
improved and communities are less 
vulnerable to natural disasters. 
When a regional drought and locusts hit 
in 2005, many of the villages in the green 
belt of Niger reported no child deaths 
from malnutrition because they were able 
to sell wood in local markets to purchase 
expensive cereals that normally would 
have been beyond reach (Green World 
Recycling and Gaia, 2010).
3.4.4 Combinations of technologies
It is possible to use several technologies 
at the same time for related issues. 
Most technologies produce additive 
results: the savings or benefits from one 
technology can be added to others, to 
produce greater effect. Sometimes using 
technologies in combination will produce 
enhanced savings, because of favourable 
complementarities between technologies. 
In other cases, there may be negative 
interactions between solutions.
For example, the use of some forms of 
biofuels to reduce fossil fuel consumption 
has significant impacts on water 
consumption and land use. The IEA has 
examined the strong linkages between 
energy policy and water use and found 
that some energy policy approaches 
would result in demand for water usage 
doubling by 2035. Elsewhere, some 
aspects of sustainable water technologies 
– drip irrigation, water recycling and/
or desalination, if applied widely to save 
freshwater, would increase the energy 
intensity of water supply. 
However, the bulk of energy use related 
to water derives from heating it. Heating 
water through the traditional electric 
storage hot water system is responsible 
for a significant proportion of energy 
consumption in residential homes around 
the world – representing 9 per cent in 
the EU in 2004, 11 per cent in the USA 
in 2005, 25 per cent in Australia and 27 
per cent in China in 2000.  This means 
that reducing the use of hot water (or 
increasing the efficiency of hot water use) 
can simultaneously reduce water and 
energy use.  
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The IPCC estimates that: “Energy 
requirements for domestic water heating 
can be reduced by at least 90 per cent, 
through a range of cost effective options, 
including: reducing consumption of hot 
water; improving thermal properties of 
hot water systems; recovering lost heat; 
and selecting low energy consumption hot 
water systems, such as solar thermal or 
heat pumps.”(Levine et al., 2007). 
An idea of the relative scale of the potential 
energy savings (and also greenhouse gas 
emission savings) is given by the estimate 
that savings of 15 per cent in hot water 
heating across Australia would offset the 
entire energy use to supply water to the 
urban water sector (Kenway et al., 2008).
The interaction between technologies or 
techniques to decouple different resources 
from economic growth has implications 
for the choice of technologies.  It implies 
that, where possible, technological options 
that are complementary, rather than 
conflicting, will better achieve decoupling 
goals.  
For example, literature points to the 
possibility to achieve the same levels of 
decoupling of greenhouse gas emission 
reduction through using mitigation 
strategies with water and food security 
co-benefits, as could be achieved by 
investments in first-generation biofuels, 
carbon capture and storage or expansion 
of nuclear electricity generation. 
This can mainly be achieved through end-
use energy efficiency, water efficiency, 
reducing wastage of food, increased 
renewable electricity generation and 
decoupling of growth from non-CO2 
greenhouse gases. Table 1 below very 
briefly describes the range of options that 
would deliver these outcomes:
 
1)  Improve Industrial Process Energy 
Efficiency–For instance shifting to Electric Arc 
Furnace Steel manufacturing. (IEA, 2006)
9) Energy/Water/Materials/Waste Nexus - Product stewardship, 
materials efficiency, recycling, methane capture from landfill (Bahor, 2009)
2) Improve Industrial Technologies Energy 
Efficiency–  Upgrade and optimise industrial 
and commercial technologies eg: electric 
motor driven systems such as pumps and fans 
and compressed air (IEA, 2011)
10) Decarbonising water supply and treatment through reducing water 
leakage water efficiency, demand management, methane to electricity 
from sewerage treatment plants. Investing in solar power generation 
structures on top of the water behind hydroelectric dams to generate 
electricity and reduce water losses due to evaporation from dam water.
3) Reduce Waste Heat Loss and + Waste Heat 
and Power Recovery (including cogeneration) 
(Romm, 2008)
11) Significantly reduce 1.3 billion tonnes of annual global food waste (a 
1/3 of global food production), currently responsible for 3.3 billion tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent emissions. (FAO, 2013)
4) Energy efficient street, traffic and neon sig-
nage lighting, such as LED, cuts energy usage 
by 85% 
12) Increased soil carbon storage in grazing systems through time con-
trolled grazing principally in the South – Africa, Australia and South Amer-
ica
5) End Use Fuel Efficiency #5 – Non-passenger 
vehicle freight transport (Trucks and Rail) (Mui, 
2007)
13) Decarbonising the Electricity Sector - Transitioning to 80-100% 
renewables by 2030-2050 through the use of additional renewable 
technologies  including wind power at sea, solar thermal and geothermal 
in non-arid areas. (Elliston B, et al 2012), (IPCC, 2012), (IEA, 2011, 2009) 
6) End Use Fuel Efficiency #6 – Fuel Efficient 
air transport and alternatives to air transport 
(videoconferencing + very fast trains) (Mui, 
2007)
14) Smart grid technologies to enable plug-in hybrid or fully electric re-
newable transportation vehicles (cars, vans, motorbikes, trucks, buses) 
powered by renewable energy sources through vehicle to grid technolo-
gies. (Romm, 2008, IEA, 2009 and 2011 and Went et al, 2008)
7) End Use Energy Efficiency #7 – Doubling 
of building efficiency. Eg:  Increasing building 
albedo reducing air-conditioning loads. 
15) Reducing Non-CO2 Greenhouse gas emissions. (Reilly, 2008)
8) End Use Efficiency #10 – Designing products 
to be more energy and water efficient.
16) Behaviour Change (Romm, 2008)
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4.1 Introduction
Despite the opportunities for organizations and economies to profit from being more resource-productive, technologies and 
techniques that improve resource 
productivity are not spreading as widely as 
might be expected. As a result, the rate of 
increase in resource productivity is much 
lower than the estimates of technological 
potential. It initially appears strange that 
profits from productivity gains are being 
lost and that chances to avoid future 
economic and environmental costs are 
going unused.  What blocks many of these 
beneficial technologies from being used 
more widely?
The answers appear surprising. Some 
of the barriers appear “soft” compared 
to the size of the benefits on offer.  In 
this respect, the blocks to decoupling 
are similar to the barriers that hold back 
economic development in general: they 
are the kind of factors that explain why 
some economies function better than 
others, or why some firms are more 
successful than others. 
4.2 Growth, development  
and transition
To understand the barriers, we have to look 
at the relationship between innovation, 
growth and transition. 
The adoption of technologies and 
techniques is part of the dynamic process 
of change in an economy, and is an 
essential part of economic growth. For 
growth to happen, old ways of doing things 
are replaced with better ways of doing 
things, old products superseded by better 
(or at least cheaper) ones – with the net 
effect being that more can be produced, 
costs can be saved, investments can be 
What currently holds 
back decoupling?
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made and people can raise their standard 
of living by consuming more. 
This description of the process of growth, 
or development, was popularized by 
Joseph Schumpeter  in the 1940s, whose 
thoughts are now found across the world in 
economic text books and who is renowned 
for the evocative phrase  “gales of creative 
destruction” to convey the way in which 
new ways replace the old to create growth. 
It is a view of growth which has formed 
the backbone of liberal economic policy 
recommendations across the world, with 
liberalization of markets (for trade in 
goods, labour or capital) being justified 
by the belief that increased market 
competition will push aside less productive 
firms and bring greater rewards for 
innovators, leading to growth through the 
expansion of more productive firms.
It means that a growing economy is an 
economy undergoing a transition, even 
when this may not be as apparent as it is 
in developing countries.  It is an economy 
whose stock of investments (including 
skills) is changing.  Even in countries 
where change is not so visible, economies 
grow through day-to-day changes as firms 
succeed and fail and employees change 
jobs. For example in the UK, 28 per cent 
of private sector jobs are lost every year, 
and around the same number created 
(Anyadike-Danes et al., 2011). 
4.3 Cycles of Growth   
and Transition
A vivid visualisation of the relationship 
between economic transition and 
economic growth is given by “Kondratiev 
cycles” (Freeman and Louçã, 2001). 
Economic growth has been observed by 
some economists to come in long waves 
of prosperity, each driven by the spread 
of new technologies and structural 
economic change.
From this perspective, the declines in 
growth are periods where growth has 
slowed as the old economic structures 
exhaust their growth potential. Figure 4.1 
illustrates these.  
After the downturn in the global economy 
in 2008, a new cycle of growth could be 
expected. This raises the question: “If a 
growing economy is in transition – where is 
it in transition to?”  
We start from the assumption that a well-
functioning economy will naturally direct 
investments to the areas that deliver 
highest returns for society. As information 
about future challenges became available, 
it would be factored immediately into 
investment, production and consumption 
decisions. Considering, the trends in 
global resources and environmental 
resource degradation, evidence suggests 
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Figure 4.1 Kondratiev cycles. 
Source: Allianz Global Investors “The Sixth Kondratieff” – long waves of prosperity, 2010 (Allianz Global Investors, 2010)
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that a well-functioning economy would 
naturally be placing greater investments in 
innovations in resource productivity. That 
implies that decoupling would naturally 
be one of the drivers of the next period of 
growth in successful economies.
In practice, whether, where and how it 
occurs may depend on national decision-
makers’ abilities to overcome biases 
that act as barriers and brakes on 
transition. Countries that can overcome 
those barriers can lead the next wave 
of transition, gain advantage over their 
competitors and secure economic growth. 
We can envisage the extent to which 
decoupling actually takes place in any 
country as a result of the interplay 
between:
  The innovative capacity of an economy; 
and
  Biases in the economic and political 
systems which hold back innovation in 
resource productivity  
Together these factors determine whether 
the kind of technologies described in 
Chapter 3 become widespread.
4.4 Innovative capacity
The ability of an economy (or a firm) to 
improve its resource efficiency is promoted 
or constrained by its ability to innovate in 
general.  The capacity to innovate differs 
greatly across countries, and is seen in 
the academic literature on innovation 
to be closely linked to a combination of 
interacting factors. These factors include: 
the extent of knowledge, the speed with 
which it is replaced by new knowledge, the 
networking of actors who can learn from 
each other, the availability of finance, and 
the right incentives (Lundvall, 2007). 
These factors are now seen by mainstream 
economists to be the produce of 
formal and informal rules in a country 
- institutional arrangements that are 
themselves dependent on culture, norms 
and leadership. These differ greatly 
between countries:
“Developing counties often lack these 
market and regulatory institutions. 
Indeed, an important part of development 
is precisely the creation of these 
institutionalised capabilities ...” – 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008, p. 4.) 
Yet, it is worth noting that the rate of 
change in developing countries – and the 
rate of growth – is often much higher than 
in more developed countries, with a great 
variation between countries. As Section 
2.1.2 notes, for innovation in resource 
productivity, middle and lower-income 
countries may have advantages which can 
more than compensate the weakness of 
these institutions, not least because some 
institutions can also hold back change. 
4.5 Bias in innovation 
investment decisions
There are factors that have been identified 
as holding back the widespread adoption 
of innovation for decoupling.  These are 
also factors that bias investment decisions 
away from investment in more resource-
productive innovations.
The starting point for investment theories is 
that firms invest in the most advantageous 
investments out of the alternatives 
available. This is often also believed to 
be the case for government investment 
decisions. In practice, this usually means 
investing in the opportunities that maximize 
financial return over the timescale sought 
for investment. The relative return on 
investments is what matters: investments 
in resource productivity can be profitable 
and still not widely taken up, because other 
alternative investments are seen as more 
advantageous, and investment funds are 
limited.
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Any factors that bias the decision-making 
process for investments will distort the 
natural functioning of the economy to 
invest in the areas with the highest returns 
for the economy.  There are several of 
these biases. 
Much of the literature on the topic 
finds that the biases that hold back 
decoupling are the factors that reduce 
the appropriable private financial returns 
to investment in resource productivity 
compared to other possible investments 
(OECD, 2011c). The barriers are often 
found in:
1. The factors which influence the prices 
and costs that determine financial 
returns for alternative investments. 
Influences on the effective prices of raw 
materials, energy, capital and labour are 
all key factors. Subsidies and taxation 
are clear examples.
This is not the whole story. Nearly all 
decisions about future investments have 
to be made in the face of uncertainty. No 
investor really knows what the future will 
hold, nor has full knowledge of all the 
alternatives available and how they could 
perform. Bearing this in mind, decision-
making can be described as the choice 
of investment that the decision-maker 
perceives to be most advantageous when 
faced with uncertainty.  There are many 
factors that influence this perception. They 
include:
2. The characteristics of the decision 
maker (e.g. their attitude towards risk); 
3. The knowledge at the front of their mind 
when deciding, and
4. The situation in which the decision-
maker decides – their institutional and 
cultural context.  
The institutional and cultural context is 
important: it includes the views of peer-
group members, the incentive structures 
within a workplace, received wisdom 
about what is good practice, codes of 
conduct, social norms and the regulatory 
framework for investments. This context 
influences: 
  How the decision-maker judges what 
is advantageous (for example, how 
short-term payback should be, or 
whether reputational risk matters); 
  How the decision-maker resolves 
uncertainty about future conditions 
(for example, whether they take 
current market prices as indicative of 
future prices, or accept majority views 
about changed future states of the 
world, resource scarcity and future 
government policy); 
  How the decision-maker resolves 
uncertainty about the performance 
of unfamiliar technologies (which 
do not have a known track record of 
performance), and
  Constraints on the ability of a decision-
maker to act (including hierarchical 
organizational structures that are 
risk-averse, such as credit committees 
in banks, or management boards, or 
other blocks to innovation, including 
financial and technical capacity). 
When any of these factors has a bias 
against resource productive investments, 
they can lead to investments in resource 
productivity that would naturally take place 
being held back.   In the following sub-
section, we gather the main factors that 
lead to bias against decoupling into two 
categories: 
  The legacy policy framework, resulting 
from past decisions by government;
  Biases against change, or “inertia”.
4.6 The legacy policy 
framework
Both sides in the debate about the 
appropriate role and size of the state in 
the economy acknowledge the profound 
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effect that government policy has on the 
choices market actors take. It is the policy 
framework that determines the rules and 
practices that allow a market to operate 
efficiently. The way in which those rules 
are set changes the relative advantage of 
different types of investments. 
“[M]ature markets rely on deep institutional 
underpinnings, institutions that define 
property rights, enforce contracts, convey 
prices and bridge informational gaps 
between buyers and sellers,” – Commission 
on Growth and Development 2008 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008, p. 4; quoted in Swilling and Annecke, 
2012, p. 91.).
Additionally for the majority of high-income 
countries, the state’s influence through 
taxation is high, with tax levels between 25 
per cent and 45 per cent of GDP (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013). Taxes influence market 
prices by changing those prices and the 
relative rewards from investments. In other 
countries, taxation can be much lower.
Governments have further influence in the 
economy through choice in the spending 
of the taxation revenues and other sources 
of funding.  Government spending is 
often significantly higher than the level of 
taxation revenues, particularly for lower-
income countries, with very many countries 
spending at 35-45 per cent of GDP (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013).
As a result, the playing field on which 
investments compete is the result, or legacy, 
of the policy decisions made in the past by 
governments. The policy framework has 
a significant effect on the relative effective 
prices of economic inputs. This is not just 
through fiscal policy. All policies which affect 
economic decisions play a role, not only 
taxation, subsidization and direct market 
regulation, but many others, including 
industrial policy, employment, innovation, 
environment, energy and consumer policy. 
These indirectly influence prices and 
investment returns, and remove or create 
non-price barriers or disadvantages.
The cumulative effect of the wide range of 
government policies is sufficient to have 
a very strong influence on the relative 
attractiveness of investments, and shape 
the direction of investment and innovation 
in an economy. The nature of investments 
determines the development path of 
an economy. Government policies have 
a key role in deciding the nature of the 
development path of an economy – for 
example, which sectors grow fastest, 
or whether it is more or less resource-
productive. 
Even relatively small changes in government 
policy can have a large effect on the relative 
advantage of investments: they can remove 
legal or organizational blocks holding back 
innovation, or make investments financially 
attractive to mainstream investors. In 
the 1980s, few would have imagined that 
changes in the energy policy of many 
countries could be a driver for investments 
in renewable energy reaching US$300bn 
a year in 2011. On a worldwide basis, 
investments in new renewable-power 
capacity exceeded that for fossil fuels by 
US$30 billion in 2008, for the first time 
(Senator the Hon. Penny Wong, 2010).
We highlight the legacy of past decisions 
because mainstream economic policy 
aiming to increase growth has, for a long 
time, tended to look primarily at growth 
from labour productivity gains. The resulting 
policy framework has helped economies 
realize significant growth related to labour 
productivity.  Although resources are one 
of the essential inputs into an economy, 
like a skilled labour force, consideration 
of resources has been as a way to avoid 
risks to growth (e.g. from shortages), 
rather than an opportunity for growth. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the result of this 
trend with the example of the oldest 15 
EU countries – a policy framework that 
successfully promoted labour productivity. 
This framework does not appear suitable 
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for a changed situation where resource 
productivity offers greater returns to society.
Figure 4.2 Resource Productivity, Labour 
Productivity and Energy Productivity. 
Source: EEA, 2011
The literature is very clear on a number 
of areas where current policy structures 
coming out of past government decisions 
steer economies away from resource 
productivity:
  Subsidies of up to US$1.1 trillion each 
year for resources (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2011). These subsidies 
encourage the wasteful use of 
resources by reducing the savings from 
investments to use the resources more 
efficiently.  
  Taxation of people’s work through 
labour taxes are relatively higher than 
the tax burden on resources (and 
energy) in many countries. As labour 
and resources are often alternative 
inputs into economic growth, this 
favours resource consumption rather 
than increased employment. Taking 
the economy as a whole, it encourages 
development of an economy that is 
more resource intensive. Together 
with distortions from subsidization of 
resources, taxation reduces the return 
on investment in resource efficient 
technologies and techniques.
  Regulatory frameworks for markets 
have often been created in ways that 
discourage long-term management 
of resources, but rather promote their 
wasteful early use. Clear examples are:
•	 Market regulations which have 
worked well for old technologies, 
but which disadvantage the entry 
of new technologies. Even quite 
small issues can have significant 
effects on the entry and spread of 
new technologies. For instance, in 
some developed country energy 
markets, bidding systems for 
electricity supply have taken place 
one day in advance of electricity 
delivery. This has put operators of 
wind turbines at a disadvantage, 
because they can only reliably 
predict their electricity output 3 
hours in advance (OECD, 2010a).
•	 The absence, or uncertainty, 
of individual property rights or 
control (for example for a fish 
stock, or forest) that creates 
competition for resources between 
individuals which may conflict with 
the collective goal of maximising 
the value over time of the 
resource.
•	 The economic value of many 
resources is not valued properly 
in market prices. In particular, 
services provided by ecosystems 
are often not valued, and so the 
capital value of an ecosystem 
as an economic asset is 
overlooked. Similarly, costs 
from environmental damage 
and costs related to increased 
material scarcity are not included 
in the costs of manufacturing 
or products. This is frequently 
because the costs or risks fall 
on someone other than the 
person using or consuming the 
benefits from the resource: they 
are “externalities”. They can do 
so indirectly, through impacts 
on environmental systems, or 
with time lags. Effects can be 
incremental or uncertain in their 
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magnitude. As a result, this 
usually means that investments 
in ecosystems services that offer 
good returns for productivity of 
the economy (as a whole) do not 
offer attractive financial returns. 
They also promote excessive 
use of resources or activities 
that damage the unpriced 
resource, and hold back growth 
of the consumer market for 
less environmentally damaging 
products and services.
•	 Past regulation of market activity 
has frequently focused on short-
term direct effects, and so has 
produced significant unintended 
consequences negatively affecting 
resource productivity.  The 
absence of policy to limit this kind 
of effect is as much a legacy as the 
existence of a system of subsidies.
•	 Policies have also often left what 
are called “agency problems” 
or “landlord-tenant” problems, 
in which the person who stands 
to benefit from an investment to 
reduce resource consumption 
is not in a position to be sure to 
get a return on their investment, 
because they do not have sufficient 
legal rights over that investment. 
The clearest “landlord tenant” 
example occurs when a building 
tenant would save on energy 
bills through energy efficiency 
measures, but may not have the 
rights to invest in the building, 
and cannot be sure to recover the 
value of those investments if they 
move out of the building.
4.7 Biases against investment 
in innovation 
There are also various ways in which 
current economic structures create biases 
against innovation. These very often apply 
to innovation in resource productivity.  We 
can categorise four types of biases from 
the literature: physical and technological; 
behavioural; organisational, and institutional 
(European Commission, 2011a). Some 
examples of each of these categories 
illustrate the wide nature of biases:
4.7.1 Physical and  
technological biases
  Established technologies tend to have 
a price advantage over innovations, 
as continued development of the 
established technology over time, and 
its production at commercial scale 
tend to reduce production costs. 
  Many technologies are used in 
conjunction with existing physical 
infrastructure, giving existing 
technologies a significant advantage 
over alternative technologies that 
would require different infrastructure  
(e.g. the lack of electric vehicles’ 
recharging points compared to the 
large number of refuelling stations for 
oil powered vehicles).
  Rather similarly, many technologies 
function well because they are part 
of networks, with widespread use of 
a common technology (the advantage 
of communication technologies is 
their ability to communicate with 
the technologies that other people 
already have). New technologies that 
compete to offer a similar service, 
but are not widely networked, are at a 
disadvantage.
4.7.2 Behavioural biases
  People have a general tendency to keep 
to existing habits, social norms, or past 
behaviour – for example in purchasing 
choices, transport choices or waste 
disposal habits. Experimental evidence 
also suggests that we naturally value 
what we currently have more than we 
did before we possessed it (Kahnemann 
et al., 1990, as cited e.g. by Moseley 
and Stoker, 2013).  People – and so the 
firms they work in – tend to be risk-
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averse, which can constrain the ability 
of firms, consumers and societies to 
adopt new innovations (OECD, 2011d).
  Behaviours are often tied to the use 
of existing technologies, creating 
a barrier to the uptake of new 
technologies that would require a 
change in habits for their widespread 
use. Individual behavioural patterns 
are also strongly influenced by peer 
groups – and so the social norms and 
context, which can also act to lock-in 
behavioural patterns (Thomas and 
Sharp, 2013), unless these social 
norms are changing. This affects 
demand for innovation, and can be 
particularly challenging for efforts to 
shift from personal ownership to a 
service based approach for appliances, 
vehicles and other consumer goods 
(Healy et al., 2011 or for a more 
accessible overview of habits Duhigg, 
2012).
  Social norms do change, and are 
influenced by effective leadership, 
example and marketing: all of 
which can either work to promote 
continuation of current patterns or 
move to change them.
4.7.3 Organisational – including 
biases against finance for 
resource productivity
  Organisations often define working 
relationships between people in 
ways that create additional rigidity in 
habits. For example, the success of 
workers is often judged on how they 
perform in a pre-defined role, which 
hinders innovation in that role.  The 
organisational structures can create 
incentives against risk-taking (and so 
innovation). 
  Additionally, existing accounting 
practices and flows of information 
within the firm can mean that financial 
directors making investment decisions 
do not receive information from 
staff (in operations) who know of the 
potential of resource efficiency.
  Organisations have often invested 
in existing capital (equipment, 
machinery, stocks, workers’ skills 
and networks).  Innovation may be 
beneficial, but can simultaneously 
make the existing capital redundant or 
less valuable. Resistance to this capital 
destruction often biases decisions.
  Both the skill set of the workforce 
and business models continue to be 
strongly based on existing techniques 
or previous training, which holds back 
to spread of new ideas (for example, 
in the spread of efficient construction 
techniques). 
Many of these factors are found in the 
finance sector, and this creates particular 
issues for changes in the pattern of 
economic investments. Due to the internal 
incentives and controls found in many 
banks and financing organisations, positive 
financing decisions tend to be made in areas 
familiar to the professional expertise of staff. 
The lack of track record for the investment 
performance of new technologies also 
makes them appear more risky, and places 
them at a severe disadvantage when 
investment decisions are made (Hudson et 
al., 2013). 
These barriers to financing are a 
considerable hindrance to resource 
productivity. McKinsey Global Institute 
estimate that to meet the world’s future 
consumption demands through resource 
efficient technologies would require 
$3.1 trillion of investment a year globally 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). This is 
only fractionally higher than the $3 trillion 
a year that would be required for capital 
investment to meet future demand for 
steel, water, agricultural products and 
energy in the absence of decoupling. But 
it would require a shift of financing capital 
into areas which will be new to many of the 
financiers controlling funds. This adds to 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
68
an already considerable challenge – both 
estimates of capital needs are more than $1 
trillion higher than the volumes that have, 
in practice, been invested in resources in 
recent years. 
4.7.4 Other institutional norms, 
including short-term 
incentives
Institutional norms are the patterns, rules, 
laws and codes of conduct that shape and 
constrain our activities37. They structure 
social and economic interactions, and can 
vary between areas of economic activity, 
cultures and over time. (Organisational 
norms, and some behavioural biases can 
also be seen as subsets of institutional 
norms.)
  One widely found norm which 
disadvantages investments in 
innovation and resource productivity 
are incentives that reward short-
term financial gain. These promote 
investments by firms in a series of 
short-term actions, whilst long-
term economic success and stability 
requires a longer-term perspective. For 
example, the relatively new institution 
of quarterly reporting of profits on stock 
markets leads to incentives for the 
management of listed companies to 
focus on the short term. 
As many of the issues with resources 
are longer-term issues, the widespread 
institutional focus on short-term 
returns raises a significant bias against 
investments in resource productivity.
4.8 Inertia in political systems 
and systems lock-in
Political systems have their own inertia, 
which often act as a brake on policy 
reform, or block it entirely. The close 
interaction in nearly all countries between 
political decision-making and economic 
37  See, for example North, 1991. 
interests can lead to what is called 
“systems lock-in” because the policy 
framework is difficult to change without 
change to economic interests and vice-
versa. Political processes can therefore act 
as barriers to decoupling, because:
  Frequently, policy is formed in response 
to the interests of leading economic 
groupings. Where these groupings 
are biased towards the current 
arrangements that have given them 
market power, they tend to engage 
strongly to preserve existing policy. This 
can be the case even as underlying 
conditions change (Iike resource 
availability). Although recommended 
policy for economic success is one that 
promotes employment overall, rather 
than protecting specific jobs, political 
pressure often lead to the protection of 
existing jobs.
  Segmented policy-making 
governmental structures –different 
ministers or departments favouring 
different specific interest groups leads 
to policy inconsistency, with the effect 
of some policies being cancelled out 
by the indirect effect of others. This 
weakens incentives for investment 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011, p. 
120).
  This inconsistency, lack of clear 
direction and past records of changes 
in policy creates unpredictability and 
uncertainty about future investment 
return on lasting policy change.
  The institutions through which policies 
are made often reflect existing 
norms, and change is often resisted, 
within the institutions (for example 
government departments) or industrial 
organisations shaping policy (Ekins and 
Salmons, 2010, p. 132). 
  Political decision-making involves the 
balancing of conflicting information 
about the impacts of future changes. 
Where economic interests are at stake, 
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groups are likely to contest evidence 
showing the need for change. Where 
there is some degree of scientific 
uncertainty about the future (as is 
inevitable) this can be used to discredit 
unfavourable information. Even 
evidence gathered by governments 
seeking to promote innovation may be 
sceptically received and scrutinised for 
bias.  The rejection of, or unwillingness 
to hear, information demonstrating the 
benefits of change is a key barrier to 
achieving policy change – as success 
in policy reform often involves political 
and economic actors perception of their 
own self-interest to alter (Ekins and 
Salmons, 2010, pp. 133-134). 
  Policymaking procedures are often 
lengthy, and can have additional lead-
in times before policy is expected to 
take effect – leading to lags in the 
policy framework in reaction to new 
information.
The existence of systems lock-in is 
believed to be a strong explanatory feature 
in the decline of countries that held on 
too long to past industrial structures that 
were uncompetitive in a changing world, 
and in the starker examples of the decline 
of whole civilisations. Jared Diamond has 
pointed to an inability to change practices 
and social organisation when conditions 
change, as one of the drivers of collapse 
of past civilisations faced with changing 
conditions, for example, of the Maya of 
central America, or the Easter Islanders 
(Diamond, 2005).  Often these declines 
appear to have come when societies 
have not realised the impacts of resource 
exploitation until it is too late and the 
ecological system has been pushed past an 
irreversible threshold, creating non-linear 
harm (Diamond, 2005). 
Another illustration of these effects 
comes in the (often) relatively slow 
spread of renewable energies in the face 
of the risks of climate change. Market 
prices in energy generation are strongly 
determined by existing, slow-changing 
regulation, economies of scale of past 
generation technologies, distribution 
network infrastructure, weak expression 
of consumer preferences and unfamiliarity 
and incorrect perception of the potential 
of new technology. For instance, a strong 
argument is made that renewable energy 
cannot be the major part of a nation’s 
energy supply, because renewable energy 
sources are too intermittent and cannot 
be guaranteed to meet both overnight 
baseload electricity demand. In practice, 
solutions for that exist (Diesendorf, 2007) 
by using a mix of sources (Tickell, 2005) 
and in practice, already by 2008, renewable 
distributed energy accounted for one 
quarter of California’s installed capacity, 
one third of Sweden’s energy and half of 
Norway’s, with Denmark generating 20 per 
cent of its electricity from wind (Smith and 
Hargroves, 2008). Nevertheless, the carbon 
intensity38 of the global economy does not 
appear to have changed since the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s. (Figure 4.3)
Figure 4.3 The lack of progress in reducing carbon 
intensity since 1985, shown by the IEA Energy 
Sector Carbon Intensity Index, 2012 data. 
Source: IEA, 2013
The historic trend of greenhouse gas 
emissions being strongly coupled with 
rising energy consumption, which are also 
correlated with rising levels of per capita 
GDP appears only rarely to have been 
broken in any sector of the economy, as 
38  This is the number of tonnes of CO2 emitted for each unit of energy supplied 
(data from IEA, 2013). 
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the International Rersource Panel’s 2010 
Report on the Environmental Impacts of 
Consumption and Production has shown. 
Some of its key findings are encapsulated 
in Figure 4.4, which shows the correlation 
between per capita consumption levels 
and per capita carbon footprints.  The most 
disappointing graph from the point of view 
of decoupling may be that of “services”, 
which are often quoted as the way out of 
overconsumption of resources. But even 
here, carbon emissions relentlessly rise 
with expenditures. 
Note: OECD NW stands for the “New World” 
countries in the OECD, i.e. Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, New Zealand and the US. “RoW” 
represents various aggregate regions.
Figure 4.4 Carbon footprints (per capita CO2 equivalents, 2001) of different consumption categories, 
plotted against per capita expenditures in the respective countries.  
Source: UNEP 2010, Fig. 4.6, p. 55
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Deepening understanding
 about the nature of decoupling
A decision-maker judging progress in the resource productivity of their economy needs to take care over three issues. It is possible 
for statistics on the rate of decoupling 
in a country to give a better picture of 
exposure to resource constraints than 
may be the case, if used without some 
deeper understanding.  
Many countries show relative decoupling 
as they grow economically, even without 
policies promoting resource productivity. 
This does not mean that their economic 
structures are reducing their future risk 
from resource scarcity. The paragraphs 
below explain why39. 
39  They are issues because decoupling can be measured in different ways, 
and each way shows something different. For more information on forms 
of measurement see Chapter X of the International Resource Panel’s first 
Decoupling report (UNEP, 2011a).
5.1 Burden shifting – or 
‘decoupling through trade’
A country can appear to be decoupling, 
even when it is not. If it is replacing its 
domestic extraction and production of a 
resource with extraction and production 
elsewhere in the world, through imports, 
its economy is not changing its reliance on 
resources. This is often labelled as burden 
shifting, and often appears as countries 
shift from an extraction and production 
based economy towards an economy with a 
higher share of services. 
As globalisation of trade proceeds, this 
increases, with materials that make up 
products increasingly coming from diverse 
sources around the world. In 1996 less than 
20 per cent of consumption in G8 countries 
was met by material imports, by 2008 this 
share had risen close to 29 per cent.
The effect of this trade on measures of 
decoupling can be significant, because 
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these frequently look at domestic 
resource use by mass. If extraction of ore 
moves from the domestic economy, with 
processed material imported instead, 
the statistical effect may be very great: 
to produce one ton of gold, typically 
1 million tons of gold ores are mined 
(Schmidt-Bleek, 1994), so when these ores 
are included in the metrics of resource 
used, the apparent change in decoupling 
from offshoring gold extraction would be 
significant. 
There is a similar effect for many products: 
it is common for 10 times more material 
resource to be used as input in the 
production process than eventually ends 
up in the final product. So importing a 
product, rather than the resources to make 
it reduces domestic resource use.
This can give the false impression of the 
changing relationship with dependence on 
natural resources. For example: 
“Between 1980 and 2008, Japanese material 
consumption decreased by over 20% while 
the economy expanded by 96%. When 
including unused domestic extraction and 
estimated indirect flows from trade, the 
decrease in material consumption appears 
more modest - 1% between 1980 and 
2008. [And] in Germany domestic material 
consumption decreased by over 10% 
between 1996 and 2008, but accounting for 
unused extraction and indirect flows cuts 
this progress in half.” (OECD, 2009).
This burden-shifting can hide dependence 
or depletion of existing sources of 
resources. The importing country is still 
vulnerable to changes in the market 
or supply for the resources, and is still 
contributing to any future scarcity. When 
its economy is viewed to include all the 
value chains by which its consumption 
is produced (e.g. from primary resource 
extraction upwards) its degree of resource 
productivity increase is smaller.
This is illustrated by three examples: 
freshwater abstraction, fish and biofuels:
  There is evidence that many OECD 
countries remain more reliant on 
adequate freshwater supplies than 
their domestic water use suggests, 
with the size of imports of goods 
produced with other countries’ water – 
shown in Figure 1.9 – suggesting that 
the decoupling illustrated by Figure 2.3 
is actually significantly lower. Annex 
C also illustrates the scale of trade 
in “virtual water”: water used in the 
production of traded products.
  Trade in fish has also resulted in 
a shift of resource depletion from 
domestic to global resource stocks, so 
that measures of the health of many 
countries’ domestic fish stocks does 
not give a true picture of the depletion 
of the fish stocks on which they rely. 
About 77 per cent of fish consumed 
worldwide is supplied from open 
oceans and from developing countries. 
Yet developed countries account for 
81 per cent of imports of fish-based 
products and thus fish consumption 
(UN, 2006).
  An emerging area of burden-shifting 
comes from the rising use of biodiesel 
and biofuels by the European Union 
(Directive 2009/30/EC, Art. 7b). Our 
report “Assessing Biofuels” (UNEP, 
2009) showed some OECD nation’s 
transport biofuels policy is shifting 
environmental burdens from OECD 
nations onto poorer developing nations 
in ways that are not sustainable. 
5.2 Understanding the drivers 
behind decoupling
Countries tend to change their resource 
productivity naturally as they develop 
because their demand for resources 
changes. Early industrialisation 
and consumption growth tend to be 
accompanied by the construction of a new 
infrastructure: such as buildings and roads 
that are resource-intensive. Once these are 
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built the resource intensity of economic 
activity naturally reduces, which shows 
up as a resource productivity increase. 
This does show that the next stage of this 
country’s ongoing development will be less 
resource-intensive, but it does not indicate 
that its economy is structured in a way that 
it will continue to become more and more 
resource-productive. 
Where this economic “maturation” is the 
driver for apparently increased resource 
productivity, it does not indicate that the 
country’s economy is becoming any less 
wasteful, or necessarily that it is less 
vulnerable to resource supply shocks.
5.3 Decoupling what matters
Some resources matter more to one 
economy’s stability and success than 
others.  Some resources are likely to have 
greater imbalances between demand and 
supply than others: several countries have 
drawn up lists of priority materials for 
their economic policy, usually based on 
the importance of those materials and the 
perception of risk in their supply. 
When considering changes in resource 
productivity, decision-makers need to look 
as closely as they can at the productivity 
changes in the resources which matter 
most to them.  Aggregate figures for 
resource use – which are frequently 
the most available – may not reflect the 
possibilities for decoupling economic 
growth from some particularly important 
resources.
Decision-making is also helped by 
considering the linkages between the 
increase in productivity of one resource 
and the effect on the economy’s 
productivity in the use of other resources.  
For example, improving resource 
productivity for metal in a production 
processes is almost certain to improve the 
energy efficiency of an economy, due to 
the amount of energy that would be used 
in the production of the saved metal, as 
well as in the efficiency of the production 
process itself.  
Knowing about these linkages gives 
decision makers more options on how 
they could decouple growth from resource 
use. (In the example above, energy use 
and related emissions can be decoupled 
from growth by reduction of metal 
inputs). Where the use of resources has 
indirect impacts on other resources – 
including fossil fuel use, freshwater, or 
“environmental resources” like soil fertility 
and healthy air – increasing resource 
productivity can also be a way to reduce 
those negative impacts. Our report on 
priority products and materials (UNEP, 
2010a) looks at the inter-relation between 
resource use and environmental impacts.
This could particularly be relevant for EU 
countries, which are increasingly importing 
goods whose production places intensive 
pressure on the environment (greenhouse 
gas and other industrial emissions, water 
pollution) from newly industrialising or 
developing countries. 
At the same time, action can be taken 
to reduce the impact of resource use on 
environmental resources even without 
decreasing the level of resources used. 
This can be done in many ways, including 
reducing toxic emissions or substituting 
dangerous chemicals with less harmful 
chemicals. This is the usual realm of 
environment policy, and can lead to 
decoupling of economic growth from 
these negative environmental impacts. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, it can be 
called impact decoupling. It is particularly 
relevant where some activities have 
specific toxic or harmful effects on health 
and the environment. 
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual and stylised representation 
of resource decoupling and impact decoupling 
graph (UNEP, 2011b, Figure 1 page xiiii)
This kind of “impact decoupling” can be 
particularly important for lower-income 
countries. 
  In “low-income” economies, the 
livelihoods of many of the poorest 
people are directly dependent on local 
environmental ecosystem services – 
whether it be fertile soils, clean water, 
or biomass-based energy sources. 
It has been estimated that services 
provided by forests (for example for 
fuel wood provision) account for 7.3 
per cent of India’s overall GDP, but 
that they account for 57 per cent of 
the effective household income of 
those living below the poverty line and 
relying on activities like subsistence 
farming (Sukhdev et al., 2008).
  The World Bank has estimated that 
economic damage, productivity losses 
and public health impacts from 
environmental degradation costs 
Tunisia 2.1 per cent of its GDP, 3.7 per 
cent of Morocco’s GDP and 5 per cent 
of GDP in Egypt (World Bank, 2010a). 
  A range of studies now shows that 
such negative environmental impacts 
are having both direct and indirect 
impacts on economies and economic 
growth (Brown, 2008). Such “costs 
of inaction” to reduce environmental 
impacts will continue to mount if 
decoupling is not achieved quickly. 
OECD studies of the costs of inaction 
related to water and air pollution, 
biodiversity loss, climate change and 
natural disasters show that such 
costs are significant (OECD, 2008b), 
and are set to rise sharply by 2030 
(OECD, 2008a).  
Historically, it has – for obvious reasons – 
been environmental resources that have 
mattered most:
 The great Empires of Assyria, Babylon, 
Carthage and Persia were destroyed by 
floods and deserts let loose in the wake of 
forest destruction. Erosion following forest 
destruction and soil depletion has been one 
of the most powerfully destructive forces in 
bringing about the downfall of civilisations 
and wiping out human existence from large 
tracts of the Earth’s surface.
Richard ST. Barbe Baker, ‘I Planted Trees’, 1944 (St.
Barbe Baker, 1994)
Figure 5.1 also illustrates that human 
wellbeing can be relatively decoupled from 
GDP and recognises that wellbeing is not 
only determined by the goods and services 
which are measured by GDP. (GDP is a 
constructed metric that measures only a 
subset of the activity which contributes to 
wellbeing, much of which is not traded or 
priced.) Policymakers aiming at increasing 
wellbeing of their citizens rather than 
GDP find that they have more options for 
achieving significant decoupling. 
This is a significant feature of sustainability 
debates in prospering OECD countries, but 
also in other countries such as Bhutan and 
in Latin America, where the key word is 
“buen vivir” (good living).40 The possibilities 
to decouple wellbeing from resource use 
have been analysed and proposed by Tim 
Jackson (Jackson, 2009), among others, 
while decisions to adopt complementary 
metrics of economic progress, in addition 
to GDP, have also become more common 
in OECD countries in recent years41. 
40  The concept of ‘Buenvivir’ has been included in the Constitutions of Ecuador 
and Bolivia. See also the Declaration of Cochabamba (WPCCC, 2010).
41  See for example the EU Beyond GDP Initiative: http://www.beyond-gdp.eu/
index.html, the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress: http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm, or the 
Office for National Statistics: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/user-
guidance/well-being/index.html 
Human well-being
Economic activity (GDP)
Resource use
Environmental impact
Resource decoupling
Impact decoupling
Time
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Neither of these important discussions is 
the focus this report.
Yet looking at the comparison between one 
other measure of progress and resource 
use can help show the possibilities 
for countries at different stages of 
development. Figure 5.2 shows the inter-
relation of per capita domestic material 
use (DMC) (in tons/capita, on the horizontal 
axis), and the Human Developing Index 
(HDI, on the vertical axis) by country from 
1980 to 2000. 
Figure 5.2 Comparison of per capita domestic material use and the Human Development Index
Source: Fischer-Kowalski, M. (2007)
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There is a growing research body (Farley, 
2005; WWF, 2008, Steimberg & Roberts, 
2010) claiming that additional increases in 
material consumption no longer translate 
into proportionate increases in life quality 
(at least as expressed by the HDI) in for the 
69 countries classed as high-income (38 
OECD and non-OECD 31).
At the other end of the scale, there is a 
group of 40 low-income countries (basically 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America) for 
which any increments in consumption are 
immediately translated into higher HDI. 
These countries account for 12 per cent 
of the global population and have a huge 
demand for goods and services, because 
the greater part of their populations live 
below the poverty line. Absolute decoupling 
of growth from resource use in these 
countries would not be possible in the way 
that it would be for high-income countries. 
Improvements in resource productivity 
can directly contribute to economic 
growth, while impact decoupling may be 
particularly important to avoid waste of 
essential environmental resources.
In the intermediate level, there is a third 
group of 105 emergent countries (57 
low to medium-income and 48 high to 
medium-income) representing 70 per cent 
of the world population.  These countries 
do seem to have the possibility to use 
resource productivity gains to increase 
their HDI, as well as improving their 
economies.
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Facilitating Transition: 
Removing barriers to decoupling
6.1 Decoupling can happen
There is enough evidence to suggest that decoupling can be achieved.  Most countries have already made investments that bring some 
degree of resource and impact decoupling. 
Several have reoriented their economic 
strategies to do more. There is now a 
wealth of experience with the measures 
that help facilitate decoupling. 
Some of the investments already made 
in decoupling are so much part of the 
existing economy that they demonstrate 
how easily decoupling fits within existing 
economic structures. The recycling sector 
is one example.  Recycling industries 
globally employ formally 1.5 million people 
and an estimate suggests that up to 15 
million people are engaged in informal 
waste collection for their livelihood in 
developing countries (Medina, 2008). 
Recycling’s global annual turnover exceeds 
US$160 billion dollars and processes more 
than 600 million tonnes of commodities 
annually (Oliver, 2008; BIR, n.d.). 
However, the biases and barriers 
mentioned in Chapter 4 stand in the 
way of an economy’s transition towards 
greater resource productivity. Their 
presence means that the most productive 
investments for future conditions do not 
necessarily take place.
To achieve the pace of decoupling 
required for economic success and stable 
environmental quality additional leadership 
from policymakers and others would be 
required. This chapter looks at examples of 
actions already taken across the world on 
decoupling, to illustrate the variety of ways 
in which decision-makers can facilitate 
change. 
There are parallels between achievement 
of decoupling and the crucial role that 
states have frequently played in stimulating 
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innovation in other areas. The public 
sector already plays a greater role in 
facilitating and steering innovation than 
is often acknowledged. Commentators 
have noted that to tackle the barriers to 
financing of innovation, developed states 
often take risks financing breakthrough 
innovations which the private sector is 
not set up to invest in. (This has included 
the technologies that led to the iPhone 
(Mazzucato, 2013). In several cases, 
government authorities have driven the 
industrialisation of nations, as seen in the 
past in Japan (Johnson, 1982) and in the 
“developmental states” seen more recently 
in other Asian (e.g. China, Singapore) 
nations and some South American and 
African countries (for an overview see 
Swilling and Annecke, 2012, chapter 4).
More specifically related to resources, 
there are many examples of successful 
decoupling where public sector leadership 
has overcome barriers to change. The 
case studies below illustrate aspects of 
decoupling.
6.2 Case studies of decoupling
6.2.1 Decoupling economic growth 
from freshwater extraction 
There are multiple benefits from water 
resource productivity improvements, 
including lower business and household 
costs and delayed need for new and 
expensive water infrastructure. It is 
important to improve water quality and 
ensure access of unpolluted clean water 
to all people and the environment. Greater 
water productivity improvements also help 
rural, urban and coastal communities 
adapt to the likelihood of near-future 
reduced water availability in many parts of 
the world due to climate change.  Also the 
more efficient use of water for agriculture 
and cities enables more water to become 
available for restoring environmental flows 
for river ecosystems and wetlands. 
Readily available sources of freshwater 
are already under significant stress: 
freshwater lakes are shrinking; rivers are 
drying up and often fail to reach the ocean, 
while groundwater resources are already 
overused in many regions. Increasing rates 
of pollution loads caused by the major 
water use sectors (domestic, agriculture 
and industries) are already limiting available 
water resources for sustainable economic 
growth and other water services in many 
river basins. Many “dead zones” now exist 
around many of the major river deltas of 
the world, where marine life cannot be 
supported due to depleted oxygen levels. 
A study has recorded 405 dead zones 
worldwide, representing a more than 100 
per cent increase in the last five years. 
These situations have increased the rates of 
physical water scarcity in many river basins.
Under an average economic growth 
scenario and if no efficiency gains are 
assumed, global demand to withdraw 
water would outstrip currently accessible, 
reliable water resources – including return 
flows – by 40 per cent by 2030. To meet 
expected growth in demand, the annual 
pace for supply additions over the next 20 
years would have to be almost triple the 
rate at which it expanded over the past two 
decades.
6.2.2 Decoupling in Australia
From 2001 to 2009, Australia has reduced 
water consumption by around 40 per cent, 
while GDP has grown by more than 30 
per cent, as Figure 6.1 shows. Usage in 
agriculture decreased from 12,200 to 7,000 
Gigalitres (GL) from 2004-05 to 2008-09. 
Brisbane has achieved a 50 per cent per 
capita reduction in potable water usage 
from 2005-10. This came at negligible cost 
as most of the reduction was achieved 
through highly cost-effective investments 
in water efficiency and demand 
management.  
This has allowed the use of scarce water 
in higher value sectors, like industry and 
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manufacturing, resulting in significant 
improvements in water productivity – an 
increase of economic return from AU$50 
million to AU$95 million per GL of water. 
There is still significant potential to 
improve water productivity through greater 
uptake of drip irrigation and irrigation 
scheduling techniques as well as higher 
use of treated recycled water. 
Figure 6.1  Australia - Absolute Decoupling of 
Economic Growth from Freshwater Abstraction 
[100 = 2001 levels] 
6.2.3 Decoupling in Singapore
Singapore has achieved economic growth 
rates of in excess of 10 per cent over the 
last 40 years with the economy growing 
25-fold in one of the fastest transitions 
from “developing” to a “leading first world” 
country in history. Its population has grown 
by a factor of 2.5 in that period to 4.4 million 
people. Yet water use has only increased 
five-fold, or a two-fold per capita increase. 
This represents a factor five decoupling 
(Figure 6.2). The average Singapore home 
now uses four times less water than a US 
home of comparable income. Singapore’s 
water utility focused on reducing the 
demand for water by improving efficiency, 
cutting waste and expanding alternative 
sources of freshwater supply. Wasted water 
has been reduced (Khoo, 2005) to 5 per 
cent by 2002 compared to 40 per cent and 
60 per cent for other Asian urban centres. 
This has allowed Singapore to cut its 
imports of water from Malaysia by 60 per 
cent and to commit to ending those imports 
entirely by 2060 through additional demand 
management and alternative water supply 
management options (PUB, 2009).
Singapore is one of the most striking 
successes, though other cities have also 
demonstrated the economic benefits of a 
focus on absolutely decoupling economic 
growth from freshwater extraction. 
Jerusalem, Los Angeles and San Diego, 
Austin, Melbourne and Sydney have all 
achieved significant reductions in water 
demand over the last two decades (Postel, 
1997). 
Figure 6.2  Singapore GDP, population and total 
water consumption growth (1965-2007) [1965 =1] 
(Source:  Khoo, T, C., 2008)
However, in general, countries have mixed 
records in water efficiency and productivity. 
Most countries have dysfunctional water 
supply infrastructure, with high levels 
of leakages ranging between 20-80 per 
cent. More than $18 billion worth of water 
is considered as non-revenue water per 
year worldwide, mainly due to leakage, 
private water sources, illegal connections 
and dysfunctional meters. Non-revenue 
water proportions range from as low as 
15 per cent to more than 70 per cent of 
water withdrawals.  The record on water 
productivity also varies by countries and by 
sectors. 
Low levels of water efficiency and 
productivity are largely attributable to 
distortions in the water markets, capital 
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availability and regulatory issues, as well 
as technological and infrastructure-related 
challenges. Current water prices often 
do not fully reflect resource scarcity or 
environmental costs. In many countries, 
the price of bulk or “upstream” water 
(particularly for agricultural use) has been 
largely static in real terms because the 
increasing costs of abstraction have not 
been passed on to end users. In 2011, 
direct subsidies of between US$200-300 
billion supported water prices globally.
The successful transitions towards more 
efficient water uses were found in both 
in developed and developing countries.  
Key success factors appeared to be: 
existence of integrated water and/or 
environmental policies and structural and 
technological transformations toward low 
water-intensive economies. In all cases, 
investments in improved technologies and 
innovations were among the key drivers 
of water efficiency and productivity. For 
example, the use of freshwater on farms 
has halved in Israel since 1984, while the 
value of production has continued to climb, 
with the adoption of drip irrigation.
6.2.4 Decoupling economic growth 
from air pollution
Across the world, we find stories of 
successful absolute decoupling of air 
pollution from economic growth, in 
developing and developed economies.
At a regional level, Mexico City has shown 
the possibility to decouple growth from 
pollution of clean air. In 1992, it was the 
most polluted city on the planet with ozone 
levels thought to cause 1,000 deaths and 
35,000 hospitalisations a year. Since then, 
lead in the air has dropped by 90 per 
cent and suspended particles – pieces 
of dust, soot or chemicals that lodge in 
lungs and cause asthma, emphysema or 
cancer – have been cut 70 per cent. Carbon 
monoxide and other pollutants also have 
been greatly reduced. 
In central and southern Chile, the air 
quality in cities deteriorated as a result 
of emissions generated by the massive 
use of firewood as an energy source in 
homes. This problem was addressed by the 
government, which deployed a programme 
for exchange of the wood combustion 
equipment by greener technologies 
under the framework of the Atmospheric 
Decontamination Plan approved in 
1995. The programme’s objective was 
to exchange at least 12,000 pieces of 
equipment during its implementation 
period (2008-10), and it reduced emissions 
by 30 per cent (UNEP and Mercosur, 2011). 
Over the three decades from 1970 to 2000, 
the majority of OECD countries achieved 
absolute decoupling of economic growth 
from all major air pollutants. A leading 
example of this has been global and 
regional efforts to decouple economic 
growth from sulphur dioxide pollution 
through first the 1983 “Helsinki protocol” 
and the UNECE Second Sulphur protocol 
in 1994. The Second Sulphur protocol 
committed nations to targets of 50 per 
cent reductions by the year 2000, 70 
per cent by 2005, and 80 per cent by 
2010 (UNECE, 1994). The environmental 
objective of the protocol – eventually to 
bring sulphur depositions in Europe within 
the critical loads of receiving ecosystems 
– is a fundamental principle of ecological 
sustainability. The emission reduction 
required was of the order of a factor of five, 
or 80 per cent. Initial perceptions were that 
it would be incredibly costly, but the arrival 
of cost effective low-sulphur fuel and a 
range of supporting technologies altered 
the cost situation such that the goal was 
attainable for significantly less cost than 
anticipated, $90 per ton rather than the 
anticipated $1,000-1,500 per ton (Hodges, 
1997). When the costs of sulphur to health 
and the environment are monetised and 
taken into account, this phase-out has 
had negligible net impact on short-term 
economic performance (Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3 OECD: Air pollutants recede while the 
economy keeps growing (OECD, 2008c, p. 16)
6.3 Decoupling resource use 
across a whole economy
6.3.1 The challenges for decoupling
Most industrialised countries have 
experienced very strong decoupling of 
economic growth from local pollution. 
Here we have consistently seen “absolute 
decoupling” – meaning a net reduction 
of environmental damage as incomes 
increase. 
On the other hand, for resource 
consumption, we have mostly seen only 
“relative decoupling”, meaning that 
resource consumption per unit of economic 
production has decreased, but the overall 
use of resources in their economies has 
still increased. This is particularly the case 
if the resource use embodied in traded 
products consumed in an importing country 
is considered.
This suggests that future efforts to facilitate 
decoupling of resource consumption from 
economic growth may need to learn from 
the successes and failures of past attempts.
Successful decoupling of some 
environmental harm from resource use 
(sometimes absolutely, and sometimes 
on a local scale with burden-shifting) was 
driven by environmental policies, mainly 
from the 1970s onwards, starting with OECD 
countries. The key features which allowed 
this to happen were: a sufficiently strong 
political constituency to drive regulatory 
change, sufficient alternatives to highly 
polluting technologies and sufficient 
capacity of governments to control the 
technologies emitting pollution. 
Decoupling economic growth from 
resource use generally has more additional 
challenges. One of those challenges comes 
from the extent of the globalisation of 
our economies that has brought so many 
economic benefits. Where goods and 
services are traded across borders, the 
boundaries of “the economy” are no longer 
defined by national boundaries – but by the 
extent of the network of contributors to the 
supply chain, the consumers of the goods or 
services, and even the people who receive 
the waste products at the end of their life. 
Physical goods, the resource intensive parts 
of economies, are usually widely traded, and 
supply and consumption networks can span 
many countries. 
This implies that for many resources, the 
rebound effect described in section 2.2.3 
appears likely to occur on a global scale. In 
interconnected resource markets, savings 
in resources in one country may lead to 
some degree of increase in use of those 
same resources in others.  In the absence 
of international agreements, governments 
in any single country have the scope of their 
action to reduce rebound effects significantly 
limited (although not eliminated) by the 
geographic limitation of their regulatory 
powers to their own borders. 
Where the resources in question are globally 
traded and can be used in production or 
consumed very widely – like many biotic 
resources, fossil fuels and many minerals 
(though not those used in very specialist 
applications) – this makes decoupling 
challenging. This contrasts with more local 
resources, which can include freshwater.
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Secondly, the interaction seen between the 
economic system and the political system, 
mentioned as a barrier to innovation in 
section 4.8, appears particularly strong as 
a bias against policy reform in favour of 
resource productivity. This seems likely to 
be due to the absence of strong political 
coalitions arguing in favour of resource 
productivity: many of the negative impacts 
of resource scarcity are less visible (because 
they are indirect, come later [as with 
greenhouse gas emissions] or are further 
away, geographically) than direct damage 
to human health or the neighbourhood 
environment. This also stands in contrast 
to some of the successes with decoupling 
environmental impacts. Although many 
individuals and firms would benefit from 
being in a more resource-productive 
economy, most of them do not have 
resource efficiency gains at the front of their 
minds, reducing the chances that they are 
sufficiently motivated to group together to 
push for change. Many of the firms that 
would stand to gain most from a shift to a 
more resource-efficient economy are still 
small, and not politically active. 
Yet for the level of improvements in 
resource productivity that would be needed 
to meet the challenge of global resource 
trends, economies would require dynamic 
technological innovation in resource 
productivity. Innovation would be needed 
at a rate currently only seen in the most 
innovative sectors of successful economies.  
It would need innovation in many firms and 
behavioural change of individuals.
6.3.2 Multi-level perspective   
on transition 
There is a growing level of academic 
literature exploring how economies with 
biases against innovation can make 
structural changes and choose to develop 
and innovate towards a particular goal. 
This is based on analysis of past economic 
and societal transitions (for example, the 
industrial revolution) and can provide some 
useful ways to think about how to facilitate 
decoupling. In this context, decoupling 
is seen as a process of transition to an 
economy that is sufficiently resource-
productive to be sustainable. 
Much of the literature draws on the work 
analysing structural and institutional 
barriers and biases like those described 
in Chapter 4. It views the economy and 
innovation as part of a complex system, 
inter-related with political, cultural, 
ecological and technological aspects 
of society. So it goes beyond ideas that 
transition comes about by a strong state 
commanding a change in behaviours 
from firms and citizens. This is a more 
realistic reflection of the way in which, in 
most countries, external political influence 
determines policy choice, as much as 
policy choices determine economic and 
societal behaviours. 
Figure 6.4 The Multi-Level Perspective of 
transition processes
One approach, called the Multi-Level 
Perspective42, conceptualises three 
different levels of society that interact to 
facilitate or prevent decoupling, shown in 
Fugure 6.4. The key aspects of this thinking 
are:
42  For a more detailed description of the Multi-Level Perspective see Grin et al. 
(2010) 
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  Innovations can evolve on a small scale 
in niches, where there are favourable 
conditions for innovation. 
  Whether these niche innovations 
manage to become widespread is 
partly dependent on the opportunities 
created by the mainstream “socio-
technical regime”, which is the set 
of technologies, policies, business 
models, consumption patterns and 
other forms of social organisation. 
  This socio-technical regime is itself 
shaped by the “landscape” of physical, 
ecological and technological and 
cultural fundamentals current at 
the time – sometimes referred to as 
“megatrends”, such as increasing 
climate change. 
  The interactions between these 
different levels are sufficiently complex 
to make it hard to predict exactly the 
degree of change which will result 
from an innovation, or a new policy. 
  Transition comes about due to action 
by innovative individuals, organisations 
or coalitions of people who are acting 
within broader societal institutions 
or structures. How much room they 
have to act depends on the conditions 
provided by those societal institutions.
  Due to the bias against change 
in these existing structures and 
institutions, significant change is 
unlikely to be able to be made in one 
part of the political-economic set up, 
without some other change taking 
place elsewhere. So transition is a 
process of co-evolution: with changes 
occurring simultaneously in at least 
a couple of the economic, political, 
cultural, technological and ecological 
areas.
  Transition will only come about by 
a very large number of changes, 
taking place at different levels over 
an extended period of time. At some 
stage, these may reach a tipping 
point, at which change escalates and 
becomes irreversible.
  A transition is very unlikely to naturally 
occur, but is shaped or directed 
(although not controlled) by individuals 
or identifiable groups of people 
organised to have sufficient influence on 
their part of the socioeconomic regime, 
or on niche innovation. Some refer to 
this as the “core adaptive leadership” of 
the transition (Heifetz, 1994).
This has implications for decoupling, 
and the widespread uptake of resource-
productive technologies. It gives one 
framework for considering which actions 
would be needed by decision makers to 
unlock greater resource productivity gains:
  Because it is rare that any decision-
maker within the political or economic 
system will have the independent power 
to effect radical change without other 
simultaneous changes, the Multi-Level 
Perspective suggests that facilitating 
decoupling would first need the creation 
of conditions in the economy which then 
support many smaller changes in the 
transition to resource productivity. 
  This points to a role for many individuals 
to bring about change within their 
sphere of influence: people inside 
and outside government, whether in 
innovation, consumption patterns, 
business models or political and 
governance institutions. Such people 
are referred to as “change agents” in 
the literature. 
Strands of academic research looking 
at political economy, behaviours and 
transition identify some factors that would 
promote transition:
  The need for a clear goal for the 
transition, agreed by sufficient people, 
or change agents, supporting change, 
so that many actions contribute to a 
shared goal.
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  The need for a widely accepted 
narrative of the future, giving the 
reasons and routes for transition 
(Ostrom and Walker, 2003). Updating 
the mainstream economic narrative43, 
in the light of changes in resource use 
and its constraints, may be essential 
to the success of decoupling. Annex A 
mentions some issues in this respect.
  For the promotion of decoupling 
through resource productivity gains, 
policymakers concerned with resource 
and environmental limits need to 
broaden their goals: expanding their 
main focus from preventing harm to 
creating the conditions that encourage 
investment in resource productivity. 
This does not mean that policy to 
prevent environmental harm is any 
less crucial – it has remained essential 
in many respects. It means that an 
additional, broader goal for policy has 
been added to the strategies of forward-
thinking economics and environmental 
ministries.
6.4 Creating the conditions   
for decoupling
To create the conditions for widespread 
investments in resource productivity, 
policymakers can take steps to increase 
innovation capacity, remove hindrances 
to innovation and reduce biases against 
resource productive investments.  This can 
improve the functioning of economies, so 
that investments are made in the areas and 
innovations that bring the greatest future 
return to a country’s economic goals. How 
much policymakers can do in practice 
is related to their resources, technical 
capacity and strength of political support.
The creation of favourable conditions can 
be made incrementally: the cumulative 
effect of many small changes affecting 
43  The prevailing narrative for economic development is based on the unlimited 
use of fossil fuels and material resources. This narrative dates from at least 
the time of Adam Smith, at a time when the world’s population was less than 
1 billion and the industrial revolution was just about to begin.
conditions for investment appears the 
most likely way in which the conditions for 
decoupling would be created.  Creating the 
right conditions invites systemic changes, 
often of a long-term nature.
A central aspect of establishing 
favourable conditions for decoupling 
is the enhancement or creation of the 
market incentives that reward innovation 
in resource productivity. This provides 
dynamic ways of reducing future costs, 
as measures doing this tend to provide 
a continual incentive to reduce resource 
consumption, promoting new technology, 
and permitting maximum flexibility 
in achieving resource efficiency and 
emissions reductions (Harrington and 
Morgenstern, 2004). 
They have the potential to encourage 
engineers, managers, and investors to 
think of innovative strategies, including 
complex systems design, in pursuit 
of better returns on investments by 
continually saving resources, rather than 
requiring policymakers to periodically 
attempt to gather similar levels of 
knowledge on technical possibilities 
and make policy decisions on that basis.  
Market signals can bring about changes 
in technology, products, and individual 
behaviour across value chains without the 
need for interventions by policy makers 
at each level of that value chain. Where 
other conditions for innovation are already 
in place, the link between one policy 
and a strong upswing in innovation can 
sometimes been seen. (Figure 6.5).
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6.4.1 Many policy makers have   
a crucial role
Prices tend to be the strongest language 
for influencing firms and individuals and 
helping them consider less wasteful 
alternatives of reaching the same desired 
goals.  Yet as the barriers to innovation in 
resource productivity are widespread – and 
often connected to each other – success 
in decoupling would need many policy 
changes. This presents an opportunity 
to forward-thinking policymakers across 
different policy areas. It also indicates 
a key role for influential political and 
economic forces to shape policies where 
they have influence. It would need to 
include actions:
  In the areas of economic affairs 
and development, fiscal affairs, 
transport, trade, planning and 
infrastructure, science and technology, 
and education. These are central to 
resource productivity. This means that 
resource policies unavoidably require 
the attention of the top ranks of our 
political leadership to help policy 
coordination.
  That take many different forms 
of measures, such as voluntary 
agreements, labelling, research and 
development, fiscal change, institution 
building, market development, public 
procurement and education.44 
  That address resource and 
environmental issues at different 
phases of a product life cycle, e.g. 
during manufacturing, during use or 
relating to disposal. 
For example, in the specific field of the 
sustainable energy transformation, the 
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development has offered a tabulation 
giving an overview of the range of policy 
measures to be used: 
44  For Europe (including Turkey), there is a good overview from EEA (2011); 
Another useful source: GTZ, CSCP and Wuppertal Institute (2006).
Figure 6.5 Growth rates of patents relating to renewable energy technologies compared with other energy 
technologies. 3-year moving average, indexed on 1978=1.0) (Haščič et al., 2010, p. 12). The jump was 
prompted in part by the feed-in-tariffs law in Germany (see chapter 7.6.1)
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Figure 6.6: An overview of instruments driving the 
economy towards sustainable energy use (WBCSD, 
2011)
Chapter 7 provides examples of some types 
of the policy measures that have been 
used to create the conditions for resource 
productive investments.
6.4.2 Creation of policy mixes
As suggested by the Multi-level Perspective, 
simultaneous changes to different, related 
barriers to innovation are likely to be needed 
to make significant progress. The way in 
which the set of policy measures are used 
in combination can make a significant 
difference to the outcome.
The OECD’s research in this area, based 
on many years of experience, has found 
that a portfolio policy approach utilising 
a variety of government mechanisms 
and policies is the most effective strategy 
to underpin decoupling of economic 
growth and environmental pressures 
and ensure minimal negative effects to 
existing businesses’ competitiveness from 
transition. They write that: 
 Significant environmental improvement 
can be achieved at relatively low cost 
to the economy and with little negative 
social impact if the right mix of policies 
is used. The necessary policies and 
technological solutions to tackle the 
key environmental challenges are 
both available and affordable. (…) Even 
for a single environmental problem, 
an instrument mix may be needed 
given the often complex and inter-
connected nature of many environmental 
challenges, the often large number and 
variety of sources exerting pressure on 
the environment, and the many market 
and information failures. Instrument 
mixes need to be carefully constructed 
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to ensure that they achieve a given 
environmental goal in an effective and 
economically efficient manner, while 
providing consumers and producers with 
flexibility in how they meet the targets, 
so as to enable innovation. Social or 
equity impacts should be addressed. 
Instrument mixes should provide clear, 
short- and long-term policy signals 
to support appropriate investment 
decisions. The policy instruments used 
in a mix should be complementary and 
reinforcing, rather than duplicative or 
conflicting. (OECD, 2008a, p. 432).
Creating conditions that deliver the 
pace of productivity gains which result 
in absolute decoupling may require new 
ways of thinking. When considering the 
instruments to include in a policy mix, 
policymakers are likely to need to think 
about the appropriate timeframes guiding 
their goals, and the scope of the impact 
they are seeking: 
6.4.3 Long-term thinking
One of the barriers that seems to create 
biases in decision-making against 
more productive investments is the 
pervasiveness of decisions based on short-
term impacts. 
Whether in finance, business or politics, 
this is very often because the decision-
maker will be rewarded (financially or 
by political success) on the basis of 
short-term, direct impacts. Yet, for those 
decision-makers looking to provide 
leadership, and longer-term success for 
their countries or firms, adopting wider 
ways of thinking would be important.
Countries are likely to fare best with long-
term targets and with incentives that will 
make ever more intelligent and efficient 
use of natural resources continuously 
profitable. A policy of a long-term vision 
and of incremental signals could be the 
recipe for stimulating innovation in the 
direction of truly sustainable development 
and avoiding capital destruction from 
unpredicted obsolescence and associated 
political resistance to policy change. 
Taking a long-term perspective can help 
in the identification of trends that make 
incremental differences year-on-year, 
but which present serious challenges or 
opportunities for the future. For example, 
Figure 6.7 shows that the share of primary 
goods among Latin America’s exports is 
still growing and has even exceeded 50 per 
cent. The use of resources in Latin America 
is neither sustainable nor efficient. It may 
take some time until resource-exporting 
countries move towards higher value levels 
of production and resource efficiency. 
Figure 6.7 The share of primary goods in Latin 
American exports is still growing, indicating that 
the continent may not be on a sustainable path, 
according to UNEP (UNEP and Mercosur, 2011) 
6.4.4 Selecting the scope 
When selecting a mix of policy instruments 
for a particular goal, policymakers have 
choices over the breadth of the firms, 
individuals or institutional arrangements 
which they want to target. For example, a 
policy mix could target a particular locality, 
or the firms involved in the production and 
consumption of a particular product. 
When considering the scope of action, 
there is a need for a whole systems 
approach (see Stasinopoulos et al., 2009). 
This is valuable for designing policy 
attempting to influence separate stages 
1998 2002 20062000 2004 20081999 2003 20072001 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
%
 o
f p
ri
m
ar
y 
go
od
s 
in
 lo
ca
l e
xp
or
ts
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
89
of the use of resources inside complex 
economic and environmental systems. 
For example, although it is important to 
ensure that automobiles are designed 
to be more energy efficient, this is only 
part of the wider system. The entire 
transport infrastructure, the philosophy 
of logistics, and the shape and spread of 
human settlements influence the amount 
of energy and other resources spent 
on transportation. Policy changes that 
take this into account can find mutually 
reinforcing policies and new ways to 
introduce policies that can bring economic 
and environmental benefits. Other 
considerations, relevant to scope are:
  The evolution of innovations may need to 
be promoted in niches, where favourable 
conditions can be created, before it 
spreads to the mainstream. Practically, 
this may suggest leadership by 
businesses, citizens and policymakers 
acting together on certain value chains, 
which can serve as niches, or in certain 
geographic or urban locations. 
  Wisely choosing the scope, or 
boundaries, of the part of the economy 
to be influenced is important to the 
outcome. One of the most important 
factors is the strength of economic 
exchange between people of firms. 
Firms in a supply chain based in one 
country supplying parts for a product 
that is manufactured in another are 
usually much more closely related than 
firms in the same geographic area 
involved in the production of entirely 
different goods. This implies that 
considering value chains of economic 
activity may often be a good starting 
point for policy decisions. In other cases, 
people and firms sharing infrastructure, 
common services and governance 
structures may be the most helpful way 
to draw boundaries of action. This is 
often the case for cities, which are also 
the location for most economic activity. 
Our report on City-Level Decoupling 
examines the crucial role of decoupling 
policies in cities (UNEP, 2013c). 
  While pollution prevention has been 
mostly addressing manufacturers and 
the service industry, resource policies 
are also addressing consumers, inviting 
them to consider arranging their daily 
habits, homes, vehicles and nutrition 
to consume less non-renewable 
resources. 
  Resource-saving policies must consider 
the impacts and influences upstream in 
the production and consumption chain, 
while earlier environmental policies 
tended to focus on reducing pollution at 
”the end of the pipe”. Life cycle-thinking 
and management can help avoid too 
much burden-shifting around the 
globe and encourage greater resource 
productivity throughout the system.
6.5 Life -cycle thinking
Measures to remove disadvantages against 
resource-productive investments have to 
be based on clear identification of which 
investments are more resource-productive 
and which are less. Getting to the right 
decision on a policy mix will probably involve 
consideration of the indirect impacts of 
a change on resources at each of the life 
cycle stages: from use of resources or 
environmental harm from extraction, up to 
waste disposal at the end of life. 
Methodologies already exist to help 
policymakers consider these influences 
all along the supply chain from production 
through to consumption. Using these 
methodologies can allow policies to 
be shaped and coordinated to provide 
consistent incentives for innovation in 
resource productivity, and so stimulate 
these savings where the opportunities are 
most cost-effective. 
Among the different life cycle based 
methodologies, Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA) (ISO 14040:2006) is currently widely 
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adopted45 to assess environmental impacts 
associated with all the stages of a product’s 
life from cradle-to-grave (i.e. from raw 
material extraction through to materials 
processing, manufacture, distribution, 
use, repair and maintenance, and disposal 
or recycling). It aims to avoid impacts 
and inefficiencies throughout the entire 
life cycle. LCA can help avoid a narrow 
outlook on environmental concerns by 
compiling an inventory of relevant energy 
and material inputs and environmental 
releases, evaluating the potential impacts 
associated with identified inputs and 
releases and interpreting the results to help 
make a more informed decision. Figure 6.8 
indicates the fundamental phases of LCA.
Figure 6.8 The Phases of Life Cycle Assessment 
Due to its comprehensiveness, LCA is 
the basis for designing resource efficient 
processes and products, enhancing the 
eco-design of a product and process and 
adopting the “whole systems approach“. 
The key to the whole systems approach 
is identifying the right problems to solve 
along the product life cycle, well before 
design begins (Stasinopolous et al., 2009). 
Significant efforts are ongoing at 
international level towards harmonisation 
45  Other Life cycle based methodologies are e.g SLCA (social Life cycle 
assessment), LCC (life cycle costing) and LCSA (Life Cycle Sustainability 
Assessment).
of life cycle assessment methods in order 
to ensure robustness and comparability 
(e.g. the ILCD Handbook of the European 
Commission and the methodology for 
Product Environmental Footprint46). 
Since 2002, UNEP and the Society for 
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 
(SETAC) have launched, together with 
a number of governments and industry 
associations or companies, a Life Cycle 
Initiative47 aimed at promoting wider 
adoption of life cycle thinking and 
overcoming barriers to implementation.
Life cycle thinking has been more and more 
integrated into investments firms make, 
and the way they design products, joining 
with environmental management systems 
to comprehensively assess impacts over 
product life cycles (Sala et al., 2012).  
The life cycle analysis includes assessment 
of the results from changes (to policy 
stimulus, or investments). Often, the basis 
for this part of the analysis is a widely 
used analysis framework called the DPSIR 
method (Driving Forces, Pressures, States, 
Impacts, Responses), symbolised in Figure 
6.9. By clarifying the cause-effect chain 
between drivers of resource pressures 
and the foreseeable impacts of resource 
scarcities, it can help in identifying policy 
responses addressing drivers, pressures, 
states and impacts. The DPSIR framework 
has been successfully used for policy 
formation for managing pollutants (Figure 
6.9), water (Kristensen et al., 2004), and 
energy (EEA, 2008) and can be used for 
policy for decoupling. 
46  International Reference Life Cycle Data System (ILCD) Handbook, 
available from: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
handle/111111111/25589; Product environmental footprint (PEF), available 
from: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/smgp/product_footprint.htm. 
47  http://www.lifecycleinitiative.org/ 
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Figure 6.9  The DPSIR Framework, depicted here from a publication on air pollution control of the 
European Environment Agency (EEA, 1997, Fig. 1)
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An overview of policies that
have promoted decoupling
This chapter provides an overview of some of the types of policy measures that have been used to facilitate greater resource 
productivity. Between them, they give 
examples that contribute to tackling a 
range of the barriers and biases holding 
back transition to more resource-
productive economies:
  Reducing investment uncertainty 
and political lock-in, and changing 
unhelpful public decision making 
structures: Section 7.1 on Strategies
  Increasing innovation capacity: Section 
7.2
  Adjusting government pricing 
instruments to align market resource 
prices with decoupling: Section 7.3, 
7.4 and 7.5
  Creating new market structures: 
Section 7.6
  Restricting harmful activities or 
products, and strengthening markets 
for innovation: Section 7.7 on Bans 
and Requirements, and Section 7.8 on 
measures increasing demand
  Overcoming behavioural lock-in and 
social norms: Section 7.9
7.1 Strategies
Strategies can be seen as policy 
instruments in themselves, and not 
only packaging, bundling together other 
policies. They can perform several 
functions to reduce barriers to decoupling:
7.1.1 Reducing uncertainty   
and providing direction
For people to adapt today to the challenges 
of tomorrow, clear signals about the way 
the future will look are crucial. When 
policymakers can provide a credible 
direction for change, they can reduce 
uncertainty around investments in 
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resource productivity and so remove a bias 
against decoupling.
The reduction of this uncertainty is one of 
the central roles of strategies. Strategies 
are frequently used to create visions and 
goals for the future and provide clear 
routes to achieve those goals through 
credible mechanisms and measures. In 
this role, the formation of a strategy is 
a policy instrument, one that changes 
expectations about the future.
  One example is the Republic of Korea’s 
Framework Act for Low Carbon Green 
Growth, which introduces goals and 
measures to foster green technology 
and industries, to create new green jobs, 
reduce energy dependency and prepare 
for future risks in resource markets 
(Republic of South Korea, 2010). 
  Clear, achievable goals are one factor 
in driving change. The regular Five-
Year Plans produced by China contain 
such targets. For instance, the eleventh 
plan in 2006 made a commitment of 
increasing national energy productivity 
by 20 per cent, which is a stunning 
commitment for a five-year period, and 
it was achieved. The twelfth Five-Year 
Plan adopted early 2011 added another 
16 per cent energy efficiency increase 
(and 17 per cent “carbon efficiency” 
increase, consistent with the goal of 
reducing carbon intensity by 40-45 per 
cent until 2020, based on 2005 levels) 
(People’s Republic of China, 2011). 
  In Latin America, countries such as 
Guyana (Republic of Guyana, 2010) 
have adopted polices specially oriented 
to sustainable consumption and 
production (SCP). In November 2011, 
Brazil launched its SCP plan, which 
prioritises education for sustainable 
consumption, sustainable construction, 
environmental agenda in public 
administration, retail and consumption, 
sustainable procurement and increased 
recycling of solid waste. Besides this 
plan, Brazil has already implemented 
the National Plans for Solid Waste 
(2010), for Climate Change (2008), and 
for Water (2007) (World Bank, 2010b). 
  Hundreds of other plans exist at 
international, national and city levels, 
all converging into the objective of 
making better and more efficient use of 
scarce natural resources. They contain 
thousands of actions relate to specific 
topics, most prominently water, climate 
and the recovery of mineral resources 
from waste.
The effectiveness of a strategy in delivering 
predictability depends on its degree of 
credibility and clarity, and the degree 
of political support behind it. This often 
means that the process by which the 
strategy is produced or agreed can have 
an impact on its success. Sufficient 
cooperation between government and 
industry must be part of the formation of 
the policy framework, if it is to be seen as 
credible and relevant. 
Strategies have other important roles, 
particularly creating policy coherence and 
justifying the creation of new institutional 
structures.
7.1.2 Creating policy coherence 
To create the conditions for resource 
decoupling, governments and law-
making parliaments would have to utilise 
the entire arsenal of instruments from 
different policy areas – and this creates 
problems of coherence. Coordination 
reduces costs and increase benefits from 
complementarity between polices. It can 
mitigate the conflicting indirect effects of 
some existing policies, particularly taxation 
and regulatory policy on investments, 
which are often strong biases against 
innovation in resource productivity.
  For instance, Portugal implemented 
major energy policy reform since 2004 
on both renewable energy and energy 
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efficiency. This has led to Portugal 
increasing the share of renewables 
(including hydroelectric power) in 
total energy supply to 50 per cent by 
2010 (Eurostat, 2012). The increase in 
share of renewable was made easier 
by reductions in total energy demand 
through energy efficiency.
  The EU adopted a Roadmap to a 
Resource-Efficient Europe for the 
transition to a more resource-efficient 
economy (European Commission, 
2011 a-c) which forms one leg of the 
EU’s economic strategy for 2020. It is 
one of a wide range of EU documents 
aiming to decouple growth from 
resource use and environmental 
pressures (European Commission 
2001a, b, 2004a, 2005a-c, 2008a; 
Decision No 1600/2002/EC; Giljum 
et al., 2005).  It includes policies 
related to energy, climate change, 
research and innovation, industry, 
transport, agriculture, fisheries and 
the environment. Policy mechanisms 
to implement the strategy include 
legislation, market-based instruments 
and refocusing of funding instruments.
  California has significantly decoupled 
GDP growth from electricity and 
water demand through institutional 
and policy coherence dealing with the 
linkages between energy and water 
supply.
The process of formation of strategies 
can bring together the decision-makers 
responsible for different areas of policy and 
provide the incentives and the interactions 
that help create greater coordination and 
coherence between policies. 
7.1.3 Creation of new  
institutional structures
Implementation of strategies often requires 
changes to institutions to bring the 
necessary capabilities and powers together. 
It can be an opportunity for government 
reform. By finding agreement on a shared 
goal for the future, strategies are able to 
facilitate creation of the new institutional 
structures that are needed to move towards 
that goal.
For example, the cornerstone of New 
Zealand’s green planning effort, the 
Resource Management Act of 1991, 
has a single purpose that applies to all 
activities on land, air, water and the coast 
– the sustainable management of the 
nation’s natural resources. Accordingly, 
New Zealand radically restructured its 
government institutions and revamped its 
laws to create well-defined environmental 
policy and management roles. This included 
an innovative system of regional government 
with new boundaries based on watersheds. 
In 2010, New Zealand further developed a 
framework for resource efficiency, based on 
a review of international activities dealing 
with resource efficiency (Government of 
New Zealand, 2010). 
Similarly, a policy feature important for 
good water management is the spatial 
organisation of implementation action 
according to catchment areas. France 
introduced this system in 1964 with six 
water basin agencies. These agencies are 
public institutions under the supervision of 
the Ministry in charge of the Environment 
and of the Finance Ministry. They bring 
together stakeholders (representatives 
of water users and of local authorities) at 
the basin level in a “water parliament”, 
deciding upon a pluri-annual intervention 
programme geared toward developing 
water resources and reducing pollution. 
They also decide upon the water use 
charges and wastewater discharge charges, 
and upon contributions to financing of the 
infrastructures (waste water treatment 
facilities, dams, etc). A law adopted in 2006 
consolidated the rules for determining 
the charge base and caps their rates. 
Charges accrue from water use, private 
homes waste water discharge, agricultural 
and industrial water discharges, (from 
agriculture with a standard in relation to the 
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number of animals), and diffuse pollution, 
chiefly from pesticides. Revenues are used 
for maintenance and modernisation of 
the system, for the protection of aquatic 
zones and for water storage in times of 
low water. In 2009, the total revenue from 
the charges was more than €2 billion, with 
pollution charges contributing the biggest 
part. New Zealand has more or less copied 
the watershed management. Similar 
arrangements exist in the USA and other 
countries (Deli Priscoli, n.d.).
7.1.4 Advisory strategies
Additionally, strategy documents can be 
advisory: describing the measures that 
would need to be put in place, and so 
helping overcome institutional biases 
in favour of existing policy mixes or 
economic structures. Their strength and 
persuasiveness comes from the possibility 
to take a long-term view, use of science 
and analysis of problems and solutions, and 
often the participation of influential political 
or scientific people and organisations in 
their formation. The forums forming these 
strategies are sometimes able to work 
outside national institutional structures 
(such as the divide between ministerial 
responsibilities) and by doing so, find 
solutions that will facilitate change. This can 
be particularly important for crosscutting 
strategies, like those associated with 
decoupling. Examples include:
  The 2001 OECD Environmental 
Strategy for the First Decade of the 
21st Century (OECD, 2001a). One of the 
early decoupling strategies.
  The World Bank, together with the 
World Economic Forum and the 
International Energy Agency, launched 
an initiative in 2008 to support resource 
efficiency in cities, called “Slim Cities 
Initiative”.
  After the global financial meltdown 
of 2008, UNEP conceptualised the 
escape from the crisis through the 
Global Green New Deal (Barbier, 
2009) and later the Green Economy 
Initiative (UNEP, 2011c). Both contain 
the strategic increase of resource 
productivity as a core element. The 
Green Economy Report documents the 
advantages and means for investing 
in 10 central sectors of the economy 
in order to shift development onto 
a resource-efficient, low-carbon 
path that factors in future resource 
demand/supply imbalances.
  The OECD’s 2011 Green Growth 
Strategy (OECD, 2011a), which shows 
how reducing unsustainable pressures 
on the quality and quantity of natural 
resources reinforces economic growth. 
  Decoupling has been adopted as a key 
framework and extensively promoted 
by the UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 
7.2 Innovation enabling policies 
The second area of measures to facilitate 
greater resource productivity are 
instruments that increase or facilitate an 
economy’s capacity to innovate. Neither 
the innovation capacity, nor the measures, 
must necessarily be specifically aimed at 
increasing resource productivity. In many 
developing countries, creation of the generic 
innovation capacity is the starting point.  
There are two kinds, which are often related: 
  Policies which boost the capacity to 
innovate;
  Policies which facilitate change and 
the spread of innovation by reducing 
the downsides of innovation.
7.2.1 Policies increasing capacity  
to innovate
In economies with developed innovation 
systems, those systems may still not be 
highly capable in resource productivity: 
they may lack researchers with the 
right knowledge, the networks, the 
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technological capacity and the institutions 
(e.g. long-term funding) which would 
support innovation in resource productivity.
The measures can directly support 
research, stimulate demand, remove 
blocks to supply, or take many other forms. 
They include: promoting skills, creating 
networks, exchanging international 
experience, infrastructure planning to 
support innovation, and capacity building 
and education curriculum reform (Desha 
and Hargroves, 2012).
7.2.2 Policies reducing the 
downsides of change
An increase in the pace of innovation 
implies faster economic change which 
often results in greater disruption of 
existing economic structures and skill 
sets. Policies which help workers and 
entrepreneurs change at the pace of 
innovation will be needed to reduce social 
costs from change, and so enable political 
acceptance.  These include policies 
supporting redundant workers to find new 
jobs and reskilling.
7.3 Policies directly affecting 
resource prices
One of the central conditions for 
encouraging resource-productive 
investments in market economies is the 
relative price of resources. For a market 
economy to make a transition in the 
direction which society wants, the price 
signals need to align with the strategic 
goals of the society. This has the potential 
to redefine the agenda of firms and 
individuals such that their investment and 
purchase decisions made in their own 
interest are in line with society’s.
This contrasts with widespread desires 
that resources should be free, or very 
cheap. For example, in the world’s farming 
communities, there is a belief that water 
should be offered as a free good, or a 
free public service, to all in need of it. If 
resources really were costless – which 
they would be were they inexhaustible and 
ubiquitous, and cost nothing to extract 
or harvest – then they should be free. 
This would be the ideal situation in many 
respects. However, when there are costs 
from resource consumption, limits to 
resources, indirect harm to others, or costs 
of provision, having prices lower than the 
real costs encourages waste, discourages 
productivity and, as Chapter 1 shows, leads 
to accumulation of negative impacts.
So, for example, in its Water for Growth 
and Development Framework, the South 
African Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry concurred with the economic 
view that social welfare is maximised 
when all costs are reflected in prices, a 
concept sometimes referred to as “full cost 
pricing”. It recognised that when prices 
are artificially low, consumption tends to 
be excessive and that it is important to 
use pricing as a means for consumers 
to appreciate the true value of water. 
Hopefully, this will effect changes in its 
consumption and achieve efficiency gains 
that will enable water system managers to 
postpone the need for new capital outlays. 
A policy change that rectifies price 
distortions at one point in the production 
chain passes through that benefit to other 
aspects of production and consumption 
of a product, not only addressing 
manufacturers and service providers, but 
also consumers.
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Box 2: Example of price change: the 
response to the 1970s energy crises
The 1970s oil shocks provided an example 
of how economies can successfully develop 
through different resource use patterns. 
•		After	the	oil	shock,	the	OECD	nations	
taken together decreased energy intensity 
of their economies by 20 per cent from 
1973-85. For the same period, in countries 
belonging to the IEA, GDP grew by nearly 
32 per cent, but energy use by only 5 per 
cent. In the US, GDP rose by 27 per cent, 
oil consumption fell by 17 per cent, net 
oil imports fell by 50 per cent. Between 
1977-85, USA GDP grew 3 per cent a year, 
yet oil use fell 2 per cent a year, achieving 
a reduction in oil intensity of 5.2 per 
cent per year. This was enabled by end-
use efficiency technological innovations 
and policy reforms. For instance, for US 
automobiles, 96 per cent of their efficiency 
gains came from more efficient design, 
with 4 per cent from smaller size. 
•		California	(the	world’s	eighth	largest	
economy) has shown how feasible it is 
to continue these trends by decoupling 
GDP from fossil fuel electricity use per 
capita since the late 1970s. Figure 7.1 
shows the success story. Since 1978, the 
Californian Public Utility Commission 
made licences for new power plants 
dependent on the proof that new power 
was economically more favourable than 
helping customers to save energy. Utilities 
helping their customers on efficiency 
earned the benefit of saving investment 
capital for new plants and were allowed to 
charge higher kilowatt prices as long as 
customers paid less on a monthly basis. 
The scheme saved California more than 
US$56 billion in electricity and natural 
gas costs (The Climate Group, n.d.). More 
recently, California has passed legislation 
committing to source 33 per cent of its 
power by 2020 from renewable energy.
Figure 7.1 Comparison of Electricity Usage Per 
Capita between the USA and California from 1960 
- 2000
•		The	oil	crises	and	the	low	prices	of	the	
sugar in the 1970s pushed Brazil to 
the beginning of a new strategy to deal 
with fuels. Brazil developed biofuels 
from sugarcane, seen in the country 
as a very successful programme. The 
ProAlcool was set up in 1975 when 
energy supply became a main priority. 
The objective was to slow down fuel 
imports while maintaining economic 
growth, by producing ethanol by biomass 
(sugarcane cassava and sorghum) to 
substitute gasoline. Sugarcane was the 
chosen substrate for ethanol production 
due to its great adaptation to the 
Brazilian soil and weather condition. The 
anhydrous alcohols (up to 20 per cent) 
were mixed with gasoline (Soccol et al., 
2005). As one would expect, any large-
scale programme of this kind comes 
with downsides, notably regarding the 
environment. Brazilian authors Luiz 
Martinelli and Solange Filoso write about 
soil erosion, deterioration of aquatic 
systems, nitrogen pollution, destruction 
of riparian ecosystems and air pollution 
from sugarcane burning (Martinelli and 
Filoso, 2008). They also mention social 
troubles such as misery and deaths of 
cane cutters.
 
Unless the state has the power to set prices 
itself, the policies that directly affect resource 
prices can be price–based (charges, fees, 
taxes, or removal of subsidies) or rights–
based (tradable permits, auctioned user 
rights)48, the latter of which usually require 
setting up of new market institutions.
48  For a general treatment of MBI’s see: European Commission (2007). For 
an analysis of price vs. rights instruments relating to resource efficiency 
in fisheries see Economic Instruments.Tthe rights approach for fisheries is 
addressed in Le Gallic, B. (2004). 
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7.4 Price-based instruments: 
fees and charges, taxes  
and subsidies
7.4.1 Fees or charges 
Fees or charges are generally paid for the 
use of natural resources or for services 
in this context. Examples are water fees, 
wastewater charges, pollution charges, 
and waste collection charges. They are 
compulsory, and their purpose is to 
recover the costs (operating or capital, or 
both) of providing a service. The proceeds 
of the fees or charges do not typically end 
up in the government’s general budget 
– rather, they end up with the service 
provider, public or private.
Cost-covering fees can indicate to 
consumers the real price of the 
sustainable provision of the respective 
resource. This was made explicit in the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Water 
Conservation Plan guidelines (EPA, 1998a), 
stating that water costing and pricing 
is also seen as a conservation strategy 
conveying the information about the value 
of a reliable provision of clean water. 
In South Africa, the types of charging for 
water can include: repeal of discounts to 
industry as an establishment incentive; 
increasing block tariffs; seasonal rates, 
higher tariffs during dry seasons and 
droughts and excess use charges. In 
the agriculture sector despite average 
increases in excess of 20 per cent per 
annum since the new pricing strategy was 
introduced.
7.4.2 Taxes 
In contrast, taxes are primarily defined 
as revenue-raising instruments. They are 
compulsory payments to the government, 
appearing as revenues in the budget. 
Taxes are a central symbol of the social 
contract. In the words of Adam Smith 
(Smith, 1776, p. 704): “Every tax, however, 
is, to the person who pays it, a badge, not 
of slavery, but of liberty.” Taxes are needed 
to finance public goods and services 
countries consider necessary, such as 
infrastructures, the legal system, public 
administration, external defence and 
internal security, social security or basic 
education.
While usually designed as revenue-raising 
instruments, the choice of which tax to 
use has hugely important side effects, only 
one of which is usually debated. They have 
a – usually intended – redistributive effect, 
frequently from the wealthier to the poorer 
segments of society. 
But taxes can also have a strong incentive 
effect, inducing taxpayers to reduce habits 
leading to high tax payments.  Where a tax 
takes the price of an economic resource 
further away from its true cost (for 
example, by increasing labour costs), its 
incentive effect is distortionary and it adds 
inefficiency to the economy.
7.4.3 Subsidies 
A subsidy is a fiscal benefit (such as a 
tax exemption or rebate) or financial 
aid (such as a cash grant or soft loan) 
provided by a government intending to 
support an activity considered desirable, 
such as food production, strategic 
industries or products, or exports. The 
basic characteristic of all subsidies is to 
reduce the market price of an item below 
its true cost of supply. A case in point is 
water supplies for poor families and for 
agriculture.
Very often, subsidies support continued 
inefficient use of resources, not resource 
productivity. Partly, this comes out of 
their primary motive, which is as a tool of 
income support. As a UNEP report (UNEP 
DTIE, 2008, p.12) on energy puts it: 
“... studies demonstrate that, globally, 
subsidies are large and that non-OECD 
countries account for the bulk of them, 
(and) ... suggest that the majority of energy 
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subsidies in non-OECD countries benefit 
consumers, by lowering the price they pay.” 
The size and impact can be very large. 
The World Energy Outlook of the IEA 
2012 concluded: “In 2011, fossil-fuel 
consumption subsidies worldwide are 
estimated to have totalled $523 billion, 
$111 billion higher than in 2010.” (IEA, 
2012, p. 69).
Water subsidies also have the main 
purpose of holding water prices down, 
notably in agriculture. Figure 7.2 indicates 
the extent to which, for some OECD 
countries, subsidies play a role in creating 
low water prices (while the costs of supply 
remain the same).
Figure 7.2  Water prices for agriculture, industry, 
and households in 12 OECD countries In 2001, only 
The Netherlands and Austria had realistic water 
prices for farms (Jones, 2003) 
Subsidies supporting the continued 
inefficient use of resources are often called 
“perverse subsidies” (Kent and Myers, 
2011) because their dynamic effects run 
counter to productivity goals. 
Road transport is heavily subsidised, 
perhaps by US$250 billion, half of which 
can safely be considered “perverse 
subsidies” - i.e. harmful to the environment 
and to the economy (Kjellingbro and 
Skotte, 2005, p. 102). Subsidies for the use 
of pesticides, fertilisers and fishing vessels 
are further examples of perverse subsidies. 
Other subsidies promote investment in 
resource-efficient production and services. 
Financial grants or credits can facilitate 
acquisition investments in resource 
efficient of technologies by businesses or 
households. The World Energy Outlook 
2011 (IEA, 2011) has its special focus on 
energy efficiency and lists some schemes, 
chiefly in OECD countries, for subsidising 
buildings and industries to boost energy 
efficiency.
7.5 Reform of taxes and 
subsidies
The G20 has committed to phasing out 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (so reducing 
fossil fuel consumption) as a way to deliver 
growth, reduce budget deficits and reduce 
environmental harm (G20, 2009).
Much of the literature discussing reform 
of taxation changing resource prices 
covers the topic under the heading of 
Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR) as 
the issue has been widely discussed by 
sustainability policymakers. The rationale 
for EFR is well set out in a report by the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2005) endorsed 
by UNEP, UNDP, OECD, the European 
Commission, and others. 
The main motive for the tax or subsidy 
reform can be to reduce incentives for 
environmental harm, but often it is that funds 
can be raised to allow the corresponding 
reduction of other taxes. This was the case 
in Germany which introduced a relevant tax 
reform from 1999-2003 in five consecutive 
steps, eventually shifting some €18 billion 
annually from indirect labour charges 
to taxes on energy – and so leading to an 
estimated gain of 250,000 jobs (Knigge and 
Görlach, 2005).
The suitability of tax reform in this context at 
country level will vary according to the level 
of development, resource endowments, and 
institutional capacity. 
Price of water
Comparison of agricultural, Industrial and Household water prices (Late 1990s)
US$/m3
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
3.0
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Fra
nce Sp
ain
Hu
ng
ary
Au
str
ali
a
Tu
rke
y
Au
str
ia
Gr
ee
ce
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Un
ite
d k
ing
do
m
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ca
na
da
2.0
1.0
0
Industry HouseholdAgriculture
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
100
7.5.1 Benefits of reform
Reform can bring several net benefits: 
  Tax and subsidy reforms can be used 
to correct the inadequacies of current 
pricing systems, to contribute to 
internalising external costs associated 
with the extraction, processing and 
use of natural resources. For rapidly 
industrialising economies, EFR can play 
an important role in leapfrogging to 
promote resource efficiency and control 
industrial pollution. For industrialised 
countries, EFR can bring about the 
consumption and production patterns 
for sustainability.
  Perverse subsidies also represent a 
large and often growing direct drain 
on public finances, depriving other 
sectors of the economy of budgetary 
resources. Reform of explicit subsidies 
(IEEP et al., 2007) yields fiscal benefits 
at times of budgetary constraint. For 
example, Indonesia removed pesticide 
subsidies in 1986 and saved US$100 
million per year in the process. In its 
place it developed “integrated pesticide 
management” (Gallagher, 1999).
  They are usually equally motivated by 
other fiscal goals, for example the tax 
revenues can be used for financing 
technology development or resource 
productivity programmes where not 
used to lower other “distorting taxes”, 
such as labour taxes (Ekins and Speck, 
2011; OECD, 2010b; Cour des Comptes, 
2011; Jaeger, 2011). 
  The administrative costs of eco-taxes 
tend to be considerably lower than 
those of value-added taxes or certain 
income taxes, which economic and 
political elites often manage to evade.
  For developing countries, what is 
perhaps particularly important is 
creating fiscal revenue from the 
extraction of their natural resources 
by foreign-owned interests. Extraction 
taxes can also serve as an incentive 
to overcome the often careless and 
wasteful methods of extraction. Where 
these taxes are linked to pollution, 
the taxes can also be an appropriate 
way of stopping deleterious trends 
of deteriorating air and water quality 
(UNEP, 2004; UNEP and ECLAC, 2003). 
Figure 7.3 summarises assumed benefits 
from EFR.
EFR
• Addressing environmental problems that affect the poor
• Improved access to environmental infrastructure
• Finances for pre-poor investments (e.g., education)  
• Revenue mobilisation
• Reduced distortions
• Reduced drains on public finances
• Incentives for sustainable natural resources management
• Incentives for curbing pollution (air, water, soil)
• Funds for environment agencies and investments
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FISCAL BENEFITS
POVERTY REDUCTION
Figure 7.3 Assumed benefits from an Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR). 
Source: World Bank, 2005, p. 18
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7.5.2 Challenges for reform
A growing number of lower-income 
countries have embarked on tax and 
subsidy reform as part of their poverty 
reduction strategies, combining it with 
preferential water and energy tariffs for the 
needs of the poorest.  However, in many 
countries, the reform of environmental 
harmful subsidies will remain a challenge 
for the foreseeable future, due to the 
complexity of the subsidy landscape, and 
the political unpopularity of subsidy reform 
by those currently receiving them. 
Some subsidies involve an explicit and 
transparent financial transfer from 
government to producers or consumers, 
such as a cash payment per unit of 
production or consumption, while other 
subsidies are hidden.  By definition, 
however, explicit and hidden subsidies 
are significantly different in terms of 
their effects on public finances. In fact, 
governments like to hide subsidies (keep 
them “off-budget”) primarily for political 
motives. For this reason, notwithstanding 
the existence of official annual subsidies 
reports, it is not easy to determine the 
level of subsidies.
In the context of the EU’s Sustainable 
Development Strategy of 2006, the Institute 
for European Environmental Policy and 
partners came up with a decision tree to 
help reform subsidies by removing such 
aspects that act as barriers to transition 
to greater resource productivity. The tool 
they proposed in 2009 (IEEP et al., 2009a) 
is shown in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4  The Environmentally Harmful Subsidies reform tool, or decision tree (IEEP et al., 2009b, p. 7)
1. Screening
[1] Is there a subsidy?
[4] What is the economic and 
social relevance of the 
subsidy?
[6] Are data available?
[5] Are there insummountable 
obstacles to reform?
[3] What is the sectoral policy 
context?
[2] Does the subsidy lead to a 
significant environmental 
impact?
3. Broader assesment 4. Analysis of reform options
2. Checklist for assessing 
the environment 
benefits of EHS removal
•	 Insights	on	validity	of	subsidy	
rationale
•	 Online	of	trade	offs	between	
environmental, social and 
economic impacts of subsidy
Subsidy 
removal is 
not likely 
to have 
significant 
environment 
benefit
Recipe book on 
the calculation 
of size of 
subsidy
 Subsidy removal likely to 
benefit the environment
•	 Online	of	alternative	policies
•	 Analysis	of	impacts	of	
alternative process
•	 List	of	compensatory	
measures
•	 List	of	potentially	
environmentally harmful 
subsidies for assessment
•	 Insights	on	political	feasibility	of	
subsidy reform
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
[2] Are are they met?
[3] Cost effectiveness
[4] Social economic and 
other impacts
[1] What are the possible 
reform options?
[3] What are the potential 
economic and social 
impacts?
[4] What are the facilitating 
factors for success?
[2] What are the cost 
benefits of each option?
[5] Long term 
effectiveness
[1] What are the subsidy 
objectives?
[1] Do the size and conditionality 
of the subsidy lead to higher 
volumes?
[3] More benign alternatives 
available or emerging
[2] Policy filter limits 
environmental damage?
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Whenever prices are changed, special 
attention is needed in the impacts on the 
very poor. There, the question remains 
whether it helps the poor more if they are 
induced by low energy prices to continue 
wasting energy, or if they receive direct 
support payments leaving them with the 
decision whether to waste energy, or save 
it through efficiency and spend the savings 
on other things.
7.5.3 Finding an appropriate  
level of taxes
Almost all of the literature on optimal 
levels of taxation, starting with Arthur 
Cecil Pigou (Pigou, 1920), assumes that 
taxes for resources, or pollution, should be 
fixed at an “optimal” rate, corresponding 
to the “external” cost of the societal or 
environmental impacts caused by the use 
of the respective commodities. Through 
this they are designed to correct the 
typical market failures in resource prices, 
and to integrate negative “externalities” 
into the cost of products and services 
(externalities being damages and costs to 
society that are not felt by those causing 
them). Despite the obvious difficulties of 
determining external cost49, Pigou and his 
followers’ considerations currently define 
the political debate on levels of taxes 
that raise the price of energy, water and 
minerals consumption.
Despite the academic literature, the vast 
majority of existing taxes on polluting 
emissions, energy or – rarely – on other 
raw materials (Commonwealth Secretariat 
and ICMM, 2009), are designed primarily to 
raise revenue. So far, they are generally set 
at modest levels (partly to avoid migration 
of polluters to convenient tax havens). 
The ICMM, an association of mining 
companies, recommends a long-term 
view of taxes on resource extraction with 
a view to maximise revenues, meaning to 
49  For carbon dioxide emissions, damage assessments differ by several orders 
of magnitude. And for Russia, externalities might even look positive: (Shuster, 
2009) 
maximise resource extraction over time 
(Commonwealth Secretariat and ICMM, 
2009, p.11).
When the decision-maker’s goal is to 
create the conditions that facilitate greater 
resource-productive investments, the 
estimation of the appropriate level of 
taxation will usually need to take into 
account a wider range of factors, rather 
than the “optimality” of taxation. This can 
include looking at the role that prices play 
in overcoming barriers to transition, and so 
taking account the extent of those barriers 
– for example the impact of subsidies on 
the effective price of the resource, and 
at the other factors creating bias in the 
economy.
Figure 7.5 gives an indication of the size 
of environmental taxation in Europe, with 
Europe being the continent of highest 
eco-taxes worldwide. South Korea is now 
the country with one of the highest level 
of resource and environmental taxation: 
roughly 10 per cent of fiscal revenues, 
compared with about 6 per cent in typical 
EU countries and 3 per cent in the USA.
Figure 7.5 Total environmental tax revenue, EU-27 
(% of GDP and Total social contributions), 1999-
2009, 
Source: Eurostat, 2011e
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7.5.4 Induced changes
Taxes reforms are often introduced 
gradually, to give time to adjust. Often, the 
announcement of future changes in taxes 
alone induces more resource-efficient 
behaviours, as firms and people adjust in 
anticipation. This is called the signalling 
effect.
Existing cautious examples of a gradual 
approach include the German wastewater 
charges that were announced in 1976. Four 
years before being actually collected, they 
had their strongest steering effect during 
the announcement period when the charge 
was still zero. Also the British “escalator” tax 
on transport fuels, introduced in 1993, and 
the German ecological tax reform of 1999 
were progressive, meaning that year-by-year 
the duty increased by small amounts. In all 
cases, the announcement of further steps 
had a major effect both on manufacturers 
and on customer behaviour. 
Our first decoupling report offered evidence 
of the effect the step-wise introduction of 
fuel taxes had in Britain and Germany and 
compared the situation with that of the USA 
and Canada. Figure 7.6 taken from that 
report shows the evidence. 
Figure 7.6  CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
consumption (the UK introduced the fuel duty 
escalator in 1993, and Germany its Environmental 
Tax Reform in 1999, adding to a hefty levy on petrol 
from 1992 to co-finance the cost of the country’s 
unification). One result has been notable decoupling 
of fuel use from GDP (not shown on the graph) as 
GDP rose at rates similar to those of the USA and 
Canada, whose petrol consumption more or less 
remained high and stable, UNEP, 2011b, p. 70)
7.6 Creating new market 
institutions
One of the biases against change towards 
resource productivity is slow change in the 
rules, regulatory framework and social 
norms that shape economic interactions 
in the market. There have now been 
many examples where new institutional 
arrangements have been created by 
policymakers create market decisions that 
take into account the challenges facing 
society. The two examples in this section 
illustrate the potential: both of these are 
rights-based market institutions which 
influence prices, and hence investment 
choices.
7.6.1 Feed- in tariffs (FIT)
Feed-in tariffs (FIT), introduced since 
the turn of the century, offer cost-
covering compensation to renewable 
energy producers. They provide secured 
returns on investments through long-
term contracts to help new technologies 
overcome the biases towards existing 
technologies. 
FITs typically include three key provisions: 
1) guaranteed grid access; 2) long-term 
contracts (15-25 years) for the electricity 
produced; 3) purchase prices based on the 
cost of generation. Often the compensation 
is reduced over time reflecting reducing 
average costs reductions of producing the 
respective renewable energy. 
Germany was the first country to offer 
FITs, for wind energy, solar power, small 
scale hydro and biomass-based gas and 
power. The legislative instrument is the 
Renewable Energies Act, adopted in 
2000 and modified several times since. 
It has been copied or adapted in roughly 
60 countries (both in the developed 
and developing world) and has boosted 
investments in renewable energies 
worldwide (World Future Council, 2009; 
Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Couture et al., 
2010; Kreycik et al., 2011). 
Figure 4.8. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption
Source: UNEP, 2011. The UNEP GEO Data Portal, as compiled from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). United Nations 
Environment Programme, http://geodata.grid.unep.ch.
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A detailed analysis by the European 
Commission concluded that “well-adapted 
feed-in tariff regimes are generally the 
most efficient and effective support 
schemes for promoting renewable 
electricity” (European Commission, 2008b). 
This conclusion has been supported by 
a number of analyses, including by the 
IEA (IEA, 2008b). Most FIT-related activity 
in 2010 focused on revisions to existing 
policies in response to strong markets 
that exceeded expectations, particularly in 
the case of photovoltaic. New FIT policies 
were implemented in several developing/
transition countries in 2010 and early 2011.
They have proved very effective at moving 
venture capital into renewable energies 
(Figure 7.7), and also patent applications 
for technical innovations in the field, both 
of which appear to be stimulated.
Figure 7.7 Venture capital investments in 
efficiency and renewable energies after the 
adoption in 2000 of the first feed-in tariffs law 
(Knol, Beta, 2012)
7.6.2 Tradable permits 
Tradable pollution permits are rights to 
resource depletion or pollution that can 
be bought or sold in artificially created 
markets. 
Now frequently discussed for encouraging 
management of carbon emissions, there 
are many incarnations of tradable permits. 
Emission-trading schemes started long 
ago with local and national pollution 
control. A survey (OECD; 1999) found nine 
applications in air pollution control, 75 
applications in fisheries, three applications 
in managing water resources, five 
applications in controlling water pollution 
and five applications in land-use control50 
For example, they are used for landfill 
permits (in Britain’s Landfill Allowances 
Trading System), fishing quotas (e.g. 
Canada, New Zealand and Norway), 
grazing rights (Australia), water supplies, 
and several undesired pollutants such 
as salt, volatile organic compounds or 
nutrients causing water eutrophication 
(e.g. in Chesapeake Bay, USA). 
The concept of tradable pollution emission 
permits was first developed by the 
Canadian economist John Dales (Dales, 
1968) in a book published in 1968. In effect, 
tradable permits turn pollution from a 
free good into a costly production factor.  
Usually, the government issues only a 
limited number of permits consistent with 
the desired level of emissions (a cap). The 
owners of the permits may keep them and 
release the level of pollutants matching 
their permits, or change their emissions 
and sell, or buy, permits to match (the 
trade). Tradable permit systems are 
therefore often called cap and trade 
systems. The decision whether to carry 
out measures to reduce pollution or buy 
additional permits on the permit market 
is based on a comparison between the 
marginal abatement cost (the cost of 
reducing an additional unit of pollution) 
and the market price for pollution permits. 
This situation creates an incentive to 
reduce emissions. 
The price given to pollution is determined 
through supply and demand in the 
emission permit market. That price 
may alter the production decisions of 
companies and, to the extent that they are 
able to pass on the additional costs to final 
goods prices, also affects the consumption 
choices of consumers. 
50  For a theoretical and practical essay see Tietenberg, 2006.
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There are various advantages and 
disadvantages of tradable permits for 
polluting emissions:
  Often permits are allocated free of 
charge, too generously, depending on 
historical emissions. This has been 
the case for the European Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) for CO2 and other 
greenhouse gas emissions, where over-
allocation, exacerbated by an economic 
downturn, led permit prices to collapse 
to insignificant levels, thus annihilating 
the intended steering effect. However, 
governments can also sell the permits 
in periodic auctions, leading to 
considerable revenues for the state 
and, in practice, a stronger stimulus to 
polluters to reduce emissions. 
  One evident challenge of emission 
permits is measuring the pollutants. 
Another is high transaction costs, and 
a need for administrative capacity for 
the state. In fact, most emission trading 
schemes define a fairly large minimum 
size of a company obliged to participate 
in permit trading. 
  Speculation can distort and disrupt the 
artificial markets, if allowed to. The 
ETS, mentioned above, has additionally 
suffered from massive, and jerky, 
movements up and down. 
•	 A linking directive of the EU 
allowed participating installations 
to offset large parts of their 
obligations abroad, using the three 
“flexible mechanisms” of the Kyoto 
protocol, Joint Implementation, 
the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), and 
International Emissions Trading. 
All this served as an invitation to 
a new breed of speculators and to 
very unpredictable fluctuations, 
frustrating all those who made 
long-term investments in 
carbon-saving technologies and 
installations.
•	 The flexible mechanisms have 
led to another kind of downside, 
namely quite odd and partly 
perverse incentives such as the 
acceptance under the CDM of 
cheap destruction of by-products 
of ozone-depleting substances 
(Kaniaru et al., 2007)51, or carbon 
offsets for big pig farms in 
developing countries (because 
they “replaced” cattle farming 
with heavier greenhouse gas 
impacts), or forest monocultures 
after destruction of virgin forests. 
7.7 Bans, prohibitions and 
mandated requirements
For many decades and in many countries, 
some of the most important policy 
measures used for resource productivity 
(mainly energy efficiency) and the reduction 
of environmental harm were implemented 
by regulation that limited behaviour with the 
threat of legal sanctions if the regulation 
was ignored.  For example, after the oil 
price shocks in 1973 and 1979, several 
countries started adopting mandatory 
requirements to drive energy efficiency, in 
particular around the energy performance 
of buildings52. 
This form of policy measures can limit 
products, or processes, or, alternatively 
require different processes, technologies 
of products to be used.  They include 
products standards, efficiency standards, 
and emissions limits (into water, or air, for 
example). They can take many forms, and 
have different layers of complexity – with 
some combining different standards to be 
met with various forms of activity to meet 
the standards.  
51 The authors describe very perverse incentives creating windfall profits to 
manufacturers of chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) with a global warming 
potential 1700 times higher per weight than CO2, and its byproduct HFC-
23, 14000 times more dangerous than CO2. Companies offering cheaply to 
destroy HFC-23, massively cash in as they “reduce” global warming. HFC-23 
destruction has over years accounted for roughly 50% of the ETS market, 
leading to artificially low prices for CO2 permits. A journalistic account of the 
story can be found in: The Economist, (2010). 
52  For a good overview: World Energy Council, 2008. 
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Some can specify an environmental 
goal (such as an environmental ambient 
pollution level) as the framing for the level 
of change to be met.
Figure 7.8 lists and describes the most 
relevant types of standards
Figure 7.8 Different types of environmental 
norms and standards (GTZ, CSCP and Wuppertal 
Institute, 2006, p. I-1)
They are adopted by public authorities 
which then inspect, monitor, and 
enforce compliance to these standards, 
punishing violations with formal legal 
sanctions. Partly for this reason, these 
policy measures are sometimes called 
“command and control” measures.53 
Direct regulatory requirements can be 
very effective at driving change. They often 
have clarity of purpose and outcome, and 
can send clear signals on what changes 
are sought (Harrington and Morgenstern, 
2004). The threat of legal sanctions can 
be (but is not always) a strong motivation 
to change, the effectiveness of which 
53  The term ‘command and control’ is actually much newer than the old term 
of environmental regulation. It was anti-regulatory feelings since 1980 that 
led to the new label of ‘command and control’, a term stemming from the US 
military language. See: Short, 2007.
depends on the credibility of the public 
authorities enforcing the regulation and 
the impact of the penalty. 
Although often regarded as primarily a way 
to directly reach a public goal, this type 
of instrument plays a key role in creating 
the conditions for investment in resource-
productive technologies:
  When they prohibit some of the 
existing (poorly performing) 
technologies, they create new demand 
for alternative, more resource-
productive technologies, and reward 
innovators. It is very unusual that they 
bring an end to the economic activity 
that is being regulated – instead 
stimulating change to alternative 
products that deliver the same 
function, or alternative methods to 
produce the same product.  They 
remove the less resource-productive 
(or more environmentally harmful) 
products or technologies from the 
market, cutting competition, and 
opening markets for more resource-
productive products. This can be 
essential to overcome biases that 
have created conditions where the 
less-productive technology is cheaper 
than the more resource-productive 
alternatives.
  When they mandate particular 
standards, behaviours or processes, 
they also create demand for (more or 
less) innovative technologies, skills or 
organisational methods. 
The effects of direct regulation depend on 
many factors, including how trade patterns 
change, skill capabilities and demand 
changes. One disadvantage can be that 
the standards are naturally “static”: they 
usually provide incentives for reaching a 
particular goal (like an emission level), but 
no incentives for innovating beyond that.  
This can be mitigated by mechanisms that 
periodically review and reset the standards. 
Type Description
Emmission 
standards
Specify the maximum level of 
permitted emmission in quantitative 
terms (perfomance-based 
standards).
Ambient 
standards
Set minimum desired level of air, 
water or soil quality that must be 
maintained.
Technology 
standards
Specify wwhich kind of technology 
must be used, e.g. by prescribing 
or forbidding certain technologies, 
or by referring to the best available 
technologies.
Management 
and process 
standards
Specify certain behaviours and 
activities, e.g. refular monitoring or 
maintainance activities or the set-
up of take-back-schemes.
Product 
standards
Specify certain product 
characteristics, e.g. on chemical 
residues in products or energy 
efficiency characteristics.
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Usually this review takes into account what 
is now economically and technologically 
possible. The most comprehensive scheme 
example of this is the Japanese Top Runner 
Programme, which identifies the most 
energy-efficient household appliances and 
vehicles and uses the results to define 
the future standard for the whole industry 
(Hamamoto, 2011).
7.8 Other ways to stimulate 
demand for resource 
productivity
Another type of measures that decision-
makers have to create the conditions for 
decoupling is the wide range of additional 
ways to stimulate demand for resource-
productive technologies. This includes 
measures that stimulate increased demand 
for products that have been produced with 
more resource-productive technologies (or 
which are simply more resource productive 
– e.g. energy efficient) themselves. Greater 
demand for such technologies makes 
further investment in resource productivity 
more attractive, and helps counter biases.
There are several distinct groups of policy 
instruments, which have often been used 
effectively together, or with the other 
instruments mentioned in this chapter as 
part of policy mixes.
7.8.1 Labelling
Labelling programmes and schemes 
have been developed since the 1970s, for 
products that are less resource-intensive 
and less harmful to the environment. Labels 
are typically applied to retail products.
These ‘eco-labels’ have two purposes:  to 
allow consumers to act on their preferences 
by providing them with information on 
characteristics of the products (or services) 
which are not otherwise apparent; and to 
educate consumers about the resource or 
environmental issue, and so change their 
consumption preferences. 
For example, Japan’s Ecomark seeks 
to “disseminate information on the 
environmental aspects of products and 
to encourage consumers to choose 
environmentally sound products”. 
Similarly, Singapore’s Green Label 
specifically seeks to “promote green 
consumerism and increase environmental 
awareness”. 
They can cover different resources: New 
Zealand and Australia have adopted a 
mandatory Water Efficiency Labelling 
Scheme covering showerheads, washing 
machines, dishwashers and toilets 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011b). The 
US EPA’s mandatory Ozone Depleting 
Substances label warns consumers of 
products manufactured with ozone-
depleting substances. The German 
“Blue Angel”, incorporating UNEP’s 
logo, is awarded to hundreds of very 
different products and typically has a 
short explanation on it, such as “energy 
efficient” or “100% recycled”.  They can 
apply to the products’ performance when 
it is used (e.g. its energy efficiency) or its 
impacts over its production phase (e.g. 
whether it is fished from sustainable 
sources), or whole life-cycle.
In a typical eco-labelling programme or 
scheme, product categories and eco-
labelling criteria are determined by a 
credible independent organisation with 
assistance from technical research staff or 
technical advisers. 
The design of the label has been found 
to be very important for the way in which 
consumers react to it – and can influence 
the outcome of labelling as a policy 
measure.  For example, the EU introduced 
a seven-step label for energy efficiency, 
which is seen in Figure 7.9. This format 
of label has since been adopted in many 
countries around the world. There is some 
evidence to suggest that a 2010 redesign of 
the EU label weakened the effects it would 
have on consumer choice (Heinzle and 
Wuestenhagen, 2012).
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Figure 7.9 The pre-2010 EU energy efficiency 
label shows highest efficiency (A) to lowest (G), 
with specified ranges for different appliances. 
The label shown above is for a highest efficiency 
refrigerator 
Many countries use labelling schemes. A 
review in 1998 by the US EPA found more 
than 25 schemes in Asia, Europe and North 
America (EPA; 1998b). A list of labels in 
the EU is kept online.54  The International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) has drawn up 
a group of standards specifically governing 
environmental labelling. The ISO 14020 
family covers three types of labelling 
schemes: 1) environmental labelling (i.e. 
eco-labels), 2) self-declaration claims and 
3) environmental declarations (e.g. report 
cards/information labels provided by the 
producer). 
7.8.2 Indicative norms and 
standards
Non-retail schemes describing the 
resource use of products or technologies 
help commercial buyers select more 
efficient products.  These include forest 
certification schemes (such as the Forest 
Stewardship labelling programme, and 
also help boost markets, so rewarding 
resource-productive investments. 
Standards reduce uncertainty about 
innovative products or processes by 
providing a benchmark for performance. 
They also communicate new norms, or 
standard practices, which also help people 
move away from past norms. 
54  http://ec.europa.eu/ecat/, accessed 12th April 2014.  
Industrial norms and standards, used for 
a long time to secure quality, compatibility 
and safety, are increasingly being used for 
environmental and resources efficiency 
purposes. Since 1996, the ISO has used 
the ISO 14000 series for environmental 
performance (ISO 14040:2006; ISO 
14044:2006), mostly focusing on pollution 
control. 
Some standards go beyond products, 
services or technologies. They can extend 
to a systematic, strategic and practical 
management approach: compliance with 
the standard provides assurance that 
good practice is being followed. The use of 
standards in this context can help adoption 
of norms that include maximisation of 
resource productivity within business 
models. The European EMAS (for resource 
and environmental management), the 
German DIN EN 15.000 series (energy 
efficiency standards for buildings and 
many industrial operations) and the ISO 
50001 energy management standard 
(ISO 50001:2011) are examples. Frequent 
updating serves of these standards 
let them keep pace with technological 
progress, in line with the “best available 
technology” principle. 
7.8.3 Green procurement 
The purchasing power of public 
organisations is considerable and can be 
harnessed to drive markets to produce 
ever-more resource-efficient products and 
services. It works by providing a sufficiently 
large niche market to reward innovators 
who bring their resource efficient products 
or services to commercial scale. The 
presence of the market encourages 
investments in commercialisation of 
technology, which can then also break into 
the private sector markets where there is 
a natural advantage for existing products, 
or where innovators are unsure of market 
demand.
Green procurement involves inciting 
or obliging public administrations to 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
109
purchase goods and services that are 
recognised for high resource efficiency 
and/or low pollution. Typical targets for 
green public procurement are buildings, 
office equipment, appliances, and vehicles. 
The International Green Purchasing 
Network was created in 1997 in Japan. In 
2010 it published a report on policies and 
programmes to enhance green business 
growth (IPGN, 2010). In Asia, Europe, 
America, Australia and New Zealand, green 
purchasing has gained wide acceptance 
and is being promoted under different 
names.55
Green procurement is not limited to the 
public sector. Major private companies 
committing themselves to the resource 
or environmental goals have and can also 
drive markets. 
7.8.4 Linking eco-labels and 
procurement
The impact of linking the use of 
government procurement and eco-labelling 
is a clear demonstration of how policies 
create greater results, more cheaply, 
where they are designed to be mutually 
reinforcing. Where environmental labels 
are used by a government procurement 
programme, it typically increases the 
market presence of the labelled products 
and enhances the credibility of the 
labelling programme. This has been the 
case with the Energy Star-labelled office 
equipment programme. Initially, the US 
government mandated that all federal 
offices stock Energy Star-labelled office 
equipment56, but as the demand for these 
products grew it became evident that not 
only were government agencies buying 
these products, but so too were private 
organisations.
55  The IGPN has an interactive web and CD-ROM based package starter kit, 
http://www.igpn.org/focus_on/kit/index.html. The International Council 
of Local Environmental Initiatives, with a membership of more than 
1000 cities ran ‘Procura+’ a Sustainable Procurement Campaign with 
a systematic exchange of experience and other practical assistance: 
http://www.procuraplus.org/. The European Union is strongly supporting 
public procurement and has issued a handbook on the subject: European 
Commission, 2004b. 
56  Through Executive Order 12845 - “Requiring Agencies to Purchase Energy 
Efficient Computer Equipment”.
7.9 Changing consumption 
behaviours
The removal of behavioural biases against 
resource-productive innovations is another 
important area where policy instruments 
can be used. This report has taken the 
spread of technological innovation (and 
some techniques) as its entry point into 
the wide, and interlinked, changes that 
would be needed for absolute decoupling. 
Removal or reduction of behavioural biases 
plays an important part in facilitating 
greater spread of these technological 
innovations. 
But change in behaviours and consumption 
patterns can also increase the resource 
efficiency of the economy in other ways – 
mainly by reducing wasteful consumption 
and disposal. For example, the average 
OECD household wastes 40 per cent of the 
food purchased. This is a significant waste, 
and cost. It also compounds losses in the 
production, processing, transportation, and 
retail steps in the supply chain that provided 
that food, as well as creating a final waste 
problem. Changing behaviour by the final 
consumer to reduce waste food often does 
not need technical innovation, but may 
require innovative policy instruments. 
A key aspect of successful behaviour 
change programmes is meaningful 
community engagement to identify 
perceptions related to the particular 
behaviour. A leading methodology for 
undertaking the design and delivery of 
community behaviour change programmes 
is Community Based Social Marketing 
(CBSM). Developed by Doug McKenzie-
Mohr, CBSM is based upon social 
science research which demonstrates 
that behaviour change is most effectively 
achieved through initiatives delivered at the 
community level which focus on removing 
significant “barriers” (i.e. impediments 
or challenges) to a behaviour occurring, 
while at the same time enhancing the 
“benefits” (i.e. incentives) for that behaviour 
(McKenzie-Mohr, 2007). 
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Measures to change people and firms’ 
behaviours around wastage during 
consumption and at the end of life of 
products or goods is a key part of several 
decoupling strategies. Behavioural change 
in separation of waste for recycling is often 
needed, for example. For instance:
  China in 2009 adopted the Circular 
Economy Promotion Law, the first in 
the world using the term “circular 
economy” in its title. The “circular 
economy” is being implemented at 
three levels: at the regional level, it is 
“big circulation” and includes lifestyle 
change to deliver people’s desires from 
fewer natural resources and energy 
and greater efficiency at company 
levels (Chang, 2009).
  Japan has introduced a number of 
visions and laws over many years, 
such as the Fundamental Law for 
Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle 
Society (Government of Japan, 2000), 
that represents a conceptual turn 
from a throwaway society in order to 
become a society with greater resource 
recycling (Wuppertal Institute, 2007). It 
has reduced its resource use by 14 per 
cent from 2000-05.
This new trend of a cyclical economy 
goes far beyond old waste legislation. 
As is the case for all serious attempts 
towards a green economy and decoupling 
of economic wellbeing from resource 
consumption, the cyclical economy 
concept, if successful, is likely to transform 
the philosophy of manufacturing and 
consumption worldwide. 
This could build on the existing progress on 
decoupling growth from waste production 
that has been achieved with strategies 
including elements of behavioural change. 
Box 7.1 describes some of this progress.
Box 7.1:  Decoupling economic growth from 
waste production 
Progress has been made in the last two 
decades in OECD countries to relatively 
decouple economic growth from waste 
production. In OECD counties in the 
mid-1990s, approximately 64 per cent of 
municipal waste was sent to landfills, 18 
per cent for both incineration, and recycling 
(OECD, 2001b). In 2005, only 49 per cent 
of municipal waste being disposed of in 
landfills, 30 per cent being recycled and 
21 per cent being incinerated or otherwise 
treated (OECD, 2008d). In 1980, America 
recycled only 9.6 per cent of its municipal 
rubbish; today the rate stands at 35 per 
cent. A similar trend can be seen in Europe, 
where some countries, such as Austria and 
Germany, now recycle 60 per cent or more 
of their municipal waste. Britain’s recycling 
rate more than tripled from 11 per cent in 
2001 to 39 per cent in 2010 (EEA, 2013). 
Overall, municipal waste generation is 
still increasing in OECD countries, but at a 
slower pace since 2000, hence it has been 
relatively decoupled from GDP. (See Figure 
7.10)
Figure 7.10 Decoupling of OECD GDP from 
OECD country municipal waste generation, 
1980-2030 
(Source: TNEP (Smith et al., 2010a) based on data 
from the OECD, 2008d)
There are several exciting innovations in 
policy, product design and process design 
that can help reduce or even eliminate 
the amount waste being generated cost 
effectively57. These innovations usually 
involve some combination of 1) directly 
reducing the amount of waste generated 
in producing and delivering a product 
or in operating an industrial process; 2) 
57  For instance, a cost-benefit analysis for the United Kingdom suggested that 
restricting metals, glass, plastics, organics, paper from both landfill and other 
residual waste treatment (such as incineration) would provide a net benefit to 
society over the period 2009 to 2024 of £8.2 Billion (WRAP, 2010). 
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designing products such that their reuse 
and recycling is cost effective and easy; 
3) designing service processes so that 
product take-back is cost-effective and 
easy; 4) increasing markets for products 
with recycled content, and 5) phasing in 
bans on categories of waste to landfill. 
These five features enable a much greater 
decoupling of waste from economic growth 
by reducing the costs of material inputs 
and enabling a market of secondary 
materials that are, in many cases, cheaper 
than the equivalent primary materials. 
One of the ways in which some countries 
have promoted the reduction of waste is 
through extended producer responsibility 
policies58. These policies create new 
economic arrangements and incentives 
by requiring producers to take back and 
recycle a certain percentage of their 
products. We have described these in our 
report on the opportunities and limits of 
metal recycling (UNEP, 2013a). 
58  Including the EU, India and China (UNEP, 2013a, p.90).  
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Considerations for
 Future Policy
Decision-makers wanting to take steps to promote decoupling can draw on lessons from past efforts to bring about policy change and 
the spread of technological innovations. 
There are different hurdles to overcome 
in different contexts, and the task is not 
easy. The nature of the issues differs in 
developing countries and higher-income 
countries, with the different resources 
involved and with the variety of specific 
economic and political contexts. This 
makes it impossible to identify generally 
applicable policy measures that have 
created the conditions for higher rates of 
decoupling. 
However, past experience with policy 
reform can provide guidance that may 
increase the chances of success.  This 
chapter describes some broadly applicable 
lessons from past experience, relating 
them to the nature of the barriers to 
decoupling. 
Although these considerations have been 
phrased for policymakers in government, 
many may also have some relevance to 
attempts at change within other large 
organisations which have institutional 
cultures and constraints. 
At the core of these considerations, 
is the observation that the continued 
existence of barriers and biases against 
decoupling is frequently due to resistance 
to policy change.59  Success in creating 
the conditions for decoupling would need 
to unlock that resistance. In this task, the 
chances of success appear higher where 
policymakers look at the institutional 
framework in which the political decision 
is made.  In practice for changes to policy, 
this means being aware of the set of actors 
who are able to influence the decision, 
their interests, relative power and the 
norms and assumptions which are shaping 
the decision. Those seeking change:
59  As mentioned in Chapter 4.
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 “... need to become adept at institutional 
analysis, identifying those elements 
supportive, or hostile to, the reform in 
question, and work to strengthen the 
more supportive elements and weaken 
the more hostile ones.” (Ekins and 
Salmons, 2010, p. 132).
This is one of the factors that has driven 
the use of packages of policy instruments. 
Using packages of policies can produce 
a set of changes which together appeal 
sufficiently to influential interest groups to 
facilitate the adoption and implementation 
of the policies.
8.1 Leadership
Bringing about innovation where there 
is significant inertia against it will take 
leadership.  Obviously, intentional resource 
productivity increase is not automatically 
popular. Extractive industries, shipping, 
trading, refining of minerals, and companies 
providing energy will be on the losing 
side, and consumers may fear the loss 
of convenience. The historical fact that 
“absolute decoupling” has remained 
the rare exception seems to indicate 
that the intentional increase of resource 
productivity tends to find more opponents 
than supporters. In other words, strong and 
determined leadership will be needed to 
make an intentional increase of resource 
productivity happen. 
Economic history is built on examples 
of economies and firms that have been 
rewarded by responding first to new 
conditions or technologies, and of firms 
and countries that have declined by failing 
to respond sufficiently fast.  The quality 
of leadership in responding to change 
seems likely to have been one of the factors 
separating performance.
Many changes can contribute to decoupling, 
which presents opportunities for leadership 
to many people. This includes individuals 
working within organisations and institutions 
across most parts of government, the 
economy and civil society (including 
consumers). Inside government, it includes 
decision-makers with influence on 
industrial, market regulation, development, 
innovation, fiscal, environment, employment 
and taxation policy.
8.2 Working with the 
institutional framework   
for decision making
Based on past experience for policy 
change60, success appears to be more 
likely where policymakers seeking change:
  Take account of the potential losers 
from policy change. Consider what 
will bring them, or enough of them, 
to favour change. Potentially use 
transitional financial support to 
help them innovate, compensation 
(perhaps from the “recycling” of 
revenues from a tax or charge) or 
align implementation of change with 
existing investment cycles, to reduce 
capital destruction.
  Help those affected by change to 
focus their innovation towards a 
consensus future goal, by changing 
their expectations of the future. By 
creating shared visions and credible 
strategies, future investment patterns 
can be changed, often without great 
expense, as firms shift their business 
models and investments in advance to 
profit from new conditions. This allows 
potential winners to see opportunities, 
and support change.
  Create, or rely on, a source of 
sufficiently trusted independent advice 
– on the science or on the impacts of 
change. The nature of the source is 
very important, as evidence is likely 
to be contested or rejected where it is 
unfavourable. Sources seen (rightly or 
wrongly) to be self-interested will be 
60  This section draws on Chapter 5 in Ekins and Salmons, 2010.  
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much less effective. Objective scientific 
evidence is very useful. Transparency 
and consensus building around 
information formation may help. 
Knowledge, and so perceptions about 
the future state of the world, can in 
any case be slow to change. The role of 
trusted, reliable and clear information 
about changes occurring in the world 
and their implications can be crucial 
for changing expectations of future 
conditions and so perceptions about 
which investments will bring greatest 
future economic advantage.  
  Present concrete examples of 
policies or practices used in different 
countries, or in different realms of 
policy.  Many of the reforms to increase 
decoupling will require new structures, 
behaviours or business models that 
may seem initially unfamiliar and 
odd. Demonstrating that different 
arrangements work elsewhere can be 
convincing. For example, the idea of 
electronic equipment manufacturers 
(like mobile phones) retaining 
ownership of valuable materials in 
that equipment while it is used by the 
consumer may seem peculiar – yet 
business models in the chemical 
sector where chemical supplier 
retains ownership of chemicals used 
in industry are frequent and long-
standing.
  Create an institutional structure for the 
specific policy decision that is: 
•	 Participatory – making decisions 
for change appears more likely 
to be more successful when 
powerful interest groups – 
particularly those who might 
block decisions at a later stage 
– are included from the beginning 
in the decision-making. This 
facilitates information flows, and 
can help form a common vision 
for the future that reconciles 
opposing views.
•	 Sufficiently broad to contain 
enough people who can form a 
pro-reform coalition within the 
decision-making structures. 
Improving resource productivity in 
the economy will naturally bring 
net economic gain, although it 
may create winners and losers. 
Finding participatory structures 
that allow losers to see how 
they could capture some of 
the productivity gain may help 
create coalitions for change. 
For example, bringing together 
the economic actors all along a 
value chain61 may identify ways 
to vertically integrate businesses, 
or change relationships between 
actors in the value chain. While 
these facilitative changes may 
require complementary policy (for 
example to regulatory structures), 
these complementary policies 
could form part of a policy mix. 
•	 Working around existing 
institutional blocks within 
political and economic actors. 
Within any large organisation, in 
government departments, private 
corporations or representative 
industry organisations, division 
of responsibility and consensus 
decision-making can mean that 
parts of that organisation are 
interested in blocking change 
and are able to impose this on an 
otherwise willing organisation. 
(Decision-making is said to 
be made to be decided by the 
“lowest common denominator”). 
Finding ways to allow the more 
innovative mainstream of an 
organisation to decide may 
facilitate change. 
  Use a simultaneous mix of policy 
instruments, as mentioned in section 
61  The ‘value chain’ refers to the chain of producers and manufacturers that 
pass a resource from when it is first mined or harvested up until it is (after 
being joined with many others) consumed by the final consumer. 
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6.4.2. This can help the actors in a 
value chain of economic activity (for 
example, from raw material extraction 
to final product consumption and 
recycling) to change profitably together. 
This may be necessary to overcome a 
“lock-in” between demand and supply, 
which can commonly happen when a 
seller offers what is being demanded, 
the purchaser buys what is being 
offered and there is little scope for 
either to innovate. 
  Work to increase the cumulative 
effect of several smaller steps, as 
it is rarely the case that political or 
economic conditions exists that allow 
a policymaker to bring about a very 
large, radical change in resource 
productivity in one step.
  Be aware of options for reform and use 
political opportunities when they arise. 
Good economic times are often more 
favourable for introducing change, with 
less fear of negative consequences 
and greater availability of finance for 
innovative investments. Yet, crises can 
also facilitate reform, in different ways:
•	 An unsustainable economic 
situation in New Zealand in the 
early 1980s, which included the 
state running excessive budget 
deficits (of 9 per cent of GDP), 
provided the rationale and 
impetus for a thorough reform of 
state support for the agricultural 
sector. The Effective Rate of 
Assistance to agriculture fell from 
123 per cent in 1983 to around 
zero in the 1990s.62 
•	 Crises may also provide 
opportunities for productivity-
reforming economic activity, 
when they lead to economic slack 
which can be stimulated to enter 
into new investments with low 
62  The Effective Rate of Assistance is estimated by comparing the value added 
of an assisted sector with the same value added of an unassisted sector (at a 
world or reference price.) It includes direct and indirect assistance.
opportunity costs. By 2011, as a 
result of uncertainty on future 
returns on investments in difficult 
economic times, publically 
traded companies in Europe were 
holding excess cash of €750 
billion (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2012). Policy change can help 
provide certainty that frees up 
this unused investment potential, 
possibly directing it into less 
conventional areas. Unemployed 
labour can be re-employed with 
appropriate training, in growth 
sectors of the future, in ways that 
can also reduce the burden of 
social support costs for the state.
8.3 Changing the institutional 
framework to facilitate 
future policy reform
One aspect of successful reform is to take 
steps that create the conditions for further, 
future policy reform. Making changes to 
decision-making processes, either internal 
to an organisation or external, can indirectly 
facilitate future change.
In government, this could mean making 
a change to the decision-making 
structures (like the mandate of ministers 
or committees), which allows decisions 
promoting the long-term management 
of resources to be taken more easily. The 
frequent fragmentation of responsibility 
for resource productivity between different 
parts of government often leads to deadlock 
and stagnation. Changing the “mindsets” 
of decision-makers, and the organisations 
they operate in, is an important starting 
point for further decoupling (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2011).
It could also mean implementing a policy 
that increases the future economic and 
political weight of innovators or favourably 
changes the perception of potential 
opponents to change (for example by 
changing company reporting to include 
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information on resources that helps 
companies take resource factors into 
account in their business decisions).
Changes to institutional decision-making 
structures have long been appreciated to 
have important beneficial outcomes, and 
this is particularly the case for overcoming 
the bias of decision-making towards the 
short term. As examples: 
  The UK is seen as a strong, liberal 
economy. In part this is because, in 
1998, authority over monetary policy 
was passed from the government 
to the central Bank of England in 
1998. This transferred the power to 
set interest rates – a power of huge 
importance to the economy. The aim 
was to provide greater economic 
stability by distancing those decisions 
from short-term political influence. 
  The UK has also attempted to create 
structures which facilitate decision 
making for the long-term in relation 
to reduction of greenhouse gasses 
by: a) legislating for binding national 
2050 greenhouse gas targets; b) 
legally committing to a series of five-
year carbon budgets (constraints) as 
steps to the 2050 goal, and c) creating 
an independent, evidence-based 
organisation to provide transparent 
recommendations to government on 
what those carbon budgets should be 
(and other related questions)63. It also 
reorganised government departments 
to provide more favourable decision-
making structures.
  The use of multi-year strategic 
programmes to steer investment is a 
long tradition in China, and some other 
countries, and these provide structures 
that (as in China’s twelfth Five-Year 
Plan) can be used to create drivers for 
decisions on resource productivity.
  Within business, Unilever opted not 
to give full financial results every 
63  By means of the Climate Change Act 2008.
quarter from 2011, changing incentive 
structures for the company away from 
constant very short-term gain in the 
direction of longer-term planning64. 
One factor influencing internal decisions 
is external agreement. There have been 
many examples where international 
agreements have acted as stimulation for 
domestic action. In part this is because 
concerted action between countries, which 
reduces fears of unfavourable distortions 
in international markets. But it is also 
because an international commitment can 
act as a persuasive tool against opponents 
of change, not least by indicating that 
change is viewed as internationally 
important.  As trade in resources is 
global, with value chains for manufacture 
of products crossing many countries, it 
seems likely that international institutions 
to improve resource efficiency will be 
needed, whether formed within the private 
sector, public sector, or both.
8.4 Putting decoupling into 
practice – linking resource 
price rises to resource 
productivity gains
8.4.1 Options for pricing 
mechanisms
Economic instruments to push technologies 
and markets towards higher resource 
productivity typically run into one 
characteristic difficulty: if price signals 
are strong, industries may just give up or 
emigrate, and consumers tend to contest  
the government imposing painful price 
signals. But if price signals are weak, there 
is a high likelihood of effects remaining 
insignificant. 
One potential way out is a price signal that 
steadily increases at the pace of decoupling 
successes. For example, if the average 
efficiency of the car fleet rises by 1 per cent 
64  See e.g.: http://www.unilever.com/mediacentre/pressreleases/2010/Unilever
movestoQuarterlyTradingStatementsinApril2011.aspx 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
117
in one year, a 1 per cent price increase of 
petrol at the pump would seem fair and 
tolerable. However, the firm announcement 
of the continuation of this scheme will 
induce car manufacturers and traders – as 
well as consumers – to speed up efforts to 
reduce petrol consumption per kilometre or 
to avoid unnecessary trips. Hence a small 
signal can have a strong impact if continued 
over a long period of time.
A policy of this kind can combine several 
of the considerations to unlock inertia 
described above, and may come close to the 
type of combined policy which is needed.
There are several forms in which policies to 
create pricing mechanisms would promote 
resource-productivity increases.  These 
often include several of the considerations 
to unlock inertia described above, and 
illustrate the type of combined policy which 
is needed.
  One proposal is to use taxation or 
subsidy reduction to move the price of 
a chosen resource upwards in line with 
documented increases of energy or 
resource productivity inside a nation’s 
economy65. 
65  For example, see the suggestion in Weizsäcker et al., 2009. 
  Another is to apply a tax on virgin 
resources, which is applied at point 
of extraction of import, and is pre-
announced by increase each year 
(by a small amount of 2-5 per cent). 
This could be coupled with resource 
taxes applied to products containing 
resources from countries without 
similar resource taxes66. 
In the sections below we look at different 
qualities of these proposals.
8.4.2 Broadening the Economic 
Discourse
In a simplistic economic debate that was 
allowed to focus only on the price level of 
a resource, the proposed changes would 
win little support. They would lose out to 
arguments that competitiveness or incomes 
would be harmed. However, that debate, 
focussing on just one element of a complex 
dynamic economic system with underlying 
assumptions that the economy is static, 
would not give an accurate picture of the 
nature of the proposals’ impacts.
66  For example, proposals along these lines were considered in discussions in 
the European Resource Efficiency Platform  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
resource_efficiency/re_platform/about/meetings/index_en.htm 
de
co
up
li
ng
 2
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
an
d 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
118
Where the announcement of price 
increases led to efficiency gains, the 
costs of resource used (which influence 
competitiveness and livelihood) would, 
on average, not increase. In these 
circumstances, on average, one would 
pay the same amount of money for the 
same quality of energy services as the year 
before – paying a higher price for each 
unit of energy, but consuming fewer units 
of energy, as each unit of energy delivers 
more output thanks to the productivity gain. 
By explicitly linking price rises to 
efficiency gains, the structure of the 
first policy proposal helps broaden the 
political discourse around the effects of 
the proposal. It moves the debate to net 
costs, innovation and investment rather 
than just price and fears of losses.  By 
providing a different framing for the issue, 
the proposal could remove most fears of 
losses to individuals, to families and to 
commercial businesses. 
The presentation of the second proposal 
could also make clear that productivity 
increases were the expected result, and 
that net costs of resources used in the 
economy might not increase, while use of 
the additional tax revenues could improve 
the economy. Making comparisons with 
past experiences could also facilitate a 
change in the political discourse. The 
competitiveness of industry, particularly 
in mature countries, now hinges less on 
resource prices than on innovative services 
and goods. Japan during the late 1970s 
and 1980s had industrial energy prices 
roughly twice as high as in the USA. But 
it flourished, building up a first-class 
high-tech industry that created much 
higher added value per unit of energy 
than industries in competing countries. 
Similarly, any country going ahead now 
with the proposals would likely be earning 
the first mover advantages in a world of 
resource constraints. And on average, 
one could expect continued growth with 
a very small rebound effect on resource 
consumption.
Political discussion could also include a 
partial analogy with the success of labour 
productivity increases over 160 years 
since the industrial revolution. Labour 
productivity in developed countries is 
now easily 20 times higher, facilitates a 
previously unimaginable standard of living 
– and yet is correlated with ever increasing 
labour costs (See Annex B).
8.4.3 Reducing bias against new 
investment by reducing 
uncertainty
The proposals would not entirely remove 
uncertainty about returns on investments 
in resource productivity within a country, 
as variations in resource prices and 
uncertainty about future energy or 
resource productivity increases would 
remain. However, uncertainty would 
be reduced, in particular long-term 
uncertainty about the direction of prices. 
Worries about remaining unpredictability 
of future prices could be tackled by the 
introduction of a legally binding price 
trajectory, which is relatively simple, 
although details would vary. The state 
can define corridors for prices moving 
slowly upwards.  For instance, for energy 
this could be differentiated corridors 
for vehicle fuels, electric power and 
heating purposes. Market prices would be 
allowed to fluctuate inside the corridors. 
Uncertainty of extreme disruptions in price 
can therefore be removed: if prices touch 
the lower band, taxes will bring them back. 
And if they touch the upper band, the state 
could reduce the levy. Such corridors of 
pricing have been debated in relation to 
carbon prices, with the introduction of 
price floor (a minimum price for carbon) 
receiving much attention.  This idea of 
defining corridors could apply whether 
prices are announced to move broadly 
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in line with efficiency gains or by a pre-
determined percentage increase in tax 
each year: both could be adjusted.
The policies would serve as a strong 
and predictable incentive to investors, 
states, individual companies or research 
laboratories to systematically invest in 
ever-more resource productivity.  They 
could afford to think big in terms of 
investing in radical improvements of 
energy and resource productivity as for 
the first time in history, the community of 
resource efficiency investors would have no 
fear of losses due to prices of the relevant 
commodities collapsing. This would drive 
innovation and adoption of the type of 
technologies outlined in Chapter 3 that 
would lead to greater resource productivity 
(and so greater growth). It seems plausible 
that the mutual reinforcement between 
prices and efficiency increases will lead 
to a long term and ultimately dramatic 
increase of resource productivity (rather 
like in the case of labour productivity 
discussed in Annex B).
If a manifest crisis of oil availability or 
climate risks plagues the world, decisions 
can be made to move prices upwards 
somewhat faster, so as to stimulate a 
speedier transition to resource efficiency, 
just as larger increases in past wage prices 
went hand in hand with greater increases 
in labour productivity. Coordination of this 
policy with other enabling policies would 
also bring greater gains.
8.4.4 Creating sufficient winners in 
favour of change
The proposals have aspects that give them 
the potential to create sufficient winners 
to form a coalition that supports their 
introduction. 
Firstly, by providing a source of government 
revenue, each mechanism creates choices 
for the government to reduce taxation 
on other people or firms in the economy, 
increase spending or to reduce fiscal 
deficits: this may either win political 
support from people outside government 
who benefit, or from the finance ministry, 
whose support may be crucial to the 
policy’s success in becoming law. The idea 
of gradually increasing resource prices via 
taxes tackles the concern that governments 
frequently have with taxes which aim to 
change behaviour (like environmental 
taxes), namely that they erode as their 
steering effect becomes successful. Linking 
the magnitude of the tax to productivity 
increases, or increasing it yearly, means 
that the total potential revenue does not 
decline, even as the number of units of 
resource consumed decreases. 
Secondly, by increasing resource tax 
the proposal increases the relative 
competitive advantage of firms which 
have above average resource productivity 
gains: these firms reduce costs relative to 
their competitors. This not only provides 
greater incentives for competition based 
on increased resource productivity, but 
provides reasons for the more innovative 
and productive firms to take political 
positions in favour of change.
8.4.5 Taking account of potential 
losers in a policy mix
By itself, the proposal would result in some 
losers who have no access to the innovative 
solutions, or whom are less productive. 
There may be branches of industry that had 
already exhausted their efficiency potential 
and now have to fear their competitors 
abroad working under conditions of lower 
resource prices. There may be poor 
families who simply cannot afford to buy 
new equipment. Producers of resources 
face declining revenues in countries mining 
natural resources. All these concerns are 
real. But all of them could be answered by 
measures taking account of the concerns, 
if desired, by applying a mix of policy 
instruments as part of a coherent policy 
package.
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Here the model for operation comes from 
Sweden. In the early 1990s Sweden, like 
much of Europe, was plagued by acid rain 
leading to dying forests and acidic lakes 
no longer supporting animal life. Nitrous 
oxides were seen as one of the main 
causes. The government announced a tax 
on NOx, which is the sum of two types of 
nitrous oxides. Large power plants were 
made liable to pay the tax. Small plants had 
no obligation because of prohibitive cost – 
but that would have been unfair to the big 
operators. 
So the government decided to apply 
the tax together with a mechanism that 
returned the tax revenues to the operators 
of power plants, but not in relation to how 
many kilograms of NOx they produced but 
based on the kilowatt hours of power they 
produced. Thus the industry as a whole did 
not lose any money but each operator had 
a strong incentive to reduce the nitrous 
oxides. This model can be, and has in 
practice, been adjusted to energy and 
resource taxes for industry. For example, 
the refund of revenue raised could be made 
based on workers employed. 
Countries have also found ways to protect 
vulnerable low-income people (who have 
limited capacity to improve their resource 
use) from policy-induced price rises. In 
many countries of the world, a move from 
generally low and subsidised energy and 
water prices to realistic market prices 
(encouraging private capital to invest in 
more supplies) has been accompanied by 
policies that allow for a preferential low 
price level for poor families. 
South Africa has set a good example 
with its integrated water plan. The plan 
involves realistic water prices encouraging 
private and public investments in water 
conservation and water supply to support 
the country’s ambitious growth plans of 6 
per cent economic growth per year. But at 
the same time, every person in South Africa 
must have access to potable water, as the 
responsible Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry clearly says (Republic of South 
Africa, 2009). A “lifeline” amount of water 
must be really affordable for the poor. This 
principle, which is also in place for small 
amounts of energy in many countries, could 
be made part and parcel of the proposal 
for increasing resource prices in line with 
resource productivity gains.
Countries applying a virgin resource tax 
might find that their net tax revenues 
increased, even if the export of their virgin 
resources slowed as they captured more 
of the economic value of their resource 
exports. These countries would have 
the option on spending tax increases to 
support particular economic sectors in 
their economies, including those affected 
by the rising tax.  Where import taxes 
were applied on products on the basis 
of their resource content, the revenues 
raised could be recycled to countries from 
where the products came, for instance to 
fund programmes to improve resource 
productivity, or to reduce the environmental 
and social impacts of resource extraction.
8.4.6 Creating new institutional 
arrangements
The design of a policy mechanism that 
raised prices of energy or resources 
would require new, presumably legally 
binding, institutional arrangements. Those 
would be context-specific to autonomous 
countries, but would be likely to involve 
binding pre-commitment of government 
to the mechanism, with independent and 
credible mechanisms for assessment, 
monitoring and tax level calculation. 
For the proposal linking price levels 
to documented efficiency gains, these 
new institutions would include standard 
metrics by which efficiency gains would 
be assessed. For a proposal calculating 
resource taxes on the basis of content 
of resources in products, international 
mechanisms would need to be created to 
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remove arbitrary decisions on tax levels. 
Standards and metrics would need to be 
set for estimation of the content, so that 
each product had a “product passport” 
detailing its components’ characteristics. 
This potentially complex exercise – 
which would otherwise have to deal with 
components from multiple sources – would 
need simplification through agreement. It 
could tie to institutions linking assessment 
and enforcement mechanisms with 
revenue sharing. Part of this arrangement 
could be that resources from countries 
with comparable resource taxation did 
not receive any additional taxation when 
imported, creating an incentive for 
domestic imposition of resource taxation. 
These tax arrangements might evolve over 
time, just as agreements over income tax 
revenue have evolved between countries.
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Conclusions                                      9
This report has sought to build on our first Decoupling report by providing information on actions which can lead to greater 
decoupling. It highlights how:
  Trends in global consumption and 
exhaustion of natural resources 
and environmental systems imply 
that the decoupling of economic 
growth from resource use will 
become ever more important for 
stable, successful economies. 
These trends are already sufficiently 
significant to influence the factors 
that make economies competitive. 
This presents an opportunity for 
some countries, but many trends 
in resources unsustainably erode 
the natural resource base on which 
many economies depend.  The scale 
of change is very large: one estimate 
suggests a need for more than US$ 
3 trillion per year in investments to 
respond to the trends. 
  Many technologies and techniques that 
deliver significant resource productivity 
increases are already commercially 
available and used in developing and 
developed economies. They allow 
economic output to be achieved with 
fewer resource inputs, reducing waste 
and savings costs that can further 
expand the economy or reduce its 
exposure to resource risks.
  A well-functioning economy might be 
expected to naturally adjust to changes 
in resource availability by directing 
investments into areas of economic 
activity that bring patterns of resource 
use in line with society’s goals (for 
example, into innovation in resource 
productivity). In practice, we see that 
many economies do not naturally 
adjust in this way, but suffer from 
blocks to transition.
  These blocks to adjustment appear to 
lie in biases and barriers to change 
within the political and economic 
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spheres, and interactions between the 
economy, politics and other aspects 
of society’s activity, which ”lock-in” 
existing patterns of resource use. 
These obstacles to decoupling can be 
categorised as arising from:
•	 the legacy of past policy decisions 
(including those made before 
information on resource trends 
was available); and
•	 technological, behavioural, 
organisational and institutional 
biases against innovation in 
resource productivity.
  Facilitating decoupling will involve 
removing these obstacles, to create 
the conditions in which investments 
in resource productivity become 
widespread. 
  Developing countries may have a 
relative advantage in decoupling, 
because they are not so strongly 
locked-in by resource-intensive 
consumption and productions patterns, 
infrastructure and institutions. 
  There has been a wealth of experience 
across the world in policy to 
intentionally facilitate the decoupling 
of resource use, or impacts of resource 
use, from economic growth, with some 
notable successes. They indicate that 
absolute decoupling of economic 
growth from resource use is possible.
  The continued existence of barriers 
to decoupling is frequently due to 
resistance to policy change.67 Creating 
the conditions for decoupling would 
need to unlock that resistance.  The 
chances of success appear higher 
where the policymaker looks at the 
institutional framework in which the 
political decision is made.  In practice 
for changes to policy, this means 
being aware of the set of actors who 
are able to influence the decision, 
their interests, relative power and the 
norms and assumptions which are 
shaping the decision.
  Leadership will be needed to break 
out of resistance to policy changes. 
Leaders within the public and private 
sectors can draw on past experiences 
with policy for guidance on how to take 
forward decoupling. 
  There are forms of policy available 
to promote decoupling that combine 
several of the considerations 
described above. The report mentions 
two, which are illustrative of the 
type of combined policy which is 
needed. One proposal uses taxation 
or subsidy reduction to move 
resource prices upwards in line with 
documented increases of energy or 
resource productivity.  Another looks 
to shift revenue-raising onto resource 
prices through resource taxation 
at source or in relation to product 
imports, with recycling of revenues 
back to the economy.
67  As mentioned in Chapter 4.
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Annexes
Annex A: Enabling Technologies to Reduce Freshwater Demand 
SECTOR Table A1: Enabling Technologies to Reduce Demand for Water and Increase Water Recycling 
Agriculture -	 Drip or sprinkler irrigation, sensors and irrigation scheduling, mulching, drought and salt 
tolerate crops, no-tillage farming practices, rainwater harvesting and managed aquifer 
recharge and recovery, urban water treatment and reuse in peri-urban agriculture.
Residential
buildings
-	 Various low-flow showerhead designs exist to reduce water consumption by between 50-
75 per cent, 
-	 Low-flow aerators reduce faucet water flow by 30-50 per cent and can also reduce the 
energy costs of heating water by up to 50 per cent.
-	 Water-efficient appliances such as front-loading domestic washing machines are 40-50 
per cent more efficient than top loading options. 
-	 Toilets that use dual-flush systems are capable of reducing water usage significantly 
compared with conventional models.
-	 Rainwater tanks for rainwater harvesting and reuse. 
-	 Drip irrigation, drought tolerant plants, mulch to reduce water loss from evaporation in 
gardens or small-scale urban agriculture.
Commercial
buildings
 
-	 Waterless urinals use liquid-repellent coatings and a lighter-than-urine biodegradable 
trap liquid to prevent odours. 
-	 Hybrid dry air/water cooling systems for large buildings have been optimised to reduce 
typical consumption of water by as much as 75 per cent.
-	 Rainwater tanks
Industry/
manufacturing 
-	 Water-efficient technologies: Waterless conveyor belt lubricants, water-efficient spray 
nozzles and spray guns nozzles/guns, clean in place technologies (i.e sensors), steam 
traps and condensate return systems, water efficient cooling tower technologies. 
-	 Onsite water harvesting technologies: Rainwater tanks, stormwater harvesting systems, 
constructed wetlands. 
-	 Onsite water treatment technologies (to enable onsite water recycling): Settling 
ponds, dissolved air flotation (DAF), membrane filtration (micro/nano/ultra filtration), 
membrane bioreactors (Stephenson et al., 2006), sequential batch reactors (SBR), ion 
exchange (Zagorodni, 2006), disinfectants (ultraviolet light, chemicals, ozone)68.   
-	 Utilise recycled water supplied by water utility: dual reticulation piping to ensure 
freshwater and recycled water can both be used. 
Fossil fuel 
power stations
-	 Water-efficient cooling systems - hybrid cooling towers, saline water-cooling towers 
(which use sea water directly).  
-	 Transitioning to using more renewable technologies as energy sources, such as wind and 
solar technologies, reduces the water intensity of delivering energy.
Source:  Compiled by Smith, M and Hargroves, K (2013) building on Smith et al (2010c) and Weiszacker et al (2009). 
68 See lecture 6.3 from Smith et al., 2010c: http://www.naturaledgeproject.net/WaterTransformed/TNEP-WaterTransformed-Lecture6.3.pdf
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Annex B: Alternative Economic Narratives
 Evidence from political and behavioural science suggests that for widespread decoupling 
to happen the mainstream political perspective, or narrative, on economic growth would 
first need to be adapted. Currently, political arguments often focus on the importance of 
preventing costs for firms or industrial groups due to changes to the policy framework. 
This constrains the economy within current structures. 
 Broadening the political discourse to look at the implications of change for the 
performance of the economy over time can help decision makers consider where the 
most beneficial set of policy mixes and investments may be for the economy as a whole. 
This Annex briefly gives two examples of information that can help provide alternative 
narratives.
B.1 Putting Costs in Context of Transition
 As economies grow, new markets and new technologies make some products, processes 
and organisational structures less productive, or obsolescent. There are usually winners 
and losers from every innovation or change. The losers from change often point to 
any additional costs to them as “costs to the economy”. This creates a narrative that 
decoupling involves greater costs (i.e. needs for new investment) than other development 
paths. This is usually a misrepresentation, when the full benefits and costs to the 
economy are considered.
 A better picture of the net benefits of costs to the economy comes from looking at 
alternative development paths and comparing the investments and costs (for example 
from new firms and new technologies replacing old).  Three points are particularly 
relevant:
1. Individual firms causing environmental harm or over-exploiting resources are usually 
not taking into account the costs of causing harm to other firms, citizens or society 
as a whole. From the perspective of the economy as a whole, the position is different. 
There, the costs of harm to environmental resources (for example pollution of 
water) do matter to economic success (for instance the costs to other water users). 
Factoring these costs in, and seeing how they can be reduced by decoupling can 
increase net benefits of a decoupling development path. 
2. Similarly, there may be reductions on future incomes from over-exploitation of 
resources in the present. If these costs are considered, and factored into decision-
making (or market prices) rather than ignored, it seems that costs have increased. In 
truth, considering these costs allows the economy to reduce costs through efficiency. 
3. Costs of new investments in response to change (for example policy change) are 
also frequently overestimated in political discussion, partly because they do not take 
into account innovation. Innovation in response to a need to change tends to greatly 
reduce investment costs, compared to their initial estimates. Good examples of 
this over-estimation come from decoupling economic growth from costly pollution. 
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Estimates of costs of different forms of pollution reduction in the USA point to 
estimates of investment costs being consistently at least double, and sometimes 
many factors greater than the final costs.  (See Table  below). Similar overestimations 
have been observed in other economies (Oosterhuis, 2006).
Table B1 Industry original estimates of the cost of particular forms of environmental protection versus 
the actual costs (in $US)
POLLUTANT Initial Cost Estimate Actual Cost Estimate Overestimation as a Percent of Actual Cost
Asbestos 
(for the manufacturing and 
insulation sectors)
$150 million $75 million 100%
Benzene $350,000 per plant Approx. $0 per plant Infinite
CFCs Early 1980s: Predicted 
financial catastrophe as no 
‘cheap’ alternatives existed.
Total cost globally of 
implementing the Montreal 
Protocol - US$235 billion in 
1997 (Bornman and van der 
Leun, 1998).
Less that Catastrophe
CFCs-Auto Air 
Conditioners
$650-$1,200 per new car $40-$400 per new car 63%-2,900%
Coke Oven Emissions 
OSHA 1970’s
$200 million – $1 billion $160 million 29%-1,500%
Coke Oven Emissions
EPA 1980s
$4 billion $250-400 million 900%-1,500%
Cotton Dust $700 million per year $205 million per year 241%
Halons 1989: phase out not 
considered possible.
1993: phase out considered 
technologically and 
economically feasible. 
n/a
Landfill Leachate Mid-1980’s: $14.8 billion 1990: $5.7 billion 159%
Sulphur Dioxide 1980s: $1,000–1,500 per ton 
of sulphur dioxide.
1996: $90 per ton of sulphur 
dioxide.
~750%
Surface Mining $6-$12 per ton of coal $0.50-41 per ton 500%-2,300%
Vinyl Chloride $109 million per year $20 million per year 445%
Source: Hodges, H. (1997).
B.2 Discussion of a new growth cycle
Economic growth has been observed to come in waves of prosperity, each driven by the 
spread of new technologies and structural economic change. Between each period of 
growth are periods where growth has slowed as the old economic structures exhaust their 
growth potential. These “Kondratiev cycles” (Freeman and Louçã, 2001) of technological 
innovations and growth are illustrated in Figure 4.1 shows these findings as an increasing 
trend in innovation with every tightening timeframes for markets to respond. 
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For some (Perez, 2002), the next wave of long-term prosperity will in part be driven by 
improved resource productivity, notably through environmental technology.
As growing economies are always in transition (by definition) discussions of policy change 
which influence investments are, at their heart, discussions about the optimal direction of 
transition. They inevitably involve making a choice on which areas of the economy would be 
more important for the future. 
There are sufficient indications are that resource productivity could provide the driver for the 
next wave. The global market for eco-industries is likely to be hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year: Some studies evens peak of €1.7 trillion per annum (BMU 2009), and may be 
growing by around 5% per annum (Roland Berger Consultancy, 2010). Gaining ‘first-mover 
advantage’ in these technological and commercial fields can capture growing markets.
B.3 The Paradigm of the Industrial Revolution
The potential of increasing resource productivity can be considered in light of what can be 
called the biggest economic success story of history, namely, the Industrial Revolution. That 
can be described as the increase of labour productivity over 160 years. 
Compared with the typical labour productivity of the middle of the 19th century, today’s 
labour productivity in industrialized countries is easily twenty times higher. This success 
has allowed many countries and families to reach levels of wealth that were positively 
unimaginable 160 years ago. 
This increase in productivity has one striking feature: labour productivity went hand in hand 
for most of the time with gross wages per hour of work. As productivity increased, workers 
could successfully demand higher wages.  And as wages went up, employers were driven 
to speed up further increases of labour productivity. In effect, there was an eternal “ping-
pong”. The rise in wages drove greater productivity, which in turn lead to more (not less) 
economic growth. Figure B.1 shows the parallel lines of growth between labour productivity 
and wages for one country (the USA) and for one segment of time of 60 years duration.   
Figure B.1  The parallel increase of labour productivity and of gross hourly wages in the United States 
from 1947 – 2007. 
Source: US Bureau of Labor
*Output per hour of all persons.
Labour Productivity and Real Compensation per Hour
(Nonfarm Business Sector)
Real Compensation per Hour**
Labour Productivity* 
**Compensation per hour divided by the impicit price deflator for nonfarm business output.
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
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The tandem increase of labour productivity and wages can be observed in all OECD 
countries. Developing countries, beginning with China are well underway emulating the 
success story. 
The mutual causality between factor prices (as economists would call wages in this 
context) and productivity and growth gives a very different perspective on how growth is 
stimulated over time, as growth comes mainly from increases in productivity. Applied to 
another production factor – natural resources – this success story suggests another side 
to price rises of resources: that they induce productivity and growth in a dynamic, flexible 
economy.
Annex C:    Balance of trade in water embodied in products (virtual water)
Table C1:  Top-ten of net virtual water exporters (Gm3/yr) and top-ten of net virtual water importers. 
(Period 1997-2001) 
Countries 
with net 
exports
Export Import Net Exports Rank
Countries with 
net imports Import Export
Net 
Imports
Australia 73 9 64 1 Japan 98 7 92
Canada 95 35 60 2 Italy 89 38 51
USA 229 176 53 3 United Kingdom 64 18 47
Argentina 51 6 45 4 Germany 106 70 35
Brazil 68 23 45 5 South Korea 39 7 32
Ivory Coast 35 2 33 6 Mexico 50 21 29
Thailand 43 15 28 7 Hong Kong 28 1 27
India 43 17 25 8 Iran 19 5 15
Ghana 20 2 18 9 Spain 45 31 14
Ukraine 21 4 17 10 Saudi Arabia 14 1 13
Annex D:  Lessons from History on the dangers of lock-in and lack of  
   foresight
Archaeological evidence reveals such courses of decline and eventual collapse in a diverse 
array of ancient civilisations: Sumerians from Mesopotamia, Maya in the Yucatán, the 
Anasazi in the American Southwest, the Garamantian Empire of the Sahara, the Greenland 
Norse, the statue builders of Easter Island, the Nazca civilization in Peru, Great Zimbabwe 
in Africa, and Angkor Wat in Cambodia.  
These past civilisations succumbed to environmental degradation and resource depletion 
in different forms. These led to food shortages and diminishing returns on investments 
in energy and resource extraction. Weakened by this, ancient civilisations became more 
vulnerable to foreign invasions, internal conflict or simply declined. Table D1 summarises 
some of these falls.
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Table D1:  Patterns of Decline – Why Civilisations Collapsed
Angkor Wat, Khmer 
Empire, Cambodia (800 to 
1500 AD) 
Deforestation to extend their farmland up to the slope of Kulen mountain, 
80 kilometres to the north, led to flooding and huge amounts of sediment 
and sand were washed down to fill up their extensive canal water system – 
ruining the city’s water supply.69
Sumeria (Mesopotamia) Agricultural irrigation systems where underground drainage was weak, 
raised the water table.  As the water climbed to the surface, it evaporated, 
leaving behind salt. Salinisation of agricultural lands resulted in collapse 
(Jacobsen and Adams, 1958).
Garamantian Empire 
(Sahara) 500 BC – 300 AD
The Garamantian empire was made possible in the Sahara by a 3,000-mile 
network of underground irrigation canals to exploit ancient groundwater. 
Overexploitation of groundwater resulted in its collapse. 
Mayan civilization, Central 
America
Loss of soil fertility and drought from deforestation and climate change 
led to a crisis from lack of sufficient food and rising levels of internal and 
external violence (Diamond, 2005).
69
69 http://www.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/news/news/2007-10-05_khmer_kings.html, [accessed 12th April 2014]
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"Decoupling 2: technologies, opportunities 
and policy options".		The	report	was	
produced by the Decoupling Working Group of 
the International Resource Panel. It explores 
technological possibilities and opportunities 
for both developing and developed countries 
to accelerate decoupling and reap the 
environmental and economic benefits of 
increased resource productivity. It also examines 
several policy options that have proved to be 
successful in helping different countries to 
improve resource productivity in various sectors 
of their economy, avoiding negative impacts on 
the environment.
It does not seem possible for a global economy 
based on the current unsustainable patterns 
of resource use to continue into the future. 
The economic consequences of these patterns 
are already apparent in three areas: increases 
in resource prices, increased price volatility 
and disruption of environmental systems. The 
environment impacts of resource use are also 
leading to potentially irreversible changes  to the 
world’s	ecosystems,	often	with	direct	effects	on	
people and the economy – for example through 
damage	to	health,	water	shortages,	loss	of	fish	
stocks or increased storm damage.  
But there are alternatives to these scary 
patterns. Many decoupling technologies and 
techniques that deliver resource productivity 
increases as high as 5 to 10-fold are already 
available,	allowing	countries	to	pursue	their	
development	strategies	while	significantly	
reducing their resource footprint and negative 
impacts on the environment. 
This	report	shows	that	much	of	the	policy	design	
“know-how”	needed	to	achieve	decoupling	
is present in terms of legislation, incentive 
systems, and institutional reform. Many 
countries	have	tried	these	out	with	tangible	
results,	encouraging	others	to	study	and	where	
appropriate replicate and scale up such practices 
and successes. 
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